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Abstract 
 
In the last seventeen years, several high level government officials in Nigeria have faced 
corruption charges totaling $22 trillion dollars related to oil revenues. In Bayelsa State, a 
Nigerian state that produces oil, officials have been marked with high level corruption in oil 
revenue. In particular, the state faces constant conflicts among the government, multinational oil 
corporations, and the people of the state. Based on these observations, this dissertation seeks to 
understand the relationship between corruption in oil revenue redistribution and perpetuation of 
conflicts in Bayelsa State of Nigeria.  
Bayelsa State is one of the nine states in Nigeria’s Niger Delta with abundant crude oil 
deposits. Oil revenues, which constitute the bulk of Nigerian government revenue, are collected 
by the federal government and shared among the states of the federation. Since 1996 when 
Bayelsa State was created, the federal government has allocated to the state a 13% derivation, of 
excess crude, and statutory allocations share of oil revenues, worth billions of dollars. These 
allocations are constantly disputed by many local stakeholders of the oil and non-oil producing 
states. This large amount of petrol-dollars has had little effect on the pervasive unemployment, 
poverty, environmental degradation, and violent conflicts in the Niger Delta and specifically in 
Bayelsa State. The state witnesses continued conflicts. 
I argue that people’s perceptions of corruption create and/or perpetuate conflicts in 
Bayelsa State. Based on Collier and Hoeffler’s (2005) greed and grievances theory, those who 
redistribute accruals from oil revenues channel public funds for their private gains (greed) rather 
than serving the public interests for which they were elected or appointed. I also argue that anti-
corruption laws and institutions do not prevent conflict in Bayelsa State. The study’s 
methodology included interviews of Bayelsans, focus group discussions, and participant 
observation in oil-bearing and oil-impacted communities in the state, bureaucrats, multinational 
corporation officials, and politicians in Bayelsa State. The transcripts of these interviews were 
coded and content analyzed to determine dominant patterns and themes. I found that corruption 
has created and/or perpetuated a host of conflicts including intra- and inter-community conflicts, 
conflicts between militants and the government’s military task force, and conflicts between host 
communities and multinational oil corporations. The majority of citizens who feel deprived of 
their benefits from oil revenues voiced their dissatisfaction (grievance) with the way oil revenues 
were redistributed to favor very few Bayelsans. I also found that the perceived forms of 
corruption weakened anti-corruption laws and institutions thus rendering them ineffective in 
preventing violent conflicts in Bayelsa State.  
Based on the findings, I put forward some policy recommendations such as amending 
existing laws to include life ban on convicted corrupt officials, professionalizing anti-corruption 
agencies, and restricting the president from unilaterally determining the dismissal of chairpersons 
of EFCC and ICPC. If these recommendations are adopted, they will curb corruption, strengthen 
laws and institutions, improve the life of the people, and reduce violent conflicts in Bayelsa 
State.  
 
Key words: Bayelsa Sate, Corruption, Conflicts, Oil Revenues, 13% Derivation, Excess Crude, 
Statutory Allocations  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation examines the connection between the perceptions of corruption in the 
distribution of oil revenue and violent conflicts in Bayelsa State of Nigeria. In this state, 
bribery, embezzlement of public funds, cronyism, political patronage, and other related forms 
of corruption, have been on the rise since 1999. Using primary and secondary data, this study 
concludes that perception of corruption in oil revenue distribution creates and perpetuates 
conflicts in Bayelsa State. 
Nigeria is the most populous nation on the continent of Africa. The last census exercise 
conducted in 2006 its National Population Commission (NPC) puts the country’s population at 
140 million. However, census figures in the country are always disputed. In the absence of 
widely acceptable population data, scholars and organizations use population estimates for 
Nigeria. The CIA, as one of such organizations, puts Nigeria’s 2013 population at 174,507,539 
people. The country is culturally, linguistically, economically, and politically diverse. In the pre-
crude oil period, the economy of Nigeria was based on agriculture, with crops such as 
groundnuts (peanuts), cocoa, and palm oil providing the country’s foreign exchange earnings. 
Scholars of Nigerian economy associate these three crops with each of the country’s three 
dominant regions – palm oil in the East, groundnuts in the North, and cocoa in the West (Ikeji, 
2011).  
Although crude oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1958, oil revenue did not 
supplant revenue from agricultural export until after the country’s civil war. In fact, the “oil 
boom,” which was responsible for the decline in agricultural production, did not occur until the 
mid-1970s. The oil boom itself was a combination of factors, including the sky-rocketing of oil 
2 
prices owing to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Adebayo, 2012). Agricultural production was still 
strong even throughout the civil war period (1967-1970) in Nigeria. The then head of state, 
retired General Yakubu Gowon, bartered cocoa (and not oil) for weapons to subsidize the war 
(Ekpo, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2005; Ojakorotu, 2005). Since then, the country has risen to be among the 
top ten producers of oil in the world. As one of the leading world oil producers and the fifth 
supplier of oil to the United States, the country derives over 90 percent of its revenue from oil 
resources (Ikelegbe, 2005). Reporting on Nigeria’s income from oil over a nine year period, 
Global Witness (2010) stated that “Nigeria earned between 2000 and 2008 roughly US $370 
billion in oil and gas exports” (p. 6). This oil revenue is shared among Nigeria’s federal, states, 
and local governments, using a distribution formula. This revenue sharing system is often 
referred to as ‘statutory allocation.’ One of the key principles in this formula is ‘derivation’— 
through which a 13 percent portion of the oil wealth is returned to the oil producing states.  
Unlike the agricultural produce found in the three former dominant regions – East, North, 
and West – of the country, Nigeria’s oil basin is located in the Niger Delta region. This region is 
located in parts of the former Eastern and Western regions of Nigeria. The ownership, 
attribution, and control of oil, including offshore oil, remain to-date a recurring debate in 
Nigerian. While the Supreme Court of Nigeria (2002) ruled that the entire country rather than the 
states in the Niger Delta region owns the offshore crude, many writers including Ekpo (2004), 
Ikelegbe (2005), Ojakorotu (2005), and Omeje (2006), argue that one hundred percent of 
Nigeria’s onshore and offshore oil is derived from the Niger Delta region and should therefore 
receive the bulk of the revenue. The Niger Delta region is made up of nine states which are Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers (Ekpo, 2004).  
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The discovery of oil could be a huge blessing or curse to an area. As a blessing, the 
revenue from oil should create jobs, provide welfare services including unemployment benefits, 
develop infrastructure, improve security, add to the state’s pension fund, and other related 
benefits (Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, Chapter 2, Section 14 and 16). These benefits help to 
cushion the negative effects of oil exploration activities. 
Contrary to these positive expectations, some members of the Nigerian political elite 
deliberately held back statutory allocations, revenue from oil and non-oil sources, for possible 
looting (SDIC, 2008). They used the revenue accruing from crude oil to promote political, 
familial, and other self-serving interests at the expense of the majority of Nigeria (Achebe, 
2000). This situation has led some agencies like Transparency International (TI) and the World 
Bank to label Nigeria as a corrupt country (Transparency International, 2012). According to the 
TI’s annual corruption perception index (CPI) report, Nigeria has been consistently ranked 
among the most corrupt countries of the world. In the recent CPI report, Nigeria was ranked 139 
out of 179 countries studied around the world. In the study, the country scored 27 out of a 
maximum score of 100 (Transparency International, 2012). A country that scores less than 50 on 
the 100-point scale is considered corrupt. TI groups countries that score less than 30 points on its 
scale as “the worst corrupt” countries. It is on the basis of the country’s score that it was ranked 
among the worst corrupt nations of the world. One may use this score to explain the prevalence 
of corruption in Bayelsa and other states in the country.  
Many studies on corruption in Nigeria, such as Adebayo (2012), Transparency 
International (2012), World Bank (2008), and SDIC (2009), have detailed how corruption is at 
the root of most of the problems such as underdevelopment, the collapse of the Nigerian 
economy, and the lack of security plaguing the country. Indeed, available literature shows that 
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the billions of dollars Nigeria and the oil producing states make annually from oil have produced 
little real benefits to the oil producing areas. While Nigeria as a whole is lacking in basic 
amenities, its Niger Delta region has been further denied opportunities for necessary economic 
development, education, and security of life and property as special groups like political class 
and dominant ethno-linguistic groups and individuals such as governors, traditional chiefs, and 
their cronies, use up resources meant for the people (Ekpo, 2012; Ikelegbe, 2005; Obi, 2014). 
There have been constant threats to security of life and property and abandoned development 
projects including hospitals, roads, and educational institutions in Bayelsa State. The perceptions 
of Bayelsans include a deliberate neglect and abuse of power and office by those who should 
care and develop the state. One of the reason those issues emerge and are sustained may stem 
from the corrupt actions of the groups and individuals that the authors (Ekpo, Ikelegbe, and Obi) 
identified. 
The perceptions people have about the issue of blatant corruption in the distribution of oil 
revenue, including bribery, political patronage, and looting of public funds in Bayelsa State, is 
worrisome (Oyadongha, 2013; Sahara Report, 2012). The concentration of oil revenue in the 
hands of those who embezzled it and the subsequent denial of benefits to the people stirred up 
emotions in the Niger Delta region. That led the people to clamor for the right to control natural 
resources found in their area.  
As a federation, the demand for resource control has been part of the debate in revenue 
sharing in Nigeria since 1946 when the regional structure was adopted. During the 1960s, the 
country’s political elites settled for the derivation principle which allowed export proceeds from 
various agricultural products to be returned to the regions where such produce came from. As 
rising oil revenue surpassed agricultural export accruals, the same elites that embraced the 
5 
derivation principle jettisoned it for other formula like population-based quotas and equality 
distribution of funds to states.  
The Nigerian military became involved in the country’s politics and decided to 
deemphasize derivation (Adebayo, 1993). Then a new struggle began in the oil-producing state, 
calling for the reinstatement of derivation. One reason for demanding a return to the derivation 
principle was the expected returns of greater revenue to the oil producing areas (Adebayo 1993). 
The second reason was to redress what the minority groups perceived as wrongs done to them by 
the major ethnic groups (Ibekwe and Ewoh, 2012; Ikelegbe, 2006; Omeje, 2006).  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The problem this study investigates is the relationship in the perceived corruption in oil 
revenue redistribution and the creation and/or perpetuation of conflict in Bayelsa State of 
Nigeria. This study, unlike previous studies that relied on secondary data, combines primary 
and secondary data to build a strong argument connecting corruption to the creation and 
sustenance of conflicts in Bayelsa State.  
Bayelsa State, located in the Niger Delta region, was created in 1996. The Nigerian 
military governments supervised the various state creation exercise in Nigeria starting in 1967. 
The military provided some justifications for creating states including Bayelsa. Some 
justifications included: to prevent systematic genocide and ethnocide similar to what took place 
in the 1967- 1970 Nigerian civil war, to address the issues of ethnic minorities, and to promote 
rapid national development (Gana, 1987; Obateru, 1995; Ojo and Adebayo, 2008). In some 
respects, Bayelsa satisfied most of the rationale for its creation in 1996. For example, in an 
attempt to solve the lingering intra-community conflicts especially between the Nembe and 
Kalabari communities that had been escalating since the 1920s, Nembe was given to the newly 
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created Bayelsa State while Kalabari remained in Rivers State (Aluko, 2013). Also, some of the 
ethno-linguistic groups like the Izon, Isoko, Epie-Atissa, and Nembe that ended up in Bayelsa 
State felt marginalized and dominated by the more populous Etche, Ikwere, Ogoni, and other 
ethnic groups in Rivers State. Their agitation for a state may have been influenced by late Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo’s speech quoted in Ojo and Adebayo (2008). In the speech, Awolowo 
posited that, “Ethnicity is the major factor to be considered as a criterion in creating any state in 
the federation so that minority groups in the midst of majority groups who differ in language, 
culture, and historical background will not feel inferior” (p. 335-336). The creation of Bayelsa 
removed Izon and other ethno-linguistic minority groups from the major ethno-linguistic 
groups who dominated them in the old Rivers State. However, these ethno-linguistic groups in 
the new state have not found a workable co-existence formula as new minority groups like 
Kolokunu, Ekpetiama, Igbriran, Atissa, and Biseni, have found themselves in a Bayelsa State 
dominated by the Izon ethno-linguistic group. Therefore, a feeling of inferiority may, in return, 
create and sustain inter and intra group conflict in the state.  
Oil production activities in Bayelsa State and elsewhere in the region have exhibited an 
endless cycle of conflicts. Within the same communities, divisions exist between owners of 
properties where oil wells are located and owners of other properties that host oil transportation 
or storage networks. Most of the divisions are centered on compensation packages and sharing 
arrangements. This is made more complex by the on-shore and offshore dichotomy, Nigerian 
government policies, and the oil corporations’ strategies of paying off militant groups and 
covering up oil spills. Some communities that are closer to the source of power do receive their 
fair share of the 13 percent oil revenue allocation via the derivation principle. Perceived lack of 
accountability and transparency from community leaders and elected officials in some of these 
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communities, however, result in communities and individuals not getting a fair share of 
petroleum wealth made from their areas (Kromah, 2003; Nossiter, 2011). The communities and 
marginalized groups like women and youths take to violent and nonviolent protests to express 
their grievances over the management of oil resources that they feel belong to all of them. 
The governments of Nigeria and Bayelsa State have made several efforts to address 
these oil related conflicts. Such efforts include, but are not limited to, the establishment of 
agencies such as the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADC), 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
(MINDA); strengthening existing anti-corruption laws and institutions that fight corruption; 
and co-operation with international and local organizations to recover looted public funds as 
well as the granting of amnesty to militia groups. Some of these efforts yielded positive results. 
An example is the 2009 amnesty program that helped to reduce violence, kidnappings, and the 
vandalism of oil infrastructures by militants and other resource control agitators in Bayelsa. 
The program, initiated by late President Musa Yar’Adua and continued by President Goodluck 
Jonathan, granted forgiveness, training, and rehabilitation of Niger Delta militants who 
renounced violence against the state, fellow citizens, and economic base (oil infrastructures). 
But many of these efforts, including the enactment of anti-corruption laws and the 
establishment of anti-corruption agencies like the Economic and other related Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corruption and other related Practices Commission 
(ICPC) to curb conflict in Bayelsa and Nigeria, generally failed to produce the desired effect of 
curbing corruption and reducing negative conflicts associated with it.  
These agencies and laws have become part of the political patronage practices and an 
extension of cronyism in the country and the state (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Appointments 
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into these agencies are based on connections to people who are in disposition to be loyal to 
those who appointed and for a certain interest to decide (Ebipade, Bekwei, and Goodhead, 
2012). To further demonstrate that appointments to these agencies are based on connection to 
power brokers, a former chair of the Economic and other related Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC), in a letter urged former President Olusegun Obasanjo to prevail on the incumbent 
President Goodluck Jonathan to reappoint her as the EFCC chair. Under these patronage 
practices, minorities in Bayelsa State’s oil-bearing and oil-impacted communities who do not 
sponsor or support a ruling political party are denied representations in many of these federal 
and state special agencies. The beneficiaries of this corrupt appointment system first use their 
position to recover what they claim as personal expenses to gain their positions. Secondly, they 
divert a certain percentage of the public funds to pay royalties to the powers (traditional chiefs 
and political godfathers) that put and sustain them in office. The Bayelsa State Governor, 
Dickson Seriake’s removal and appointment of the local government chairmen in 2012 
confirms what Igonika (2014) characterizes as “intrigues of high-wire politicking and policy 
summersaults of politicians. They view the local governments as an ass they kick around 
through the imposition of their political sons and daughters to expand their coast of personal 
aggrandizement.” Such removal of elected officials by the governor and replacement of 
chairmen with people he personally appointed put a question mark on democracy and 
accountability in Nigeria. 
Using these agencies to settle political score rather than rigorous anti-corruption work 
could encourage the perpetration of corrupt acts such as embezzlement, stealing, and diversion 
of public funds. The perpetrators have nothing to lose because their political godfathers are in 
control of any agency or institution that may question their conducts. For example, former 
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Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha who was convicted of looting billions of naira from the 
Bayelsa State’s treasury, disgraced the state and Nigeria by jumping bail in London and 
disguising as a woman to return to Nigeria in the night. It took international pressure and 
clashes among political factions before Alamieyeseigha was arraigned in a federal court in 
Lagos. At the end of a plea deal, he served only two years in jails and was granted state pardon 
by President Goodluck Jonathan (Carroll, 2005; Daniel, Bacarese, and Hatchard, 2011; 
Offiong, 2013; Stolen Assets Recovery Initiatives (StAR)-World Bank, 2013). Compare his 
case with a jobless young Nigerian who stole a N50,000 (about $300) worth Erickson 
cellphone and was sentenced to 45 years in prison (Odesola, 2013). The weight of these two 
crimes in any criminal code are not the same. However, these two classical Nigerian crime 
cases and the punishment the legal system prescribed on two criminals show clearly partial 
treatment. Such actions would call for attention in how Bayelsans and other observers perceive 
the leaders and their unfair (corrupt) actions.  
Another instance was during the field work for this study. One of the participants 
named one former governor’s appointee, Timi Godswill (pseudonym) that represented the state 
at the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), who was indicted for embezzling N60 
million ($380,108.00) of public funds – NNDC funds which was derived from oil resources. A 
court sentenced her to three months in prison and she was not asked to refund the looted 
money. The earlier mentioned convicted former Governor Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, 
who Nigeria’s incumbent President Goodluck Jonatthan granted pardon in 2013 (Oludare, 
2013) is typical of an instance that calls attention to what people perceive as corrupt actions 
being condoned for certain individuals. Alamieyeseigha’s crime included stealing public funds, 
money laundering, abuse of office, and other corruption related crimes. The funds stolen and 
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laundered came from oil revenues that accrued to Bayelsa State while he was the governor of 
the state (StAR-World Bank, 2013).  
In Bayelsa State, contrary to the redistribution of oil revenue for the benefit of the 
people, giving them better status for social welfare, a few elected officials and bureaucrats have 
hijacked the state’s revenues. Former governors of the state, who were the chief redistributors 
of oil revenue by virtue of the powers conferred on them by the state constitution, lead an army 
of few elites who hijacked the state’s revenue for personal gains. Governor Alamieyeseigha 
who administered the state between 1999 and 2005 embezzled more than N50 billion ($800m) 
of the state’s resources, and only $620 million was recovered from Alamieyeseigha’s loot while 
$180 million remains unaccounted for (EFCC, 2004). Alamieyeseigha’s successor, Timipre 
Sylva, ruled the state between 2007 and 2011. According to Odiegwu (2012), Alamieyeseigha 
mismanaged N660.45 billion (about $4.403 billion) (Odiegwu, 2012). There still remains the 
unanswered question about what happened to the recovered $620 million.  
These actions of these elected officials and the way the state and national authorities 
and institutions protected the looters of the Bayelsa State’s resources are all what prompted the 
protests by women’s groups, seizures of oil facilities, and other violent conflicts by irate youths 
from oil producing communities (Obi, 2005; Ojakorotu, 2005; and RMAFC, 2013). The 
protesters may not likely end as long as what are being protested against persists in the state. 
 The governors in the administration of the state even use oil funds to hire private 
security guards to protect the looters of public funds. The state government, politicians, and 
local chiefs use the army, police, and other state security apparatuses to suppress communities 
and groups that demand transparency and accountability in the management of oil revenue. 
This system of using all sorts of security apparatus to suppress civil groups demanding 
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transparency and accountability from their leaders is what Obi (2010) referred to as the 
militarization of the state. Similarly, Ojakorotu, (2005) described the system as “the oilification 
of the Niger Delta conflicts.” Unemployed youths have established illegal private security 
companies that politicians and looters of oil resources patronize in order to protect their ill-
gotten gains. Politicians have resorted to using these private guards known locally as ‘thugs’ 
during elections. These practices not only make the state unsafe, but also create tensions among 
the private security companies as they fiercely compete for clients. The thugs especially engage 
in killings and maiming of those who stand in the way of their patrons’ pursuits thus creating 
intra- and inter-community conflicts, the proliferation of militia groups, and other associated 
conflicts in the state.  
1.2a Challenges for the communities 
Many communities in Bayelsa State are located in the creeks with no access roads and 
no access to communication facilities to link the countryside with the mainland. Most of the oil 
wells and storage facilities are found in communities located in these underdeveloped 
countryside (Ekpo, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2004; Olutayo, Ogundiya, and Amzat, 2009). The 
conditions of the infrastructure and communication in most of the state’s creek communities 
are very poor. Human Rights Watch (1999) reported that the creek communities are not 
connected to the electric grid; while proper sanitation and health care are available to less than 
25 percent of the riverine dwellers. Studies by Omeje (2006), Watts (2007), and Zalik (2004) 
documented the difficulties the indigenes of Bayelsa State encounter in their attempts to visit 
family and business associates located within a few miles of each other. There have been 
instances when it took several days or weeks before information was sent or received by crises 
managers living in the capital city of Yenagoa when an oil spill or other emergencies occurred 
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(Oyadongha, 2010, 2012; Vidal, 2012). The absence of these infrastructures encourages rural-
urban migration which, in turn, creates conflicts between urban dwellers and countryside 
residents, which as well, exacerbates existing tensions. 
As part of their corporate social responsibilities, Multinational Oil Companies 
(MNOCs) do invest some of their profits in community development projects in their host 
communities. Some civil society organizations, under the auspices of regional development 
agencies (RDA) and community chiefs are the major contractors and managers of the oil 
community development funds. According to people in some of the affected communities, 
officials of the MNOCs, leaders of RDAs, and community chiefs award development contracts 
for provision of health centers, bore-holes, and electricity to themselves and companies in 
which they have interests. The contracts funds are collected but the works for which money 
was collected never get executed, rather the contractors pocket the money. The community 
people believe that those contractors were never identified or arrested because the people that 
ought to identify, report, and press for their arrest are the same people that won the contracts. 
This may be the reason the leadership including government officials and chiefs have failed to 
convince people on how they negotiated and awarded contracts to companies and individuals 
that nobody could trace. Some analysts conclude that these community leaders may have 
viewed the start-up funds as an entitlement due to them as leaders of oil producing and 
impacted communities. When communities see the MNOCs as not delivering on their 
agreements outlined in their memorandums of understanding (MOU) between them and the 
communities, conflicts such as hostage-taking, violent seizures of oil facilities, and vandalism 
of oil installations do occur.  
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It is ironic that the state is also one of the most impoverished, prompting Ibeanu (2005) 
to declare that, “Those who produce wealth are the poorest and those who are wealthy take 
wealth by force” (p. 37). This situation created two main groups that oppose one another. The 
first group consist of the ‘poor wealth producers’ and the second group consist of the ‘greedy 
wealth managers.’ The goal of the poor wealth producers is to control revenue accruing from 
the wealth they produce while the greedy wealth managers want the status quo to remain so that 
they can continue to appropriate the revenue that should get to the poor. Thus, violent conflicts 
over who controls oil revenue in the state have remained endemic.  
1.2b Political and Economic Interest Groups 
Yet, except for the different ethno-cultural groups that remained fairly stable, political 
and economic groups in the state constantly experience changes in status, power, and resource 
ownership, thereby creating unstable relationships among them. The People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) that has controlled the government at the state level since 1999 but not most of the 
state’s eight local government administrations have not had good relations with the state 
government. In a political culture of ‘winner takes all,’ and the attraction of the 13 percent 
derivation (a mandatory value of oil revenues deducted and given to areas from where crude oil 
was derived), Bayelsa has been a hotbed of political wrangling. The governor used his powers 
of control over local governments to depose local administrators and appointed new ones. The 
rate of local government chairmen turnover and fatalities associated with it in the state rose 
from 30 in 2012 to 38 in 2013 (FFP, 2014). Also most of the beneficiaries of the state’s 
microeconomic program for example are PDP supporters and indigenes of Sagbama, Dickson’s 
local government of origin. Some of these appointed chairmen met stiff opposition from local 
groups. The supporters of local chairmen and chiefs deposed by Governor Dickson in 2012 
14 
have clashed with supporters of the governor’s new appointees. The clashes resulted in deaths 
and destruction of property (FFP, 2014).  
1.2c Ethnicity and Grouping Challenges 
Bayelsa State is comprised of one large ethno-linguistic group (Izon or Ijaw) and many 
other smaller ethno-linguistic groups such as, Kolokunu, Ekpetiama, Igbriran, Atissa, Biseni, 
Nembe, Ogbia, and Ogbein. Ethnicity as an identity in Nigeria has remained fairly stable over 
time. Traditionally, women, by virtue of interethnic marriage, can change their ethnic identity 
more readily than men within these patrilineal community leaders. These small ethnic groups 
always allege that the more populous Izon group is dominating every important office, and 
hence acquiring more of the resources of the state. As Morris (2014) noted, development 
projects in the state are concentrated in the state capital and other Izon ethnic dominated cities. 
Conflicts among and between these ethnic groups over the use and allocation of the state’s 
resources are constantly occurring.  
Inter- and intra-community conflicts are not restricted to ethno-linguistic groups in the 
state only. Political groups and other social groupings are involved in one form of conflict or 
the other. The PDP, the most dominant political party in the state and country, and more than 
30 other political parties in Nigeria, are engaged in the state’s politics. Politicians have used 
“thugs” during conflicts to fight their opponents and snatch election materials to enable them 
rig votes. Some of these youth supporters usually given arms during electioneering are 
abandoned after politicians win or lose elections. Arms and ammunitions given to these thugs 
are rarely retrieved once they are disengaged by their patrons (Badmus, 2010). The thugs use 
those arms and ammunitions to violently dispossess other people of their properties, kill rival 
thugs, and commit other crimes.  
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Given the foregoing one sees that, in theory, the indigenes of the state, through the 
government, own the resources but in practice, ownership of natural resources such as oil, land, 
forestry, and fish are vested in a few privileged groups. These privileged groups usually go any 
length to retain their position in power so as to retain ownership of the state’s resources as it is 
the only way to satisfy their personal interests (greed). This has prompted many people to 
agitate for resources control by the people. The agitators in the state and elsewhere in the Niger 
Delta region have been oscillating from non-violence to violence, civil actions to criminal 
actions, and a host of other approaches. The Human Rights Watch’s report (2006) on the Niger 
Delta provides evidence of these oscillations. According to the report, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s group 
used letter writing, dialogue, lawsuits, non-violence and civil actions in agitating for resource 
control. The militia groups that emerged after the death of Saro-Wiwa such as the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), and 
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), used violent approaches such as bombing and kidnapping of oil, 
government, and traditional officials in their agitation for resource control (Ikelegbe, 2001). 
The constant change in approaches has made some individuals and groups question the 
agitators’ intentions. Many of the agitators like the NDVF, MEND, and a host of other militant 
groups operating in the state have conflicting goals ranging from resource control, economic 
advancement of militia leaders, drug trafficking, and illegal trade in petroleum products 
(Omeje, 2006; Watts, 2007). The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) became involved once 
the activities of resources agitators began to undermine national security.  
In a cursory view, one sees that Bayelsa is an oil producing state comprising of many 
ethno-linguistic groups. The people who have merged as leaders in the state have continually 
robbed the people blind, leading to a number of conflicts as the people of the state continually 
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agitate for better resource management and welfare. This continuity in bad leadership and 
continued conflicts has generated concerns. This study thus seeks to research on the 
relationship between corruption in the redistribution of oil revenue and the various conflicts in 
Bayelsa State. The next section discusses in more detail the purpose of this study.  
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The major purpose of this study is to investigate the way what people perceive of 
corruption in oil revenue redistribution in Bayelsa create and perpetuate conflicts in the state. 
The specific objective is to assess the perception of the indigenes of the state on how corruption 
in oil revenue distribution creates and sustains conflicts. Other specific objectives are to find 
out from the indigenes why efforts to resolve conflicts in the state seem to have not worked, 
seek ways to address the conflicts and thereby make policy recommendations that can manage 
and prevent conflicts in Bayelsa. It is expected that the implementation of findings from this 
study can help to resolve conflicts in the state. The findings can also add to the body of 
literature on the connection between corruption and conflicts.  
1.4 Justification for the Study 
Bayelsa State was chosen out of the nine states that make up the Niger Delta region for 
this study because, relative to other states in the region, it is the only state where two former 
governors, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and Timipre Sylva, have been convicted of 
misappropriating public funds worth N710.45 billion ($6.4b) within the last ten years 
(Odiegwu, 2012). Tribunals and local courts have convicted many other civil servants in the 
state as well. In 2012 alone, twenty senior civil servants in the state ranging from assistant 
directors to directors were arraigned in courts for corruption charges such as bribery, stealing of 
public funds, and money laundering (Odiegwu, 2012). It is also the state in the region with the 
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least developed infrastructure, poor communication networks, dilapidated schools, lack of 
potable drinking water, and a low human development index especially in 
Kolukoma/Opukuma, Ekeremor, and Ogbia (Ekpo, 2004).  
Another reason why Bayelsa State was chosen for this study is the diversity of conflicts 
that exist in every part of the state. First, ethnic conflicts are frequent. The major ethno-
linguistic group, Izon, and two other groups (Attissa, and Ekpetiama) from the minor ethno-
linguistic groups in the state, are constantly involved in violent conflicts with each other. The 
feud between Izon and other ethnic groups in the area, according to Ejobowah (2000), has been 
going on for over a decade. The Attissa and Ekpetiama groups always feel that they are being 
marginalized by their Izon neighbors (Morris, 2012). There are claims of certain groups 
usurping the state’s benefits such as employment opportunities, development projects meant for 
certain geographical areas of the state, and appointments into political offices for their groups’ 
benefits at the expense of all Bayelsans. Because of its ethnic plurality, the state is best suited 
for a study of group’s perceptions of corruption involving their members and non-members. 
In addition, there are also violent confrontations between militants from the various 
ethno-linguistic groups who joined to fight the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and 
MNOCs operating in the state. Those groups seem to put their differences aside and form a 
united front in their struggles against the FGN and MNOCs for resource control, and against 
environmental degradation. For example, MEND, a militia group operating in the region, draws 
membership from all the ethnic groups in Bayelsa and other Niger Delta States. MEND was 
formed with the belief of taking on the FGN and MNOCs that exploit the region and its people 
(Hanson, 2007; SIDC, 2008). For these reasons, the Bayelsa State is best suited for the study.  
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1.5 Main Research Question and Hypotheses 
The main research question is: How does perception of corruption in oil revenue distribution 
create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State?  
This dissertation hypothesizes that: 
H1: Perceptions of corruption create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State.  
H2: Anti-corruption laws and institutions do not prevent conflict in Bayelsa State. 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has eight chapters. Chapter 1 has already been discussed. The 
remaining other chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the history of Bayelsa 
State, along with a description and discussion of the geographical location of the state, its 
people, and resources. Chapter 3 presents a review of existing literature on the independent 
variable (corruption) and the dependent variable (conflicts), specifically in relation to Nigeria. 
For the independent variable, corruption, the analysis will concentrate on its forms and effects 
on the society. For the dependent variable, conflict, the analysis seeks to address types of 
conflicts and factors that cause conflicts especially in oil revenue redistribution in Bayelsa State 
and Nigeria. This chapter also looks at how the internal systems – ethnic relations, traditional 
class structures, company/community/government relations, anti-corruption laws and 
institutions, and prebendal culture in the state are created and/or perpetuated by corruption.  
Finally, Chapter 3 highlights applicable theories in the study of corruption and conflict. 
The relevant theory for this dissertation is greed and grievance theory (Collier and Hoeffler 
2006). This theory is found to be the most suitable because it provides an understanding of the 
link between motivations for corruption (greedy behaviors or private interests) and grievances 
in a society. Conflicts lie at the intersection where those who believe that it is their right to 
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determine what other people get in the society and those who believe that those self-made 
determinants of other people’s entitlements are depriving them of their benefits as members of 
the society. In other words, greed begets grievance. Informal power network systems help to 
sustain this self-made state benefit determinants. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methods used in this study. This chapter is divided into sections 
including the conceptualizations and operationalization of key variables. It as well deals with 
the adopted research design, sampling (i.e., the sampling frame, sample size, and sampling 
approach), the nature of the data collection procedures, and the approach to data analysis. 
Chapter 5 discusses three sources of oil revenue and acts of corruption in the process of 
redistributing revenues accruing there from the state. The primary and secondary data collected 
during the researcher’s fieldwork is presented using appropriate tables. Chapter 6 presents and 
analyzes data sets on the perception of people on corruption in oil revenue redistribution and 
how they create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa. Findings in this chapter will help 
answer the main research question as well as provide support for hypothesis #1 stated above.  
Chapter 7 presents and analyzes data on the working of the anti-corruption laws and 
associated institutions such as Chapters 12 and 38 of the Nigerian Criminal Code that deal with 
corruption and its related offenses; and the law courts, ICPC, and EFCC, agencies that the 
country put in place to interpret and enforce anti-corruption laws. This chapter presents and 
analyzes data on how these laws and institutions work in Nigeria. The findings provide support 
for hypothesis #2. For example, the study finds that existence of these laws and institutions and 
the selective manner in which they have been applied did not prevent political office holders in 
the state from looting public funds. The United Nations through its specialized agency, StAR, 
is currently helping the state recover some of the funds looted by its former officials. This 
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effort of the United Nations agency is what the Nigerian anti-corruption laws and institutions 
ought to have done in the first place if they have been effective. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the findings from this study. Among the major findings 
are that the state relies almost exclusively on oil revenue for its sustenance thereby leaving 
other natural resources in the state underutilized. The culture of looting public funds, favoritism 
in the sharing of public benefits, bribery, and other forms of corruption ensured that the state’s 
resources are concentrated in the hands of the few. The masses of the people, who suffer the 
most as the few enrich themselves with resources that belong to all Bayelsans, react and 
compete violently for crumbs left behind by their leaders. They are also pushed to participate in 
dreadful acts by their ‘greedy’ political patrons. Violent competitions pit different groups, 
factions, and socio-political networks in the state against one another.  
Patronage and network systems created and, or weakened anti-corruption laws and 
institutions thereby rendering them ineffective in fulfilling the purpose for which they were 
created. The behaviors of state leaders further weaken mechanisms that are supposed to prevent 
corruption and the subsequent conflicts. Based on these findings, Chapter 8 provides some 
policy recommendations that if considered and implementedcould help reign in corruption 
which is associated with violent conflicts in the state. This chapter also discusses the limitations 
to this study, ethical considerations, and future research direction on corruption especially at 
the local level.  
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Chapter 2  
About Bayelsa State of Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of Nigeria’s geo-political arrangement, the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria, and Bayelsa State. It also contains a detailed discussion of Bayelsa State 
including but not limited to its creation in 1996, location in Nigeria, state and local 
administration, population and resources. This overview is necessary in understanding the 
economic importance of Bayelsa State to Nigeria’s economic viability, the various vested 
interests in the crude oil deposit in the state, and how the state is run by political leaders. 
2.2 Nigeria’s Geo-Political Arrangement 
The country was divided into six geo-political zones to enable an even spread of 
opportunities and to establish stability. The zones are North-Central, North-East, North-West, 
South-East, South-South, and South-West. Following the return to civilian rule in Nigeria in 
1999, after decades of military administration, the PDP, one of the key political parties in 
Nigeria, has ruled the country and dominated the Bayelsa State government. The leaders of PDP 
reached an understanding with other members of the party that a rotational presidency, which 
creates an opportunity for each of the six geo-political zones of the country to produce in 
sequence the presidential candidate for the country, was the best way to ensure political stability 
in the country. For an opportunity and the envisaged stability to occur, the country was divided 
into six geo-political zones. Other political parties that contested the 1999 election which ushered 
in the civilian administration in Nigeria and its 36 states also adopted this rotational presidency 
policy. This policy required that if a party’s presidential candidate for a general election came 
from a northern zone, for example, the party should pick its next presidential candidate for the 
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next election from one of the other zones. This rotational formula, however, did not entirely 
eliminate political problems. There were still contentions in the subzones in producing 
candidates for the zones that gets a turn to produce the next president. Within each subzone, 
there exist multilayered groups including ethno-linguistic, economic blocs, and kingmakers 
contending for the ‘all important presidential seat.’ In such divided society, potential conflict 
recipes include ethnic fragmentations, informal powers, and group interests’ dominance.  
It is important to note that this zonal arrangement was not incorporated in the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN). The reason this zoning system was not 
inserted in the constitution was because the power brokers in the north and south political divides 
have refused to accept any arrangement that tends to make the two divides equal (Odiegwu, 
Ubabukoh, Baiyewu, and Okpi, 2012). Protecting the interests of the zones that nominated them, 
the framers of the constitution never discussed or voted for such arrangement during the 
constitutional conference. Consequently, the politicians and their respective political parties 
agreed, in principle, to adopt the zone system in allocating seats within the parties. Zone system 
was used during the 1999 general elections but overlooked in subsequent elections.  
Nigeria’s South-South zone is made up of six states, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, and Rivers (Figure 2.1). These states are located in the areas colored in light blue. 
Bayelsa State is the southernmost, located on the west side of Rivers and south of Delta States. A 
major characteristic of the states in the South-South is that they are all oil-bearing and oil-
impacted communities. Oil-bearing communities are those communities that have crude oil 
deposits. Oil-impacted communities are those that may not necessarily have crude oil deposits 
but are impacted by oil exploration and processing activities such as oil pipelines traversing 
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through them, oil spills polluting their environment, and lands taken from them for oil storage or 
flow stations. 
Figure 2.1: Map of Nigeria Showing the Six Geo-Political Zones 
 
Source: Google images 2013. 
2.3 Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region 
The six oil-producing states in the South-South geo-political zone are joined by Abia, 
Imo, and Ondo States to make up nine states classified as the greater Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria (Figure 2.2). Abia and Imo States are in the South-East while Ondo State is in the South-
West geo-political zones respectively. The Niger Delta region is Nigeria’s economic base. All 
the off-shore and onshore oil that account for more than 80% of the country’s annual revenues 
are derived from the Niger Delta (Obi, 2002; Ojakorotu, 2005; Omotola, 2010; Osaghae 1995). It 
is also on record that this region is notorious for violent conflicts among the various contending 
interests groups such as resource control agitators, Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), 
24 
criminal gangs, and Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs) (Abdallah, 2012; Akinola, 2012; 
Ejibunu, 2007; Henderson, 2013). 
2.4 The Geography, Population, Politics, and People of Bayelsa State 
2.4a Geography and Population 
The dynamic history and politics of Nigeria have, many times, placed Bayelsa State in 
different geo-political zones. During the colonial era, it was part of the Southern Protectorate of 
Nigeria. When in 1954 Nigeria was divided into three regions, the area remained in what was 
then known as the Eastern Region. With the country gaining independence in 1960, the 
independent government retained the regional system but the 1966 first military administration 
of a post independent Nigeria discontinued the regional system and created 12 states from the 
existing regions. Again, parts of Bayelsa remained in the East Central State of Nigeria. Another 
state creation exercise in 1973 conducted by then military government of Murtala Mohammed 
and Olusegun Obasanjo put the whole area now called Bayelsa State, into Rivers State of 
Nigeria. Then in the last state creation exercise conducted by the Sani Abacha military regime in 
1996 Bayelsa was carved out from the Rivers State. The state’s name was derived from three 
original local government areas (L.G.As) (Brass, Yenagoa, and Sagbama) that formed the state.  
Currently, Bayelsa State has a total of eight L.G.As (Table 2.1). Yenagoa L. G. A, which 
is the state’s capital has more infrastructural development projects than the other seven LGAs. 
Most of the other L.G.As lack basic infrastructure and lie deep in the creeks. The lack of 
infrastructure in most of the creeks makes residents in such areas to migrate to Yenagoa, 
Akaubiri, and Akaba (Ekpo, 2004).  
Bayelsa is among the states that share Africa’s largest wetland (Nwankwoala, 2012). Its 
population is 1,703, 515 people which is 1.22% of Nigeria’s population (National Population 
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Commission, 2006). It is the least populated state in Nigeria. The local governments and their 
corresponding populations are shown in Table 2.1 below. Figure 2.3 which follows Table 2.1 
shows location of the eight L.G.As of Bayelsa State. 
Table 2.1: Bayelsa State’s L.G.As and Population 
 
LGA POPULATION Percentage 
Brass 184, 127 11 
Ekeremor 269,588 16 
Kolokuma/Opokuma 79,266 5 
Nembe 130,966 8 
Ogbia 178,606 11 
South Ijaw 321,808 18 
Yenagoa 352,285 20 
Sagbama 186,869 11 
Total 1,703,515 100 
Source: Nigerian National Population Commission 2006. 
 
 
Fig 2.3: Map of Bayelsa State of Nigeria Showing Local Government Locations 
 
 
Source: www.googleimages.com. 
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Bayelsa State is bordered by Delta State in the west, Imo State to the north, and the 
Atlantic Ocean to the south. Bayelsa was administered by five military administrators prior to 
1999 when Nigeria returned to civilian rule. The number of successive elected and appointed 
civilian governors in the state since its creation prompted additional attention of researchers 
studying the state. 
2.4b Politics and State Administration 
The administration of Bayelsa State is structured like other states of the FRN and in 
accordance with the constitution which provides that the state establishes an executive branch of 
government headed by an elected governor. The governor is the Chief Executive of the state and 
performs all the functions associated with the office including but not limited to the appointment 
and supervision of members of the state executive council (i.e., commissioners), top civil 
servants, and local government chairmen, as well as the creation of new kingdoms in the state, 
and management of other non-human resources (e.g., oil, timber, and fish). All seventeen 
ministries and their political heads known as commissioners, the Deputy (Lieutenant) Governor, 
74 Special Advisers, 163 Special Assistants, and a host of other political and bureaucratic offices 
created by the state government report directly to the governor (Miepano, 2012; NairaLand, 
2012).  
Figure 2.4 below gives a pictorial representation of the state’s administrative structure. 
Some extra units including Special Assistants, Permanent Secretaries, and Directors General, are 
not represented in the figure to avoid overcrowding the organizational chart. Only the governor’s 
office, deputy governor, special advisers, commissioners, and secretary to the state government 
are depicted. 
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Figure 2.4: The Organizational Structure of Bayelsa State 
 
  
Consistent with military regimes that created and had governed the state, the military 
appointed its officers to govern the state from 1996 to 1999 when the country reverted to civilian 
rule. Table 2.2 below presents a summary of the governors of the state from its creation to the 
time of writing this dissertation. A total of four military administrators and seven civilian 
governors including the incumbent Governor Dickson Henry Seriaku have ruled the state since 
1999. Four out of these seven civilian governors were elected while the remaining three acted as 
governors following political conflicts that have dogged the state. Table 2.2 lists the military 
administrators and civilian governors of the state, their time in office, the type of mandate, and 
how their tenure ended. 
  
Executive 
Governor
Dickson Seriake Henry
74 Special Advisers
Commissioners of 
17 Ministries or 
Departments
Secretary to the 
State Government
Edmund Allison-Oguru
Deputy or 
Lieutnant 
Governor
Gboribiogha John Jonah
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Table 2.2: Past and Present Governors of Bayelsa State 
 
Governor  Tenure of Office Type of Mandate How Tenure Ended 
Ayeni Philip 10/7/1996-2/28/1997 Military Administrator Military Reshuffle 
Daura Habu 2/28/1997-6/27/1997 Military Administrator Military Reshuffle 
Omoniyi Caleb 6/27/1997-7/9/1998 Military Administrator Military Reshuffle 
Obi Paul 97/9/1998-5/29/1999 Military Administrator Military ended Rule 
Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha 
5/29/1999-12/9/2005 Elected Governor Impeached for 
corruption 
Goodluck 
Jonathan 
12/9/2005-5/29/2007 Constitutional 
Replacement (CR) 
End of 
Diepreye/Goodluck 
term 
Timipre Sylva 5/29/2007-4/16/2008 Elected Governor Court nullified 
Election 
Werinipe 
Seibarugo 
4/16/2008-5/27/2008 CR Re-Election of Sylva 
Timipre Sylva 5/27/2008-1/27/2012 Elected Governor Supreme Court 
Decision forced him 
to step down 
Nestor Binabo 1/27/2012-2/14/2012 Speaker of State House 
of Assembly & CR 
Election of Seriake 
Dickson 
Dickson Seriake 
Henry 
2/14/2012-Date Elected Governor Still in Office 
Source: Dickson, S.H. (2013). Administrators of Bayelsa State.  
 
Apart from the bureaucracy and its hierarchies, each governor is assisted by a deputy or 
lieutenant governor, secretary to the state government, commissioners, special advisers, and 
many other aides in the administration of the state. The governor and his deputy are elected in a 
single ballot. The state’s constitution empowered the governor to appoint his executive council. 
The commissioners are politicians, and are members of the state executive council (Figure 2.4). 
Though the governor appoints them, they must be confirmed by the State House of Assembly 
(BSHA). The appointment of special advisers and assistants are not subject to SHA’s approval. 
2.4c Traditional Administration in Bayelsa State 
The traditional administration of Bayelsa State is based on hierarchical chiefdoms. The 
highest kingdoms are called ‘First-Class Communities’ headed by ‘First-Class Chiefs.’ There are 
twenty-four such first-class communities ruled by first-class chiefs. The remaining two other 
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hierarchies are second-class and third-class communities. Second-class communities are ruled by 
second-class chiefs. The number of second-class chiefs in the state is not fixed unlike the first-
class chiefs. And finally, third-class chiefs rule third-class communities (Bayelsa Portal 2013). In 
order of reporting, the third-class chiefs reports to second-class chiefs. The second-class chiefs 
report directly to the first-class chiefs while the first-class chiefs report directly, depending on 
the circumstances, to the governor. Only critical matters like an incident that can threaten oil 
production or life of the people are reported directly to the governor by the first-class chiefs. 
None critical issues are reported to the chairman of the state’s council of traditional rulers by the 
second-class chiefs. The council was headed as at August 2013 by King Joshua Igbagara, the 
king of the Ibeni-Oyiakiri Clan.  
There are indeterminate numbers of third-class chiefs. Some first-class chiefs can create 
and install third-class chiefs as they deem fit subject to approval by the state government. The 
ranking of a given chief determines the amount of entitlements he gets from the state and some 
businesses operating in his sphere of authority. Some critiques of the system of stratifying the 
state into first-, second-, and third-class communities point to the tension it creates among the 
chiefs (Akinola, 2012). An example was a narrative provided by one of the participants in the 
study. According to an interviewee, a late King of Okpoama, (a first-class chief) demanded a 
certain amount of money as royalty from a late second-class chief of Lobia II Community, in 
whose jurisdiction two oil wells existed. The refusal of the second-class chief to comply with this 
demand was suspected to be behind the mysterious attack on his palace, which subsequently led 
to his death. These first-class chiefs, by virtue of their positions, are nearer to the center (i.e., the 
governor of Bayelsa), and therefore can and do abuse their powers with little or no 
consequences.  
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The closeness of these chiefs to the state’s power center prompted Ibeanu (2002) to 
argued that “the closer a person is to the center, the greater his/her payoff” (p. 165). The payoff 
received by the first-class chiefs comes mostly from bribes paid by oil companies operating 
within their domain and from illegal taxes imposed within the kingdoms which agrees with the 
belief of the interviewee who narrated the issue between the late chiefs of Okpoama and Lobia II 
communities in the previous paragraph. Ikelegbe (2005) agrees in his work titled “The Economy 
of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria” when he postulated that, “the initial 
access to these benefits (different forms of payments. Settlement, incorporation, and pacification 
strategies) for individuals, groups, and community were restricted to the traditional rulership 
structures, local elites, and businessmen” (p. 216). The hierarchy of the chiefs in Bayelsa State is 
represented in Figure 2.5. 
 
Fig 2.5: The Chart of Traditional Administration in Bayelsa Stat
 
24 First Class 
Chiefs
Third Class 
Chiefs
Third Class 
Chiefs
Third 
Class 
Chief
Second Class 
Cheifs
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2.4d Ethno-Linguistic Groups  
There are nine main ethno- linguistic groups in Bayelsa State, the Izon, Kolokunu, 
Ekpetiama, Igbriran, Atissa, Biseni, Nembe, Ogbia, and Ogbein. The largest is Izon or Ijaw. 
National and state demographics do not show the exact population of these ethno-linguistic 
groups. At best, the NPC provides total population of citizens in a state and could breakdown the 
demographics based on gender and age categories such as children, youths, and adults. What is 
known and even admitted by the Bayelsa State’s ethno-linguistic groups is that the Izons are in 
majority. A lesson that may have prevented the release of much information on ethnic 
composition and dominance may come from the 1995 Rwanda’s Hutu and Tutsi groups’ episode. 
In 2013, a staff of Bayelsa State Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in an interview for 
the figures of the ethnic composition of the state, only referred to the Bayelsa State Portal and the 
2006 Nigerian Census figure for the state. The portal only provided ethno-linguistic composition 
of the state without giving population figure for each group. The 2006 census figures did not 
provide any figures or percentage composition of the ethnic groups. It rather showed total 
population of the state, gender composition, and age group categories of the population.  
2.4e Traditional Occupation of the people of Bayelsa State 
Bayelsans are mainly farmers known for fishing, crop production, lumbering, and palm 
oil milling. In the Sagbama local government alone, 90% of its 186,869 population (see Table 
2.1) is engaged in agro-based occupations such as cassava production, fishing, and palm oil 
extraction (Alagoa, 1999). Other notable occupations in the state include local brewing (palm 
wine tapping and local gin production), trading, carving, and weaving. The Southern Ijaw area of 
the state brews high quality local gin. An interviewee in this study stated that fishermen and 
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other people who work in the swamps are the primary consumers of this locally brewed gin. This 
interviewee further said that the local gin keeps the body of a consumer like fisherman and rice 
grower warm as he or she works in Bayelsa’s swampy areas. 
2.4f Natural Resources of Bayelsa State  
Natural resources such as arable land, fishing, and forestry were in abundant supply in the 
Bayelsa State prior to 1956, and these resources defined the traditional occupations (farming and 
fishing) of the Bayelsans. The discovery of crude oil in Oloibiri in 1956, an area in Ogbia Local 
Government Area of the state, changed the livelihood patterns and economy of the state from an 
agricultural-production-dominated economy to an oil-dominated state, especially after the oil 
boom of the 1970s.  
The history of crude oil production in Nigeria is not complete without a reference to 
Oloibiri in Bayelsa State where the first oil well was sunk. Although this state was where 
commercial crude oil exploration started in Nigeria, Bayelsa is not the highest oil producing state 
in the country. Evidence from the 13% derivation given to each of the nine oil producing states 
showed that the state is ranked third, behind Akwa Ibom and Rivers States (Abdallah, 2012). 
There is also much oil-related infrastructure in Bayelsa State such as a refinery, gas plant, and 
crude oil pipelines.  
These facilities provide jobs, income, and development to the state and its inhabitants. 
However, it is important to point out that the income generated from oil fluctuates due to 
unstable oil prices in the international market, conflicts in the oil producing areas, sabotage of oil 
pipelines, and flooding such as the one that ravaged the region in 2012 (NNPC, 2013). In 
addition to oil, the state is endowed with other natural resources like fish, clay, and lumber. 
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Table 2.3 below shows major natural resource deposits and the parts of the state where they are 
found. 
Table 2.3: Natural Rresources of Bayelsa State 
 
Natural Resources Major Location  Product and End-
use 
Bye-products and 
End-use 
Crude Oil Ogbia, Nembe, Odi, 
and Kolokuma 
Crude oil for export 
and local 
consumption 
Petro-chemical 
products, drugs, and 
energy uses 
Fish Brass, Southern 
Ijaw, Ekeremor, and 
Nembe Local 
Government Area 
Food consumption, 
fish oil and other 
drug,  
Fish meal for animal 
feed 
Cassava  Yenegoa, Ogbia Food consumption, 
drugs, textile 
accessories, animal 
feed, and paper 
Animal feed and 
industry composite-
bread 
Rubber  Ogbia, Yenegoa, 
and Kio Sagbama 
Rubber/plastic 
products 
Household and 
industrial 
containers, soccer 
balls, shoe glues and 
other leather works 
Rice  Ogbia, Silga, 
Ynengoa, and 
Akassa 
Food consumption, 
beverage, and other 
industrial raw 
material 
Rice, hash, stalk, 
and paper board 
Maize  Ogbia, Yenagoa, 
and Kio Sagbama 
Food consumption 
and industrial 
alcohol 
Animal feed 
production 
Oil Palm Ogbia, Yenagoa, 
Northern Silga 
Touniberi and Ama 
of Sagbama 
Domestic oil, 
pomade, industrial 
oil, and related 
products 
Seed and drug 
production 
Sugar Cane Ogbia and Silga Brown sugar-food, 
bahum, 
Confections, drugs, 
industrial alcohol, 
and fuel 
Molars-industrial 
alcohol sludge, 
fertilizer, and paper 
Honey  Northern Bayelsa Sweetener, food, 
and drug  
 
Gin  Ekeremor, Silga, 
and Ogbia 
Industrial alcohol  
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Timber  Ogbia, Ekeremor, 
Logs, Yenagoa, 
Kio, and Sagbama 
Saw mill, boat 
building, wooden 
furniture and 
fixtures, building 
construction, and 
chemicals 
Briguet, paper 
board, and wooden 
crates/containers 
Sea Shells Brass, Nembe, 
Ogbia, Silga, and 
Ekeremor 
Building lime, white 
wash, calcium 
concentrate for 
animal feed, and 
toothpaste 
 
Clay/Laterite Ogbia, Yenagoao, 
North Silga, 
Sagbama, 
Kolokuma, and 
Ookuma 
Red burnt brick, 
ceramics, land 
blocks, and mortar 
 
Sand  Nun R, Forcados, 
kolo Creek, and 
Epie coastal areas 
Glass making, 
construction 
industry, and chips 
 
Natural Gas (LNG) All flow stations in 
the state 
Fuel for industry 
and domestic uses, 
petro-and chemical 
production 
 
Water Resources All over the state Crops production 
and animal 
husbandry 
 
 
Sources: Ekpo (2004, p. 116)  
 
It is evident from Table 2.3 that Bayelsa State is richly endowed with natural resources. 
Ogbia, Yenagoa, and Sagbama stand out among the resource rich areas. Many of these areas 
have large deposits of crude oil as well, but they lack access routes because a majority of the 
state are in the hard-to-reach creeks. They rely on routes from non-resource rich communities 
for access to their communities.  
2.5 Bayelsa State Oil Revenues 
The Bayelsa State’s oil revenues are derived from three sources: a statutory allocation, 
the 13% derivation, and an excess crude account. The 13% derivation is a form of compensation 
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paid to areas where the natural resource (crude oil in this case) is derived. The excess crude 
revenue is the surplus revenue that emerges after a budgeted oil output is reached. All oil 
producing states receive additional revenue from the proceeds of the excess crude. Statutory 
allocation is a combination of oil and non-oil revenues collected by the federal government on 
behalf of all the states, and redistributed to all thirty-six states and the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT) of Nigeria by the FGN. A detailed discussion of these three routes is provided in Chapter 
3, and how much revenue Bayelsa generated from these three sources in the 2011, 2012, and 
2013 fiscal years is provided in Chapter 5.  
This study examined only the state’s oil revenues from these three routes. It did not 
include federal and local governments’ revenues that are also expended in the state and also 
under the control of various elite groups. How much the state made from these three oil revenue 
routes and how the state government redistributes them are all presented in Chapter 5.  
One may argue that crude oil deposit in Bayelsa State is a blessing to its people but other 
people could argue that Bayelsa State’s crude deposit is a curse to the state. According to the 
views of authors who oppose the idea that Bayelsa’s crude oil deposit is a blessing, deprivation 
of means of livelihood for many Bayelsans, threat to life and property of citizens, and lack of 
development infrastructure among other curses are what the people face daily because of the 
presence of crude oil in their land (Henderson, 2013; Tamuno and Felix, 2006; Whaley, 2008). 
In addition, McFubara, Edoni, and Rose (2012), noted that inhabitants of the state are among the 
poorest in the world with a high mortality rate of 717.4/100,000. Dirt and environmental 
pollution associated with oil exploration continue to pose health risks to the state where 67% of 
the population lacks access to adequate sanitation (Whaley, 2008). Crude oil theft, as well as 
diversion and misappropriation of revenue from oil, are rampant (Obi, 2002; Ojakorotu, 2005; 
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Osaghae, 1995). Specifically, lucrative illegal oil deals and claims of entitlements by oil 
producing communities, ruling elites, and their intermediaries have given rise to insurgency in 
the area (Ejibunu, 2007; Omotola, 2006; Whaley, 2008).  
With a population of less than two million people, many wonder why Bayelsa State lags 
behind other oil producing and non-oil producing states in Nigeria that are larger in population. 
Bayelsa officials often defend this perceived sense of underdevelopment of the state to its 
youthfulness relative to Rivers State and other oil producing states. They further claim that the 
topography of the state, the devastating effects of over five decades of oil exploration activities, 
and other natural disasters like flooding and mudslide have combined to hamper the development 
efforts of the state government. Rivers State, one of the oil producing states from which the state 
was carved out, has a population of 5,185,400 (NPC, 2006). It has swampy areas like Bayelsa as 
well, and yet it has developed key infrastructure and it is relatively more peaceful than Bayelsa.  
Critics of the government like Ebipade, Bekewei, and Inanife (2012), while admitting 
that decades of oil exploration contributed to the slow pace of development, have blamed the 
lack of progress on high level of corruption and continuing conflicts in the state. They also 
point to the state’s almost exclusive reliance on oil revenue leaving other potential important 
revenue resources such as fish, lumber, and property taxes largely untapped. 
2.6 Justification for the Creation of Bayelsa State 
Many reasons have been advanced to justify the creation of Bayelsa State in 1996. Two 
contending views, the government and its critics, have provided reasons to justify state creation 
in Nigeria. From the government’s perspective, state creation exercises help to bring government 
nearer to the people, foster national development, and protect minority interests. From the 
perspective of the critics of state creation, especially scholars, states are created to compensate 
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political loyalists, promote ethnic nationalism, and get a greater share of the federal revenue 
(Elaigwu, 2007; Femi, 2011; Terzungwe, 2012).  
The desire to bring government and development nearer to the people, elimination of fear 
of political domination of minority groups by majority groups, and political patronage are among 
the reasons given to justify state creation (Oyovbaire, 2014). While some of these goals seem to 
have contributed to the development of the state, others have contributed to the present crisis. 
Delving more on the reasons justifying state creation one can see the following: 
2.6a To bring government nearer to the people  
Nigeria’s estimated population by the end of 2013 was 170 million (Subair, 2013). The 
country with a total area of 923,768 square kilometers, is equal to the combined areas of four 
states, California, Montana, Ohio, and Rhode Island (CIA, 2013). The sheer size and population 
of the country means that citizens cannot always directly see the impacts of the federal 
government situated in Abuja. Successive governments in Nigeria that embarked on state 
creation often rationalized their actions through the need to bring the government nearer to 
Nigerians.  
2.6b Faster national development  
Another argument is that development in a large country like Nigeria executed from a 
central location will be very slow. The central bureaucrats cannot adequately assess the 
development needs of over 170 million Nigerians. In some cases where development needs are 
accurately assessed and order given to implement such needs, it has been seen that warding of 
contract, executing such contracts, monitoring contractors and evaluating work done is always 
cumbersome and more challenging.  
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Bayelsa has special development needs. It is mostly a swamp with little or no access to 
roads, electricity, health care facilities, and other development infrastructure. As part of the 
former Rivers State created in 1967 to bring faster development to this part of the country, the 
Bayelsa zone was largely neglected. The development infrastructure marked for the area was 
concentrated in the Port Harcourt area (Niger Delta State Movement, 1979). Creating a new state 
out of the old Rivers State would according to the Movement reduce the concentration on Port 
Harcourt and spread needed infrastructure to the rest of the state. By decentralizing development 
through the creation of more states, the government hoped to accelerate the pace of national 
development.  
2.6c To eliminate ethnic minority political domination by larger ethnic groups  
Ethnic factors are contentious issues in the government and politics of many pluralistic 
societies like Nigeria. Of the two hundred and fifty ethnic groups in the country, the three largest 
groups, Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba, have been the hegemons in the government and politics 
of Nigeria (Jinadu 1985). It is not uncommon, therefore, that the former three regions of Nigeria, 
East, North, and West, were controlled by the three ethnic groups while the minority ethnic 
groups located in those regions were overshadowed. Leaders of the minority groups, in an 
attempt to pull their people from the shadows of their majority counterparts, agitated for state 
creation. Onyeagucha, Oronta, and Nick (1995) suggested that those who agitated for the 
creation of Bayelsa State may have envisaged its creation as a way of reducing the domination of 
the constituents of the state by their more populous Rivers State indigenes.  
However, some writers do believe that the ethnic minority leaders are not necessarily 
demanding separate states for the benefit of their ethnic groups, but for their personal gains. 
Oyovbaire (2014) and Terzungwe (2012) among other writers contend that the elites who lobby 
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for the creation of new states and local governments in their areas are not truly altruistic. These 
political opportunists see in the state creation exercise an opportunity to become governors, 
commissioners, political party leaders, or major contractors patronized by political office seekers 
(Femi, 2011). Indeed, self-interest promotion by new state creation agitators may not be 
something new because during the colonial era in Africa, most of the freedom fighters such as 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Kwameh Nkrumah, and Jomo Kenyatta ended up 
becoming the leaders of their countries.  
2.7 Economic Importance of Bayelsa State 
The economic importance of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria’s economic viability and 
political stability cannot be overemphasized. The nine Niger Delta states constitute the basin that 
holds Nigeria’s crude oil wealth. At the heat of petroleum resource ownership conflicts between 
oil producing states and the FGN, the latter claimed exclusive ownership of off-shore petroleum 
resources in the Niger Delta region. The former took the latter to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court in its ruling upheld latter’s claim. Although the controversial on-shore and 
offshore oil dichotomy removed a large sum of the estimated total daily oil production of three 
million barrels from the region, the Niger Delta Region still contributes significantly to Nigeria’s 
85% annual revenue from the oil sector. Bayelsa’s contribution to this total daily oil production 
is 30% (Bayelsa Portal, 2013). 
The significance of the state to the economy of Nigeria was further underlined during the 
peak of insurgency in 2005. Insurgent groups like MEND, NDVF, and IYC initially stated that 
they were fighting for the right of wealth producers to control the benefits accruing from the 
wealth they produced. However, as Omotola (2010) suggested in his work titled “Liberation 
Movement and Rising Violence in the Niger Delta Region,” these insurgent groups, through oil 
40 
bunkering, kidnapping, and other criminal activities they engaged in, greatly undermined 
Nigeria’s total oil output. In response to the illegal activities of the militant and insurgent groups’ 
actions, the government of Nigeria deployed troops and other state security agencies to the area. 
Thus, according to Ojakorotu (2005), the area began to be militarized and conflicts escalated. 
The escalation of conflicts between the government of Nigeria and militants in the region caused 
a decline in the country’s daily oil production output between 2005 and 2006 from 2.4 million 
barrels per day (mbpd) to 1.6 mbpd (Alison-Madueke 2006). Thus, the expected income declined 
as well, since the budget was based on oil production output of 2.4 mbpd. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the history of Bayelsa state from its creation in 1996 to the 
present. It presented the ethno-linguistic composition of the state, the various appointed and 
elected leaders since its creation, and the traditional administrative system consisting of first, 
second, and third-class chiefs. While the chieftaincy system runs parallel to the modern 
administration of the state, the chapter reveals that the two groups of elites share a common 
interest in sharing the resources of the state while the majority of Bayelsans they govern wallow 
in poverty.  
From the foregoing discussion, Bayelsa State has several natural resources that if 
developed, can supplement the revenue the state generates from oil. Bayelsa State is 
economically important to Nigeria because it is one of the major areas where crude oil deposits 
that supports the country’s economy are located. The various administrators, acting and elected 
governors who have governed the state since its creation have not made any meaningful effort to 
harness these resources towards the development of the state. As this dissertation will 
demonstrate, the only score card those administrators could show is how much they looted the 
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state’s treasury with impunity. Also as would be seen in this dissertation, some of those state 
officials who had limited access to the state’s resources opted to instigate violence as a means to 
obtain their own share of the state resources. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores existing works on three major themes of this dissertation: oil 
revenues, corruption, and conflicts. Regarding oil revenue, this study examines three major 
sources applicable to the study. They are statutory allocation, 13% derivation, and excess crude 
oil. Within the theme of corruption, I consider the concept, forms, and effects of this practice. 
Regarding conflict, I examines forms and connections between conflicts and corruption in oil 
revenue redistribution. Finally, the chapter discusses the dissertation relevant theoretical 
framework, greed and grievance theory postulated by Collier and Hoeffler (2006). I begin with 
the literature on oil revenues.  
3.2 Oil Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 
“The key mechanism linking authoritarian rule and resource dependence, both in 
democratic transition and in democratic consolidation, is an incumbent’s discretion over 
the distribution of natural resource rents.” Jensen and Wantchekon (2012). 
 
Nigerian government derives its oil revenues from the rents and royalties, as well as from 
the production and sale of crude oil and gas products. Bayelsa State’s oil revenues are derived 
from the state’s share of revenue that the Federal Government of Nigeria collects and shares with 
its federating units. Nigeria practices a federal system of government, a political arrangement 
that provides power-sharing between the central government and the government of the 
federating states. Administratively, the Nigerian federal system is made up of three tiers: federal, 
state, and local. The federal government of Nigeria is at the apex of these levels of 
administration. While this dissertation is not interested in many of the vested issues in the 
development and practice of the Nigerian federal system, it cannot avoid the intergovernmental 
fiscal relationships especially as they relate to revenue allocation.  
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Successive regimes in Nigeria, especially the military, have enjoyed the incumbency 
discretion over the distribution of the country’s natural resource rent. This discretion was not 
acceptable and so displeasing to the wealth producers who are mostly disadvantaged by the 
system because they felt that they do not enjoy the benefits of wealth they produce (Ekpo, 2004; 
Obi, 2005; Ojakorotu, 2006). In many countries where fiscal federalism is practiced, certain 
principles guide the implementation of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In their work titled 
“Fiscal Federalism and the Issue of Resource Control in Nigeria: Challenges, Options, and 
Strategies,” Ifurueze, Jibrin, and Bernard (2012) discussed many of these principles such as 
minimum provision of essential public goods, diversity, and derivation. Diversity, derivation, 
and provision of essential public goods are very important in any review of Nigeria’s revenue 
allocation formula and their link to oil revenue distribution in the country. Some of these 
principles are explained as follows:  
a. The principle of diversity: The federal system must have the ability to accommodate 
large varieties of diversity. Demand for public goods such as defense, road construction, 
and other infrastructural development projects varied across different areas within the 
country. In some major cities like Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, and Port Harcourt, some 
level of public goods exist relative to other small cities that include Warri and Yenagoa. 
The principle of diversity requires that Nigeria implements a fiscal federalism that 
accommodates these differences in the supply of public goods.  
b. Minimum provision of essential public goods and services: Buchanan (1967) defining 
public good and service pointed that “any good or service that the group or community of 
individuals decides, for any reason, to provide through collective organization 
[government] will be defined as public” (p. 11). In Nigeria, education, health care, and 
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portable and affordable water supply, are some examples of public goods and services 
that the government provides for its citizens. Most of the northern states and some states 
in the South-South were at one time classified as educationally disadvantaged states. This 
required the then governments at local, states, and national levels to, in addition to 
providing minimum essential goods and services to those designated areas, double their 
efforts through fiscal federalism to ensure those areas lagging behind were helped to 
catch up with the rest of the country.  
c. The principle of derivation: It is expected that the component units of a system should be 
able to control some of its own resources as they desire. The 1999 constitution of Nigeria 
has in its Chapter II: “Fundamental Objective and Directive Principles of State Policy” 
Section 16, Subsection 1-4 which stated that “The state shall harness the resources of the 
nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant 
economy for the benefit of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of 
status and opportunity.” In harnessing the national resources and applying the principle of 
equality, some of the areas where those resources are derived suffer. On the other hand, 
the effects of exploitation of those resources are not felt equally by areas where the 
resources are not located. Derivation principle, therefore, seem to be a response to 
deprivations resulting from economic activities. Within this definition, the derivation 
principle is the understanding that fiscal federalism should allow any area from where 
such revenue is derived to keep a part of the total revenues. This is the basis of the 13% 
derivation in effect today in the country. This principle will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
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Nigeria over the years experimented with many and modified versions of these 
principles. Notable among them are equality, population, derivation, national interest, and special 
needs (Adebayo, 1993; Obi, 2004). It is informative to note that the federal government leads 
Nigeria’s revenue mobilization and distribution. But, does the government’s leadership of 
revenue mobilization and distribution ensure fairness?  
The implications of the federal government’s control of revenue mobilization and 
distribution are visible in the endemic patronage politics that national revenue mobilization and 
redistribution are exposed to (Ahmad, 1994; Frynas, 2000). According to the 1999 Nigerian 
constitution, all revenues accruing to the federation are kept in the federation account from 
where it is distributed among the three tiers of government. Most of the states and local 
governments in Nigeria depend on federal allocation for survival because their internally 
generated revenue (IGR) is not sufficient. The Nigerian states and local government areas were 
created out of existing regions and states by military administrations in Nigeria. This is unlike 
what is obtainable in the United States where states elected to join the union.  
One of the criticisms of state and local government creation in Nigeria is that the military 
junta that created them succumbed to interest group pressure and failed to consider the viability 
of such geo-political units (Osaghae and Onwudiwe, 2007). It is left to the more viable states 
and, indeed, the federal government to heavily subsidize state and local governments that are less 
economically endowed. 
The Nigerian annual revenue accrues mostly from the oil sector. Indeed, following the 2004 
Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) recommendation, 
petroleum revenues from the federation account were shared among the three tiers of 
government in this order: 
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 Federal Government of Nigeria ______________ 52.68% 
 State Governments _______________ 26.72% 
 Local Governments _____________ 20.60% 
The Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform (NDCBP), an umbrella of civic organizations in 
the region, states that “the funds distributed among the different tiers of government from the 
federation account is based on the federal annual budget estimate for the price of crude oil in the 
particular year ($30 in 2005, $35 in 2006, $59 in 2008, and $45 in 2009)” (p. 11). How do these 
sharing ratios work with the various principles listed amount? This study attempts to answer this 
question by examining each of the major principles Bayelsa and other states of the federation use 
in obtaining their share of the federation account.  
3.3 The Derivation Principle 
The derivation principle simply means that a percentage of the revenue generated from 
natural resources is given back to areas from where the natural resources were derived. This is in 
addition to the general percentages every state and local government receives. The 1999 
constitution capped oil revenue derivation at 13% for oil bearing communities. Commentators of 
Nigeria’s revenue allocation trace the controversy to the late 1950s when the Philip’s 
Commission made certain recommendations on revenue sharing for Nigeria’s federal structure. 
In the history and politics of revenue allocation in Nigeria using the derivation principle, the 
Macpherson administration allocated 100% of the proceeds to regions where the revenue was 
derived. A few years after Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the 100% derivation was cut in half 
(Adebayo, 1993).  
The post-colonial 1963 Republican Constitution of Nigeria clearly allocated 50% of 
federal revenue to regions where such revenue was generated. Detailing this derivative principle, 
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the 1963 Republican Constitution stated that, “There shall be paid by the federation to each 
region a sum equal to 50% of (a) the proceeds of any royalty received by the federation in 
respect of any minerals extracted in that region; and (b) any mining rent derived by the 
federation from within that region.” The Shehu Shagari administration further slashed the 
derivation principle to a mere 2% before the current 13% cap (Osaghae and Onwudiwe 2007). 
Nigeria was initially divided into three regions following the adoption of the 1954 Littleton 
Constitution. These regions have been dominated by Nigeria’s three major ethnic groups as I 
stated in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Many contend that the 50% status quo would have 
remained untouched were it that the major ethnic groups host Nigeria’s oil deposits. 
The sharp reduction of revenue sharing based on derivation is among the grievances of the 
Niger Deltans against the Nigerian government. Some state governors follow the same procedure 
to share state allocations to communities within their respective states. Some community and 
ethnic leaders from the region saw the reduction as part of the majority ethnic groups’ greed in 
which they sought to grab everything their less powerful minority ethnic counterparts owned. 
Indeed, Obi (2005) noted that the three majority ethnic groups, the Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba, 
orchestrate this systematic reduction of receivable income and other compensations of the 
minority ethnic groups in the country.  
In a minority on minority conflict, some state governors are alleged to have used their state 
allocations to favor communities and associations close to them (Ebipade, Bekewei, and Inainfe 
2012). In a 2013 interview with Isu (pseudonym) he said that, the Delta State Micro Economic 
Fund, established primarily to provide economic empowerment to rural people, has become a 
political patronage fund as it gives loans to families and members of the ruling party.  
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3.4 The Principle of Equality of States and Population 
The federal government of Nigeria (FGN) wanted a simple formula. After giving the oil 
producing states their share (by derivation), the amount left to be shared among the states were 
split into two. One part would be shared by population – meaning the needs of each Nigerian 
must be met. The other part will be shared based on the principle of equality of states – on the 
notion that every state has the same responsibilities, bureaucrats to run. Note that ‘population’ 
really was the federal government’s idea of operationalizing ‘need.’  
This principle of derivation has continued to generate conflicts among the presumed 
beneficiaries and losers of the formula. At a certain stage, the FGN, jettisoned this derivation 
principle for ‘equality and population’ (Obi 2002). This principle of equality of state and 
population uses a two-stage calculations in the allocation of oil revenue from the federation 
account. Stage one implies that part of the accruals from the federation account are to be shared 
equally among the thirty-six states and the FCT. Stage two involves distributing the remaining 
amount based on the population of the states. A look at the population distribution of Nigeria’s 
170 million people according to states can help to show which states would be the largest 
beneficiaries of oil revenue if this approach were adopted. 
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Table 3.1: Population distribution among the states in Nigeria 
S/NO NAME OF STATE POPULATION 
(million) 
OIL BEARING STATE (OBS) OR 
NON-OIL BEARING STATE 
(NOBS) 
1 Abia 2,881, 380 OBS 
2 Adamawa 3,178,950 NOBS 
3 Akwa Ibom 3,902,051 OBS 
4 Anambra 4,177,828 NOBS 
5 Bauchi 4,653,066 NOBS 
6 Bayelsa 1,706,515 OBS 
7 Benue 4,223,641 NOBS 
8 Borno 4,171,104 NOBS 
9 Cross River 2,892,988 OBS 
10 Delta 4,112,445 OBS 
11 Ebonyi 2,176,947 NOBS 
12 Edo 3,233,366 OBS 
13 Ekiti 2,398,957 NOBS 
14 Enugu 3,267,837 NOBS 
15 Gombe 2,365,040 NOBS 
16 Imo 3,927,563 OBS 
17 Jigawa 4,361,002 NOBS 
18 Kaduna 6,113,503 NOBS 
19 Kano 9,401,288 NOBS 
20 Katsina 5,801,584 NOBS 
21 Kebbi 3,256,541 NOBS 
22 Kogi 3,314,043 NOBS 
23 Kwara 2,365,353 NOBS 
24 Lagos 9,113,605 NOBS 
25 Nasarawa 1,869,377 NOBS 
26 Niger 3,954,772 NOBS 
27 Ogun 3,751,140 NOBS 
28 Ondo 3,460,877 OBS 
29 Osun 3,416,959 NOBS 
30 Oyo 5,580,890 NOBS 
31 Plateau 3,206,531 NOBS 
32 Rivers 5,198,716 OBS 
33 Sokoto 3,702,676 NOBS 
34 Taraba 2,294,800 NOBS 
35 Yobe 2,321,339 NOBS 
36 Zamfara 3,278,873 NOBS 
37 FCT Abuja 1,406,239 NOBS 
Source: Census figures taken from the Nigeria National Population Commission (2014). 
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From the table above, the principle of equality gives every state and the FCT Abuja an 
equal proportion of the oil revenues through the federation account. The population principle 
provides additional revenues to states that have bigger populations than their counterparts with 
smaller populations. Based on the population principle alone, and comparing potential oil 
revenue that could accrue to Bayelsa, as an OBS, with a population of 1,706,515, and Kano, a 
NOBS, with a population of 9,401,288, it is clear that Kano’s statutory allocation accrual would 
be much larger than Bayelsa’s. Some potential conflicts that could emerge from this arrangement 
include inter-state, inter-ethnic, client-patron friction, and government versus community 
clashes. There are also potential issues of greed and grievances between those that would receive 
more revenue and those that receive less revenue. 
3.5 The Principle of National Interests 
In the principle of national interests, the federal government has the power to overrule the 
principles of equality, population, and derivation to allocate revenue to any state or local 
government of the federation if it deems it necessary to protect the country’s national interest 
(Omotosho 2010). Since there is no clear definition of what constitutes a national interest, 
opponents of this principle denounce it on the ground that it lacks objectivity. It is also criticized 
because it could be considered a blank check in the hand of the government to buy favor from its 
supporters. Those who support this principle like Eson (2010) and Ikeji (2011) argued that it 
helps the national government especially during emergence situations, wars, and natural disasters 
to channel funds to the most affected areas or to join international efforts that promote Nigeria’s 
national interests.  
Following the diplomatic row between Mandela’s South Africa and Abacha’s Nigeria in 
2006 that resulted in the latter’s boycott of the 2006 African Cup of Nations hosted by South 
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Africa, many questioned the justification of the large amount of funds Nigeria gave to the former 
anti- apartheid movement, African National Congress (ANC) during its struggle with the 
apartheid regime. ANC is now the ruling political party in the Republic of South Africa. 
Successive Nigerian governments before the Abacha junta justified the use of funds from the 
national interest allocation to fund the ANC on the ground that a liberated South Africa is 
Nigeria’s national interest. By the same token, one of the grievances of the Niger Deltans against 
the use of the national interest paradigm is their perceived sense of injustice (Ojakorotu 2006). 
They contend that if national interests are rightly interpreted, areas that sustain the country ought 
to be given priority when sharing revenue. Similar national interest argument has been used to 
justify the allocation of more petroleum funds for the development of Abuja as the national 
capital. However, one may want to rethink what constitutes national interests and how best to 
serve them. Some Niger Deltans may question whether Abuja, far removed from the economic 
base of the country, is of more national interest than areas where the nation’s economic 
foundation is located.  
3.6 State and Local Government Revenue Allocations  
As the federal government supervises the states and local governments, so do states 
supervise and control local governments. With the various local government reforms and the 
power of state governors to create autonomous communities (cities) out of existing local 
governments and appoint local administrators, opportunities are created to promote local 
patronage networks. We have seen above that the constitution provided 20.6% of the revenue 
from the federation to the local governments. The states, including Bayelsa, receive the local 
governments’ share from the federation account and disburse it through the state revenue 
allocation process. As argued by Olofin, Bello, Salisu, and Olalekan (2012), such revenue 
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transfer from the federal government to the local governments through the state influences 
economic activities and growth in the country. But many have questioned the degree of such 
influence and growth given what each level of government claimed to have disbursed or 
received. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution provided in Chapter VI, Part C, Section 162 revenue 
allocation principles. However, what is being practiced contradicts most of these principles. For 
example, oil blocks were allocated to political allies, goods and service that may be enjoyed only 
by a few privileged Nigerians are projected as public goods and services.  
Most of the reviewed literature like those by Adebayo (1993) and Obi (2004) on the 
modified revenue allocation principles in Nigeria like as well as those on the economic activities 
and growth spurred by federal allocations to local governments through states (Olofin et al., 
2012), seem to overlook how such principles and practices may have crippled economic 
activities and growth in the country. The authors did little to show how these allocation 
principles may have contributed to the corruption of resources revenue managers and in the 
process created and/or sustained conflicts. Looking at oil revenue allocation in particular, the 
application of the derivation principle may have achieved negative results given the persistent 
violent demand by most Nigerians in the oil producing states for resource control. Equally, the 
percentage of Nigerians who actually benefit from the principle of equality in the sharing of oil 
revenue is contentious. In using population principle rather than derivation, the government 
creates several issues. One of such issues is that areas that support the economy suffer 
deprivation of benefits of natural endowment since they may have low population (Table 3.1). 
Second, population figures are contentious in Nigeria. Funds that would have been used in 
providing infrastructure in areas classified as low population areas are diverted to high 
population areas. Note that low population areas do not accept their population figures as 
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accurate. They often accuse the National Population Commission (NPC) of manipulating the 
figures. Even high population areas still believe that the commission undercounted them. 
Thirdly, a high population area that has no natural resource deposit may be encouraged not to 
control its population knowing full well that it will benefit more than areas from which the 
national revenues are derived. Now I turn my attention to the literature on the corruption in 
Nigeria. 
3.7 The Concept of Corruption 
The term corruption has various definitions. Generally, it is a situation in which public 
office is used for personal or private gains (Transparency International, 2012; Triesman, 2000; 
World Bank, 2013). Shaxson (2007) contends that interpreting corruption along the spectrum of  
‘Public office for personal gain,’ is too narrow. For an expanded meaning of corruption, 
Shaxson says that corruption should be viewed from “how people perceive and relate to each 
other, not just how they behave” (2007, p. 1127). Nye (1967) states that corruption is a 
“behavior which deviates from formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (p. 419). Some public office holders 
see their position as an opportunity to provide jobs for members of their immediate families, 
sell public property, and award contracts at ridiculous prices to family and friends in apparent 
disregard for due process. Some public leaders totally privatize public affairs using the 
proceeds to buy favor from potential competitors while the public suffers. Viewed from any 
angle, corrupt behaviors generally serve personal interests of those involved. 
However, not all appointments, contract awards, and other related actions that seem to 
be in favor of a leader’s constituents amount to corruption. In certain cultures, people are more 
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productive when they work with people they have known for a long time. It is evident that by 
working with trusted hands, a good governance system is established. Leaders who have 
worked with members of their families, schoolmates, and peer groups for a long time know 
how passionate each of these subsets are when it comes to serving the interest of the public. 
Rarely can you find a member of an inner circle of a good leader betraying the trust placed on 
him or her. If most people have the interest of the public at heart, the urge to satisfy private 
interests at the expense of the general will could be resisted. Suppressing private interests is one 
of the best anti-corruption mechanisms (Irwin, 2009).  
Traditionally, many Chinese administrators in the public and private sector are those 
that were born together, schooled, worked, and did most things together. The idea is that having 
done many things together for a long time, these groups build trust among themselves. This 
trust is carried into the public and private arena. Appointing lieutenants from within a trusted 
circle does not necessarily amount to or encourage the practice of corruption. It does not 
necessarily follow that every aspect of caring for one’s close family, close associates, and/or, 
profiting from a person’s effort undermines the public’s interests.  
But Nye’s position represents mostly Western interpretation of collectivist cultures of 
most developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In collectivist cultures, civil 
servants and private workers prefer working with persons, family members, schoolmates, and 
peer groups, they have long associated with. Wilmot and Hocker (2007) suggested that long 
relationship helps people to build trust in collectivist societies hence workers in Asia and most 
African societies’ preferred co-workers that they have interacted with over time. This can mean 
that a supervisor that worked with his or her subordinates for a long time is better placed to 
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know the behavior of each staff member. Sufficient knowledge of potential workers can help 
select good people who can render dedicated and honest services to the public. 
This study agrees with the view that corruption in public affairs is not only contrary to 
legal and moral norms but also undermines the capacity of the state to secure the welfare of all 
its citizens (Osoba 1996). Whether corruption is viewed from a moralistic or systemic 
perspective, the baseline is that it is anti-norms, and, that it benefits private rather than public 
interests. Next I explore works on forms and effects of corruption. 
3.7a Forms of Corruption 
Scholars like Carl (1972) Lawal and Tobi (2006) and Morris (2011) identified two 
broad categories of corruption. The first category involves behaviors of elected officials hence 
its name ‘political’ corruption. Carl (1972) explains the concept and effect of political 
corruption on an organization by arguing that it occurs “when a power-holder who is charged 
with doing a certain thing… is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced 
to take actions which favors whoever provides the rewards and thereby damage the group or 
organization to which the functionary belong” (p. 10). The United Nations Oil for Food 
Programme in Iraq was closed because of the magnitude of corruption involving UN officials, 
contractors, and officials of the Iraqi government. For Morris (2011), political corruption 
occurs at the highest level of a state’s institutions, including the three branches of 
government—the executive, judiciary, and legislature. However, political corruption, as was 
the case of New Jersey’s bridge closure which was intended to punish political opponents of 
Governor Chris Christie, may occur without the knowledge of the highest level of a state.  
The second category of corruption is perpetrated by career civil servants and therefore 
is called “bureaucratic corruption.” Within this functional division of a society, Dike (2005) 
56 
separates political corruption from bureaucratic corruption by positing that “bureaucratic 
corruption occurs in public administration or the implementation end of politics. It is the kind 
of corruption the citizens encounter daily at places like the hospitals, schools, local licensing 
offices, police, taxing offices, and on and on” (p. 2). Explaining how bureaucratic corruption 
occurs in the health sector, Lantham (2001) and Vian (2008) argue that bureaucrats in the 
public health sector prefer expensive hospital construction, high tech equipment procurement, 
and prescribe costly drugs for treatments because of higher bribes manufacturers and suppliers 
of these costly construction materials, equipment, and drugs offer them. Savedoff (2006) 
identifies the perpetrators of corruption in the health sector as payers, regulators, consumers, 
medical equipment suppliers, medical staff, and other actors in the field of healthcare delivery. 
Instead of explaining corruption from the above two broad categories, Morgan (1998), the 
World (Bank 2011), and other writers on corruption provide us with expanded forms of 
corruption such as bribery, theft of public funds, distortions of government expenditure, 
patronage, and cronyism that can occur in any society. I examine these expanded forms of 
corruption in the next five paragraphs relying mostly on Morgan’s (1998) classifications of 
corruption that includes bribery, theft, distortion, patronage, and cronyism. These are further 
examined below. 
Bribery is the most talked about act of corruption. It features in writings by scholars like 
Adebayo (2012) and; Morgan (1998); organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2000), Transparency International (TI, 2012), and the 
World Bank (2008). The World Bank (2008) defines bribery as “one of the main tools of 
corruption. They can be used by private parties to ‘buy’ many things provided by central or local 
governments, or officials may seek bribes in supplying those things.” Bribery according to 
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OECD (2000) is “the offering, promising or giving of something in order to influence a public 
official in the execution of his/her official duties” (p. 3). The two beneficiaries of bribery are the 
payer and receiver.  
The payer commits the crime of paying, offering, or promising a bribe or an undue 
advantage to an official while the receiver receives or agrees to receive the bribe or the undue 
advantage (World Bank, 2011). For example, according to Donovan (2008) and corroborated by 
George and Lacey (2006), a $180 million bribe was paid by a Halliburton/TSKJ’s Chief 
Executive to Nigerian government officials during a multi-billion dollar Bonny Island LNG 
Project contract bid. This bribe created two beneficiaries—the executives of Halliburton who 
secured the contract and the Nigerian officials who received the payoff. 
Theft and Money Laundering also known as pillage or stealing, constitutes another 
severe act of corruption committed through the privatization of state assets by enterprise 
managers and other officials in transition economies. A subset of this is petty theft of items 
such as office equipment, stationery, vehicles. According to Morgan (1998), looters of public 
funds steal tax revenues, fees, cash from the treasury, and extend advances to themselves that 
are never repaid. Abiodun (2012) and Nnochiri (2012) in their respective works on Bayelsa 
State noticed that theft and money laundering is prevalent mostly among Bayelsa’s middle and 
low level bureaucrats. 
Distortion of Government Expenditure occurs when government spending is 
distorted by the officials, in order to benefit or serve their private interests. The decision can 
include delaying the award of contracts or revising upwards the contract costs. Amuwo (2012) 
argued that “public servants and elected officials can cause delays so they could get 
opportunities to extract bribes, individual bribers can improve their personal situations at the 
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expense of the polity, the net loser” (p. 173). Other ways to distort government expenditures 
can include duplication of contract awards and accepting a poor job done by a contractor as a 
quality job. 
Patronage: According to Morgan (1988) is “an instrument through which political 
power is acquired and maintained by granting economic advantage to backers in exchange for 
political support” (p. 32). Through patronage, economic activities are regulated by the political 
office holders to give advantages to their supporters. Such advantages include licenses, 
employment, and other related economic benefits, given to their favorites and powerful 
businesses so as to expand their support networks (Joseph, 2014; Mohammed, 2011; Root, 
1998). The expansion of this support network provides security for both the client and his or 
her patron. Indeed, Joseph (2014) argued in his work “Democracy and Prebendal Politics in 
Nigeria,” that clientilelism in Nigerian society has become a viable means Nigerians use to 
“move upward socially and materially; such individuals also come to accept ties of solidarity 
and continued advancement as well as their own” (p. 55). Patronage system allows informal 
powers to flourish. Therefore, while the social and material security of the few clients and 
patrons is guaranteed by patronage, majority of the citizens may be threatened daily by social 
and material insecurity.  
Cronyism is a situation in which personal relations supersede existing rules and 
regulations in the conduct of public affairs including economic, political, and social matters. 
This corrupt act contrasts with rule-based practices that put relationships below rules and 
regulations guiding the conduct of official activities (Hooke, 2008). Cronyism in all its 
ramifications according to Joseph (2014) is “a strategy of both survival and upward mobility in 
Nigeria. It is not dismissed by the persistence of affluence for a relative few and penury for the 
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many” (p. 59). However, relationships are very important in many African and Asian countries 
prompting people from some countries in those regions to conduct businesses with individuals 
and organizations they may have close relationship with (Irwin, 2009).  
When Goodluck Jonathan, the immediate past president of Nigeria, was the governor of 
Bayelsa State, the incumbent governor, Henry Dickson, was his mentee. A personal 
relationship developed between the mentee and his mentor. It was suggested that Dickson 
promoted Mrs. Patience Jonathan to the position of Permanent Secretary (Executive Director) 
in Bayelsa State Department of Education without following the state’s civil service procedures 
for such appointment because of the long relationship between the two families. They are not 
only tied politically, the two families are members of the same ethnic group (i.e., Izon). Before 
going further, it is vital to examine conditions that may favor the occurrence of any of these 
forms of corruption. Cronyism allows informal powers to flourish. 
Informal powers are extra constitutional powers exercised by holders of offices like 
governors, commissions, and presidents. Such powers include agenda setting for the State House 
of Assembly, executive privileges and executive agreements. Executive privileges can, for 
example, be invoked by the governor of Bayelsa State to deny Bayelsans access to documents 
relating to actual amount received by the state from oil revenues. Such refusal can create and/or 
sustain conflicts between the ruling group and the opposition group. The opposition group may 
believe that withholding information relating oil revenues from them is a strategy by the ruling 
group to loot the state’s resources. Political godfathers are influential party leaders who dictate, 
who to be appointed or elected into offices (Joseph, 2014). This group of people is often referred 
to in Nigeria as “kingmakers.” A kingmaker’s demand to a governor to put a number of his 
clients in certain offices may conflict with state’s interests. This was exactly what happened in 
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2003 in Anambra State which is about 270 miles from Bayelsa State. The elected Governor, 
Chris Ngige, rejected a list of people to be appointed into his executive cabinet sent by one of the 
state’s kingmakers and chieftain of the PDP, Chief Chris Uba. For daring the kingmaker, 
Governor Ngige was abducted. Chief Uba caused the state legislature to vote for Ngige’s deputy 
to be sworn in as his replacement. The abduction and rush to replace the elected governor were 
orchestrated by Chief Uba and former President Obasanjo (Awuzie, 2004; Pana Press, 2003).  
 3.7b Conditions favoring Corruption 
Existing studies have shown that there are many conditions that could make a society or 
an organization vulnerable to corruption. One such condition is colonialism. It is argued that 
clerks who served Nigeria’s colonial authorities formed the nucleus of the country’s post-
colonial bureaucracy. These clerks came into Nigeria’s post-independence office carrying 
white-collar crime attitudes (i.e., corruption) that they learned from British colonial officials 
(Adebayo, 2012). In this case, corrupt acts like stealing, cronyism, and distortion of 
government projects are caused from a learned behavior in which it was passed from the 
country’s inherited pre-independent to the post-independent clerks.  
Also, corruption may be favored by regime types and their maturation as well as a lack 
of accountability (Adebayo, 2012; Ewoh, Matei, and Matei, 2013). On the regime type and lack 
of accountability, Adebayo suggests that military dictatorship and lack of accountability to the 
Nigerian citizens favor stealing and money laundering, cronyism, and other related acts of 
corruption in the country. Ewoh, et al. (2013) mentioned level of maturation in the democratic 
processes, stages in the integration processes, and geo-political conditions of a nation as factors 
accounting for variations in a country’s corruption. The likely dominant corruption acts in this 
situation include political patronage, and bribery.  
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Yet, another influencing factor of corruption is power imbalance and tenure of office. 
The view held here is that more powers in the hands of bureaucrats and other public officials 
who stay in office for an extended period of time lead to corruption (Ferraz and Finan 2009). 
Civil servants in Nigeria and many other places serve in one station for years. A justification 
for this extended service period is to ensure stability. But Campante, Chor, and Do (2009) 
found flaws in such stability arguments because stability contributes to corruption by creating 
room for the politically stable politicians, also known by the acronym in Nigeria as AP 
(‘Always in Power’). Their argument may explain why politicians award contracts to their 
cronies while political appointees repay political godfathers in cash and kind in order to remain 
in office longer.  
Finally, the weakness of existing anti-corruption laws and institutions in a society may 
make worse the corruption within it. Section 308 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution grants 
immunity to presidents, vice presidents, governors, and other high office holders from 
prosecution while in office. The intended purpose of this immunity clause is to prevent people 
from using frivolous law suits to block officeholders from performing their duties. However, 
some of those officeholders capitalize on this clause to elevate themselves and their offices 
above the laws of the society. Another issue is the requirement for both the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and other related Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) to obtain permission from the Attorney General of the Federation (political office) 
before investigating, arresting, and prosecuting allegations of corruption. Political associates, 
could in this case, be shielded from investigation and/or prosecution.  
People are rational actors who are regarded as autonomous agents. Humans can make 
bounded, rational, means-end calculations. As gain seekers, they are always evaluating the 
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benefits of any enterprise and its associated costs before embarking on it (Addy, 2012). This may 
mean that gain seekers could take chances if the profit outweighs the costs. In societies where the 
chance of being caught in corrupt practices is diminished or refunds of stolen funds, if caught, 
are lower than the amount stolen, the desire to engage in corrupt practices may increase. Having 
discussed the meaning and causes of corruption, this research moves to discuss the effects 
corruption has on society.  
3.7b Effects of Corruption  
The effects of corruption in a society can be positive or negative. On the positive side of 
corruption, it improves social welfare by reducing cumbersome regulations and reward poorly 
paid bureaucrats (Leff, 1964; Montinola and Jackman, 2002). Proprietors of schools and other 
enterprises, for example, can find it difficult to get approvals or permits to open schools, 
hospitals, and small businesses because of existing laws regulating the running of such 
ventures. Strict regulations can create unnecessary bureaucracy and adversely affect economic, 
political, and social advancement of a society. Bureaucrats may accept corruption and ease the 
burdensomeness of restrictive laws. Similarly, corruption in the country may serve as a reward 
for poorly remunerated employees. Montinola and Jackman (2002) alluded that developing 
countries, like Nigeria and Argentina, underpay workers. Wages in Nigeria are low even by 
comparison to other developing countries. Extra income from corruption helps low income 
workers to survive. Billon (2003) concurs by stating that bureaucratic corruption “ensures the 
survival of low ranking civil servants, even if some of their bureaucratic activities are in 
themselves questionable” (p. 415). The unanswered question is whether top civil servants are 
also fighting for survival given the evidence from Nigeria, which suggests that big time corrupt 
officials are top people in high places such as governors, ministers, presidents, and other top 
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ranking individuals in private and public sectors (Donovan, 2008; Igwe, 2014; and United 
Nations, 2013).  
On the negative side of corruption, Morgan (1998) strongly argues that “the most 
devastating consequences of bribery are usually not the cost of the bribes themselves, but the 
distortions they unleash within political and economic systems” (p. 27). Nigeria in general and 
Bayelsa State in particular are no strangers to such distortions. While billions of dollar in oil 
revenue have been received over the past several decades, little physical infrastructure is 
observable in Bayelsa or other Niger Delta states. On the other hand, the region is home to 
billionaire former governors and bureaucrats who are directly tied to oil money made from 
corrupt practices (Kashi, 2007). Their billions were generated through contract award 
duplications, distortion of the original costs of contracts, and founding and patronizing civil 
society organizations that served as fronts for funneling illegally acquired public funds 
(Timothy, 2013) (Timothy is a pseudonym for a participant in this study).  
Corruption further divides a society into opposing camps. Such camps include 
perpetrators and victims of crimes; wealth producers and those who misappropriate wealth; and 
first-class chiefs that flaunt bonuses and royalties from government and oil companies on one 
hand and on the other hand, the real owners of farmlands where oil wells and pipeline 
transverse but receive no compensation from the government and oil companies alike. Indeed, 
Johnston (1986) concludes that corruption “produces divisions and conflicts, both among those 
involved in corrupt enterprises and between those who are included and those left out” (p. 464). 
The divisions and conflicts induced by corruption are discussed later in detail in this chapter as 
well as in Chapter 6.  
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The selfish owners of the illegal oil refineries sited in private homes, thick forests, and 
creeks, the international oil bunkering cartels and their local collaborators, security personnel, 
and bureaucrats involved in the illegal oil transactions, form corrupt enterprises cliques. Those 
on whose lands and properties the corrupt enterprises cliques profit from form their own group 
with the intention to confront those feeding off their resources. Thus, potential conflicts in goal 
attainment of these two groups always exist.  
Supporting the division and conflict paradigm in corrupt societies, writers like Oji and 
Okocha (2005) and Okojie and Momoh (2005) contended that beneficiaries of a system that is 
corrupt will always clash with the victims of the system. Using Bayelsa State as an example, 
these authors associate demonstrations for and against former state administrators who looted 
the state’s resources to the complexities of the Bayelsa conflicts. This study agrees that 
divisions among the constituents of the state partly create and/or sustain conflicts plaguing the 
state.  
A divided society embroiled in conflict is unstable given that each group looks after its 
own interests rather than collective interests of the whole society. Morgan (2008) linked the 
divisiveness embedded in cronyism to instability by stating that “political instability occurs as 
excluded groups fight for political power in order to access rents produced by cronyism’s 
distorted pattern of property rights” (p. 34). Morgan’s assertion is exemplified in Nigeria’s 
Land Use Decree of 1978. The Nigerian military government promulgated the Land Use 
Decree of 1978. This decree and its subsequent amendments by civilian legislations, since the 
country returned to civilian rule in 1999, gave the government total ownership of land 
traditionally owned by families. Under the traditional family land ownership system, 
individuals inherited land from their family for generations. The 1978 Decree has generated 
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two main conflicts. The first set of conflicts generated by the Land Use Decree is land property 
inheritance versus government ownership, which can polarize society along the line of groups 
who become new land owners and the traditional land owners now rendered landless by the 
Decree. It also created litigation and enforcement problems between civil and traditional laws. 
The second set of conflict emerges from the manner of redistributing public land.  
Land acquisition and distribution in choice areas is the biggest source of cronyism. Original 
owners of the property rarely receive compensation. USAID (2010) agreed with this sentiment 
when it posited that the Nigerian land reform methods provided by the Land Use Act 
“redistribute lands that have been acquired in dubious fashion.” These new owners put little 
into public coffers before and after they have been given title to the land. The most intriguing 
part of this behavior is when one looks at who the new land owners are, how they acquired the 
property, and what they do with it. Again, USAID provides some insights on who, how, and 
what of these land deals:  
Allocation procedures are highly discretionary, allowing opportunities for corruption 
and self-dealing by state and local government officials and politicians. Individuals can 
obtain land use rights, but they have no foundation of communal land holdings and no 
presumption of inheritance within families or lineages. Registration of Certificates of 
Occupancy under the Land Use Act is costly, time-consuming, and places the land- 
certificate holder on the tax rolls (USAID, 2010).  
 
Further evidence of cronyism and what the cronies do with their corrupt wealth is 
provided by the work of Ebipade, Bekwei, and Goodhead (2012) titled “Gov. Sylva’s Corrupt 
Empire and Cronies Revealed.” The authors are of the opinion that Bayelsa State’s funds stolen 
by the governor and his fronts were spent buying choice land and property in Nigeria’s capital, 
Abuja. They also give account of the thieving culture and cronyism in the state when they 
explain that “part of the loots from Marine Maritime Limited was used by former Governor 
Sylva of Bayelsa State to award a contract to NO. 1 Property to build sixty-one (61) duplexes in 
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a choice area in Abuja. The same company was used to build another sixteen (16) duplexes in 
Abuja. The wife of the owner of NO. 1 Property is one of the best friends of Mrs. Alayingi 
Uduak Sylva.” 
As a result of cronyism, citizens who are victims of severe distortions and abuses of 
their rights to access and own land can resort to fighting for political power which is seen as an 
end to property acquisition. When they win political power, it becomes an opportunity for them 
to access rents produced by cronyism’s distorted patterns of land and other rights. The 
incumbent political power holders on the other hand will use all means available to hold on to 
power knowing fully well the implications of losing power to their opponents. The fierce 
competition that follows the interactions between these two groups intensifies.  
Corruption damages the image of a society and, affects its ability to attract investors 
from outside because people do not have trust in such informal mechanism. TI provides annual 
report about corruption in every country of the world. Investors want to be sure of the safety of 
their investment. One piece of information that helps them to make investment decisions is an 
annual report called “Corruption Perception Index (CPI)” produced by TI. Over a 10 year 
period, Nigeria has remained among the most corrupt nations group as Table 3.2 below shows. 
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Table 3.2: Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Score over a 10 year period 
 
Year Score  Remarks  
2013 30/100 or 3.0 From 2012, TI changed the 
CPI base from 10 to 100. 
Nigeria’s lower (CPlower) 
and higher (CPhigher) are 
based on 100. Ranked 
144/177 countries in 2013 
2012 31/100 or 3.01 139/176. Based on the 100 
point ranking; below 50 
points suggests serious 
corruption problem. 
2011 2.4 Last year TI used the 10-
point base to rank countries. 
Ranked 143/183 
2010 2.4 A score lower than 5 
indicates a systematic and 
serious corruption problem. 
Ranked 134/178 countries in 
2010 
2009 2.5 130/180 countries 
2008 2.7 121/180 countries 
2007 2.2 147/179 countries 
2006 2.2 142/163 countries 
2005 1.9 152/158 countries 
2004 1.6 144/145 countries 
2003 1.4 132/133 countries 
 
Source: http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2003. 
 
A decade of TI’s annual CPI results (2003-2013, Table 3.2) shows that Nigeria has had a 
miserable transparency record when compared to some other developing countries within Africa 
including Botswana and Ghana, which have continued to remain among the one hundred ‘less 
corrupt countries’ in TI’s annual reports where Iceland, New Zealand, Finland, and Denmark are 
the least corrupt countries in the world (TI Annual CPI Report 2013). The reprehensible 
consequences of corruption including low foreign direct investment (FDI) and dissatisfaction 
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among citizens of corrupt states made countries to take measures aimed at remedying the 
situation. I now move to discuss some anti-corruption measures. 
3.7c Anti-Corruption Measures 
Most of the discussions so far reveal that corruption is associated with costs such as 
creating and sustaining divisions among groups, violent conflicts, and weaknesses in the ability 
of a society’s institutions to perform effectively. To avoid the negative costs of corruption, a 
society like Nigeria puts in place laws and institutions to reduce corruption and its associated 
conflicts.  
The enactment and/or amendments of existing anti-corruption laws include: Nigeria’s 
Criminal Code with two chapters that define various acts of corruption as crime and penalties for 
violators. Chapter 12, Sections 98-111 prohibits public officials, individuals, and organizations 
from stealing, soliciting, offering, and/or receiving bribes, engaging in unauthorized buying or 
selling of any public property, extortion; and other acts deemed corrupt practices. The country’s 
regional level laws—east, north, south-south, and west—incorporated these prohibitions into 
their respective judicial systems. Another chapter is also devoted to fighting corruption, Chapter 
38, Section 4, Subsection 1, and Paragraph 9 contains the Criminal Code notoriously called 
“419.” This chapter and its sections provided for the arrest and prosecution of people involved in 
different forms of corruption including money laundering, stealing by taking, and other financial 
crimes. These constitutional provisions and their corresponding amendments are intended to curb 
corruption and perhaps push the country out of the group of most corrupt countries of the world. 
For the laws to serve their purposes, however, they have to be enforced.  
Establishment of special anti-corruption agencies and institutions: The country’s 
constitution clearly stipulated the procedures for prosecuting individuals or organizations found 
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in violation of the anti-corruption laws with the accompanying sanctions for anyone convicted 
by the law court or tribunals established for that purpose. The establishment of agencies and 
institutions such as the Independent Corrupt and other Related Practices Commission (ICPC), 
Economic and other Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Law Courts, and Prison 
Services are intended to help in the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and enforcement of any 
breaches of the constitutional prohibitions on corruption. A brief discussion of each of these 
agencies and institutions is provided next. 
The ICPC was established by “The ICPC Act of 2000.” The agency’s mission statement 
is “To rid Nigeria of corruption through lawful enforcement and preventive measures” (ICPC 
2006). This agency has wide-ranging powers including the power to investigate and prosecute 
any Nigerian in the public and private sectors who engaged in any form of corruption. It has 
powers to investigate and prosecute public officials including the president, governor, and/or 
judge who gets involved in corruption. This agency reported several cases of corruption it 
successfully prosecuted and obtained convictions.  
According to the agency’s 2014 press releases, an account clerk, insurance 
commissioner, visa scammers, former Inspector General of Police, and fake National Youth 
Service Corps (NYSC) members were all arrested, prosecuted, or are being prosecuted by the 
agency on corruption charges. This agency’s June 2014 press release stated that a medical clerk 
was successfully prosecuted and convicted of theft. The accounts clerk received a three month 
jail term for defrauding a Federal Medical Center of N8.3 million or $51,553.00 (ICPC, 2014).  
The agency sees the successful prosecution and conviction of these public officials as a 
measure of achievement and received praises over the arrest and prosecution of the highest 
ranking police officer in the country. However, a majority of Nigerians ridiculed the court 
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system on its weak punishment of corrupt officials like the accounts clerk above. Other skeptics 
saw the agency’s report as a failure on the part of the agency to serve the purpose for which it 
was established. Most of the public reactions in the newspapers and other news media outlets to 
the report show total condemnation of the ICPC and the court for making mockery of Nigeria’s 
anti-corruption laws. One commentator asked after reading the ICPC’s press release, “Is this 
sentence a reward for defrauding the tax payers of N8.3 million?” Another commentator 
mocking the agency begged that he be given a three month jail term and be paid N8.3 million 
(ICPC, 2014). This jail sentence, according to a majority of bloggers, demonstrates Nigeria’s 
unwillingness to tackle corruption because it encouraged, rather than discouraged, people from 
engaging in corrupt practices.  
EFCC, a member of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 
(IAACA), was established by the “EFCC Act of 2002.” The agency has several responsibilities 
including but not limited to investigation of all financial crimes, enforcement of the EFCC Act, 
and collaborating with local and international agencies in matters deemed necessary to perform 
its functions (EFCC, 2002). The agency’s 2013 annual report showed that it successfully 
prosecuted and obtained convictions on 117 cases in 2013. This report did not include cases yet 
to be investigated, under investigation, or dismissed. There was no reason given for dismissed 
cases. 
The EFCC chairman admitted in the press release that the agency’s inability to convict 
alleged high-profile thieves stem from the outrageous amount of public funds those individuals 
stole. He is of the view that the high-profile thieves use their money and networks to delay 
court processes. If the amount stolen intimidates the agency that has the responsibility of 
prosecuting, where can the public whose funds have been looted go to seek assistance in 
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recovering the money? The blame may not be entirely on the agency. For example, an ex-
governor of Bayelsa stole more than $4 million from the state. This amount is more than the 
agency’s annual budget. The ex-governor and his criminal network could buy over someone in 
the Attorney General’s office and other people who directly or indirectly have supervisory roles 
over the EFCC.  
The foregoing review of the literature on corruption in general, and corruption in 
Nigeria in particular, reveals much about the crisis that a developing country, like Nigeria, 
faces, especially when that country is dependent on a single source for its revenue. I turn next 
to the literature on conflict. The question, ‘How does corruption create and/or perpetuate 
conflict in Bayelsa State?” will be a pertinent one to answer. The next section of this chapter 
examines the concept of conflict in an attempt to engage with the question.  
3.8 Conflict 
Interactions among people can lead to disputes. Disputes are negotiable. During 
negotiations, parties to a dispute can reach a compromise, and no significant changes may 
occur in a society’s institutions and structures (Burton 1990). Conflict goes beyond disputes 
and it connotes behavior of actors that can destroy lives, properties, institutions, and structures 
of a society. Writing on the behavior of parties to a conflict, Coser (1967) postulates that 
conflict is “a struggle over values, and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which 
the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the rivals” (p. 8). Similarly, 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Hugh (2011) posited that conflict is “the pursuit of 
incompatible goals by different groups” (p. 30). The pursuit of different goals diminishes the 
ability of parties in a dispute to compromise, negotiate, and/or avoid significant changes in the 
institutions and structures of their societies.  
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In his work on constructive conflicts, Kriesberg (2007) threw light into the behavioral 
attributes of people in a conflict. He identifies common behaviors in conflict situations to 
include attacking the other party, demanding that an adversary must change, or arousing and 
mobilizing members of their group for the struggle with opponents. The mobilization of 
support for a party can energize it to continue the fight especially if it has the potential to do 
well or retain control over a territory (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). This belief is informed by 
four components of conflict, identity, grievance, goals, and methods which have profound 
implications on the destructiveness of the conflict episode. Indeed, Kriesberg (2007) 
summarizes these four components of conflict and their destructiveness, which I have included 
in Table 3.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3:  
Conflict Components, Their Negative Effects, and Corruption Link When Escalation Occurs 
Components  Negative effects Corruption link 
Identity  Exclusive of other parties; 
Ethno-nationalism; 
Defining self by opposing others 
Cronyism, patronage, 
diversion of 
property/projects 
Grievance  Believe existence is threatened; 
Feel humiliated by other parties; 
Historical trauma 
Looting or stealing, 
patronage, and cronyism 
Goals  Assume to be in zero-sum 
conflict; 
Seek destruction of other parties; 
Seek revenge 
Looting, bribery, 
patronage, and diversion 
Methods  Believe violence is the only 
recourse; 
Indiscriminate violence allowed 
Bribery, looting, and 
patronage 
Source: Kriesberg (2007), “conflict components and destructiveness” with some modifications. 
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The summary of conflict components and their associated negative effects reveals a 
linkage to conflicts and also indications that conflicts exist in various form and between different 
people such as ethnicism, intra- and inter-communities, and interpersonal. I turn to types of 
conflicts in order to look more into these linkages.  
 Types of Conflicts 
Conflicts can be international and domestic. International conflicts involve individual 
groups, governments, and non-government organizations across national borders. Domestic 
conflicts occur within a country. Note that some domestic conflicts may spill across borders. 
This study focuses on domestic conflicts and may refer to international conflicts where 
necessary.  
Domestic conflict occurs among actors within the geographical boundaries of a given 
country (Fox, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Mazrui, 1990; Small and Singer, 1982). In their work on resort 
to arms, Small and Singer (1982) defined domestic conflict as “a military conflict within a state 
where the national government is one of the active parties and where both parties in the conflict 
can and intend to struggle despite any costs” (p. 210). The authors further suggest that 
destruction of villages, lives, infrastructure, legitimacy, and other related costs of war by 
government and its internal opponents do not diminish the intent of fighters to fight on.  
According to Omeje (2006), domestic conflicts in Nigeria include conflicts between 
government and militia groups in the Niger Delta region, between Niger Delta communities 
and Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs), and among interethnic groups. This study 
focuses on Bayelsa State’s domestic conflicts. The next sections examine Bayelsa State’s 
dominant conflicts and their causes. 
3.9 Dominant Conflicts and their Causes in Bayelsa State 
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Even before Bayelsa State was created in 1996, its communities had been embroiled in 
various kinds of conflict. In this subsection, I discuss the major conflicts and factors that create 
and/or sustain them in the state.  
3.9a Intra- and Inter-Community Conflicts 
A communication expert, Pace (1983) asserted that a conflict-free society will never 
exist. In a scenario where people are forced naturally or by human action to live and work 
together, he argued “antagonism, tensions, aggressions, stereotypes, negative attitudes, and the 
frustrations of perceived conflicting needs will always be present” (p. 59). Pace’s view 
prompted many authors to believe that in intra-community conflicts, groups within a given 
community engage in sharp disagreements and spend resources struggling over power and 
control rather than collaborative problem solving (Baxter, 2006; Coleman, 1995; Osaghae, 
1995; Quanantelli and Dynes, 1976). Such conflicts can set factional leaders against each other 
in many ways such as disagreements over policy and implementation strategies, disputes over 
perceived personal interests, and a history of disagreements among leaders. Thus, the intra-
community conflicts among the Ogonis pitched late Ken-Saro Wiwa’s faction against Lekara 
and other Ogoni factional leaders (Osaghae, 1995). Most of the intra-community conflicts 
revolve around leaders who seek to promote private interests (greed) at the expense of the 
communities they lead. 
The self-gain pursued by many serving and potential community leaders in oil 
producing areas of the Niger Delta prompted Omofonmwan and Odia (2009) to argue that in 
the process of negotiation, these leaders “are more interested in what will benefit themselves 
and their immediate family members at the detriment of their respective communities” (p. 25). 
As in any conflict, intra-community conflicts affect community cohesion. In extreme cases, 
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lives and properties are lost. The ‘Ogoni four’ and ‘Ogoni nine’ may not have occurred were it 
that the actors were not engrossed in greed. The Ogoni four led a faction of the Movement for 
the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) while the Ogoni nine led another faction of MOSOP. 
Ogoni nine leaders accused Ogoni four leaders of taking money from government and MNOCs 
and abandoning the Ogoni struggle. The Ogoni nine, according to indictment charge against 
them assassinated the Ogoni four on mere suspicion of collaborating with government and 
MNOCs. The Ogoni nine were summarily tried for murdering the Ogoni four and executed. 
Similarly, Ebipade, Bekewei, and Goodhead (2012) associate the 2012 removal of most 
of the former elected chairmen of Bayelsa’s eight LGAs by the incumbent Governor Dickson 
Seriake, to his personal desire to put his cronies in power. The authors suggested that 
corruption allegations against those elected officials leveled by the governor were baseless.  
The governor’s action only created tension among the electorates and supporters of his 
appointees for the vacated LGA seats. It also exacerbated the intragroup tensions in the state. 
The division and heightened tensions sparked off violent conflicts which the Fund for Peace 
(FFP) organization (2014), reports resulted in the deaths of dozens of people in the state.  
 
3.9b Inter-Community Conflicts 
Unlike conflicts that occur among groups within a community, sharp disagreement can 
arise between a community and its neighbors. For clarity, inter-community conflicts are 
restricted to those occurring between communities within an ethnic group. This clarification is 
necessary to avoid confusing it with inter-ethnic conflicts. In a study titled “Anthropology and 
the Study of Conflict: An Introduction,” LeVine (1961) clarified the concept of inter-
community by positing that it “covers the entire range of levels above a single community but 
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within one ethno-linguistic entity” (p. 4). In this regard, conflict between two communities in 
the Attissa ethno-linguistic group is an inter-community conflict. 
Circumstances that cause inter-community conflicts such as stratification of the 
traditional rulers in the state, domination of a group, humiliation, succession to vacant 
chieftaincy stool, especially in places where more than two communities make up a kingdom, 
and the scramble for scarce resources get reinforced. Such is the case in Agbere community 
where twelve people including a policeman died following a tussle over who succeeds the 
sacked paramount ruler of the community (Osun Defender, 2014). Some first-class chiefs in the 
state, as part of the small percentage of elites that benefit from oil revenues, are ex-
communicated by their subjects during conflicts. Such Royal Fathers are no longer seen as the 
custodians of the traditional culture of the state and fathers to their kingdoms. As stated by 
Opene (2013), the powers and benefit structures of first-class chiefs spike tension between 
them and the other lower tiers of chiefs. One of the informal powers of first-class chiefs is to 
determine who gets employed based on the employment quota given to their respective 
communities (NGO Community Assessment Report 2013).  
Conflicts among ancient communities that form part of the modern Bayelsa State may 
not have been created by oil revenue according to Ikein, Alamieseigha, and Azaiki (2008). The 
authors believe that Nembe’s attack on Akassa in 1895 was not because of oil deposits in the 
latter, but the humiliation of the Nembe community by the Akassa-based Royal Niger 
Company (RNC). The Nembe Kingdom believed thatits Akassa neighbor and host of NRC’s 
provided the company a platform to launch an attack on the kingdom and its people. 
However, wealth accruing from oil resources in recent years has perpetuated inter-
community conflicts in Bayelsa State. Using data from the Nigeria Watch Organization and 
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Partners for Peace, the FFP carried a longitudinal study of inter-ethnic conflicts in Bayelsa 
State between 2010 and 2014. The study showed that the incidents and fatalities of inter-
community conflicts in Bayelsa State doubled in 2011 compared to 2010. It spiked for the year 
2013 when compared to the 2012 period. Another trend in the study showed a 280% rise in the 
incidents of conflicts from January 2013 to June 2014 as shown in Figure 3.1 below. Although 
the study shows a decline in fatality figures since January 2014, this may not mean that 
violence has been eliminated in the state’s conflicts.  
 
Figure 3.1: Conflict Risk Factors showing Incidents and Fatalities of Ethnic Conflicts in 
Bayelsa 
 
  
Source: Fund for Peace (2014). Web Map platform 
 
Other causes of inter-community conflicts include diversion of government projects, 
bribery, patronage, and cronyism. Such conflicts may spill over to ethnic conflicts especially 
where the neighboring communities are of different ethnic groups. 
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3.9c Inter-Ethnic Conflicts 
In many multiethnic countries of the developing world, the politics, economy, and 
society are dominated by ethnic strife (Kanbur, Rajaram, and Varshney, 2011). Ethnicity is 
described as a socially constructed phenomenon that assigns a sense of shared traits and 
communal identity which distinguishes one group from other groups in a society (Nnoli, 1978). 
Thus, making such distinction may create boundaries, which, in the course of multilayered 
interactions with other groups, make each ethnic unit jealously guard and promote their 
interests at the expense of other ethnic units resulting in some greedy behaviors on the part of 
ethno-linguistic groups who dominate a society. Other ethno-linguistic groups being dominated 
respond with a list of perceived grievances they claim to suffer in the society. Indeed, Kanbur 
et al. (2011) postulated that the construction of ethnic groups and ethnic consciousness in the 
minds of a people “are not simply received at the local scale but are reworked in relation to 
local politics, economic, and social dimensions” (p. 148). This may explain why removal of an 
elected local government chairman, employee of a public agency, and/or use of a given 
language in public office, even when justified, is interpreted from an ethnic lens.  
By reworking the ethnic consciousness, people may be creating boundaries between 
those who share the same common language, birth, and other related markers of identity and 
other people who share different identity markers. For example, in the historical context of 
Nigeria, citizens have always identified themselves as members of one of the over 250 ethnic 
groups in the country (Nnoli, 1978; Obi, 2004; Osaghae, 1986). One of the consequences of 
such identity marking is tension in the sharing of public goods among the different groups in a 
society that perceive themselves as different from the other (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Public 
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goods include state provided development projects, employment opportunities, scholarships, 
and political appointments.  
Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2005) associate the probability of civil war to 
ethnic fractionalization. The Ijaw/Itsekhiri ethnic war over the location of Warri South local 
government headquarters (IRBC, 1999); the appointment of persons to key government 
positions based on patrimonial networks (Obi, 2004); and the citing of development projects as 
well as response patterns to issues affecting a particular group or region in the society are 
caused or sustained by private interests of leaders, government, and multinational patronage 
systems and rewards, and a lack of fairness over the subnational management of natural 
resources revenue (Salawu, 2010). Inter-ethnic group conflicts have resulted in thousands of 
deaths and displacement of people in Nigeria. In a historical study of the ethnic Ogoni uprising, 
Osaghae (1995) found that the 1994 violent conflicts which broke out between Ogonis and their 
neighboring Andonis and Okrikas destroyed more than ten of their villages for no apparent 
reason, killing 1,000 Ogonis and rendering about 30,000 homeless (p. 337). Many of these 
conflicts and their impacts may result from or reinforce the manner of oil revenue distribution.  
3.9d Company-Community Conflicts 
Extractive companies like Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria 
(SPDC), TOTAL, Chevron, and other related oil corporations that operate in oil fields in 
Bayelsa State oil fields have bases located inside communities in the state. These communities 
commonly referred to as ‘host communities,’ provide sources of raw materials, space for 
establishing companies’ physical infrastructure, and other operating supports to companies. The 
company operations usually create both positive and negative impacts in the society (Blowfield 
and Frynas, 2005). The expected positive impact includes jobs creation, maximization of 
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profits for company owners, compensation to property owners affected by oil operations, 
development of host communities, and revenue for the government (Dahlsrud, 2008, Ojo, 
2012). When properly managed, a company’s positive impact in its host community results in 
mutual benefit for the community and company.  
On the negative impact, many people have argued that the majority of a community’s 
population bears the burden while a small minority benefits from the positive impact of 
corporations operating in a society. This has prompted Renner (2002) to assert that “in many 
developing countries, the economic benefits of mining and logging operations accrue to a small 
business or government elite and to foreign investors” (p. 8). The elites, traditional rulers, and 
government officials (Obi, 2010; Ojo, 2012; Shaxson, 2007), who benefit from the exploitation 
and profits from the wealth of the host communities, rush to Switzerland and other so-called 
least corrupt nations to deposit their dirty loots while the communities wallow in abject poverty 
and misery.  
The increasing rate of unemployment is yet another negative impact of corporations on 
their host communities. A study by Eregha and Irughe (2009) showed that host communities in 
Bayelsa State despite their huge wealth in 2001 had twice the unemployment rate (37.1%) 
relative to the average national rate of 18.1%. One of the contributing factors to high 
unemployment in the region was the destruction of the traditional occupations, such as fishing 
and farming. According to studies by Ojo (2012) and Ovwsa (1990), oil induced environmental 
degradation destroyed farming and fishing industries that were the main sources of livelihood 
in the Niger Delta region. Indeed, the United Nations report (2011) on Ogoniland detailed the 
danger communities in the area are facing including oil spills, gas flaring, lack of drinking 
water, inadequate remediation of pollution, and low investment in catalyzing sustainable 
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recovery of Ogoniland. Thus, conflicts often erupted between corporations and traditional 
farmers and fishermen that had lost their jobs and other grievances due to company operations.  
Individuals and organizations are pointing fingers as to who is responsible for oil 
spillage in the state that created environmental and other health hazards. MNOCs accuse host 
communities of causing oil spillages. To them, sabotage of oil installations by protesting 
community groups, oil bunkering by illegal refinery operators in the bush, and crude oil thieves 
(Dada, 2013) cause the spillage. The communities point to the MNOCs’ use of old pipelines 
and other rusty equipment as well as crude oil stealing by oil workers and their international 
collaborators as the cause of the spillage (BBC, 2013). When spillage occurs, the ecosystem is 
affected and MNOCs may not respond on time, triggering conflicts between them and the 
affected communities. 
Other causes of company-community conflicts include selective reward systems that 
benefit elites and leadership groups (Ojo, 2012); Ogoni versus Shell BP over employment; 
failures in the implementation of some provisions of memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
between companies and communities; and environmental issues and insecurity (Owolabi and 
Okwechime, 2007). Writing on the Ogoni versus Shell and Chevron conflict, Ejibunu (2007) 
linked this conflict to the destruction of the Ogoni homeland and inadequate compensation to 
the community by the oil giant. Similarly, Oyadongha (2013) opined that the Ewelesuo 
community versus Shell BP conflict stems from oil spillage coming from the company’s 
operations in the community.  
These conflicts have resulted in the deaths of corporations’ staff, indigenes of host 
communities, and officials of Nigeria and Bayelsa State governments. Destruction of properties 
belonging to the government, corporations, and communities has been linked to 
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community/MNOC conflicts. Dada (2013) reports that in 2013 alone, SPDC lost $700 million 
to oil thieves (p. 27). Peel (2005) puts the quantity of daily oil production output two leading 
multinational corporations lost in 2003 alone through company-host community conflicts in 
Nigeria as 40,000-100,000 barrels for Shell and 5,000 for Chevron (p. 11). These loses can 
account for the reluctance of MNOCs to implement some aspects of MOUs signed with 
communities which in turn fuels company-community conflicts 
 
3.9e Militia Groups-Government 
Contentious relationships between government and non-government groups (militia 
groups and MNOCs) have generated new terminologies in explaining violent confrontations 
between a state like Nigeria and armed groups within its territorial boundaries. Some of these 
new terminologies include state and non-state actor conflicts (Blin, 2011), new wars (Kaldor 
2006), and insurgency (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The ‘new war’ is fought in two fronts 
according to Kaldor (2006). The first front involves violence between the state and organized 
political groups (government and opposition parties) for political motives. The second front 
involves conflicts between privately organized groups, such as drug cartels, kidnappers, and 
other related criminal groups, for private gains. Apart from these two fronts, a third front in the 
Niger Delta region is conflict between the actors in the two fronts, that is, political parties and 
their followers versus privately organized groups. Some selected cross-actor violence in the 
region were the radicalization and militarization of resource control conflicts (Omotola, 2006) 
and the police/military and militia standoff of 1999 that left more than 3,000 people dead in 
Odi, Bayelsa State (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1999). Indeed, Heidelberg (2011) listed 
many ‘new wars’ around the world and some of the goals parties in the violent confrontations 
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expected to achieve in their 2010 conflict barometer. Several cases were listed in Nigeria. 
These included the conflicts between the state and Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) involving autonomy, economic and political 
dominations, and the conflicts between the state, MEND, and other militia organizations over 
systems, ideologies, regional predominance, resource control, and secession (Ojakorotu, 2005; 
Omotola, 2006).  
In Bayelsa, government-militia conflicts include confrontations over resource control, 
autonomy, dominance, and private financial benefits for major actors (Kaldor, 2003; Obi, 2005; 
Omeje, 2005; Osaro, 2010). Exposing one of the major actors who received private financial 
benefits from the mayhem, Osaro (2010) put the total amount Mr. Timi Alaibe and Mr. Atel 
Beredigo, indigenes of Bayelsa State, illegally got from oil revenue funded projects at N1.5 
billion or $9.3 million (p. 2). According to Peel (2005), Nigeria’s yearly oil loss in monetary 
terms as a result of government-militia conflict is $1bn (p. 11). The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (2012) validated Peels assertion when it acknowledged that sabotage of 
oil installation and illegal oil dealing by Niger Delta militant groups contributed to the 
country’s decline in oil revenues. This monetary loss does not include personnel and other 
resources invested in fighting or prosecuting militia members. The militia groups equally 
incurred losses as well but their losses may be difficult to quantify other than in lives.  
The foregoing discussions on conflict provides a great revelation on the link between 
corruption in oil revenue allocation and a variety of conflicts such as intra- and inter-
community, ethno-linguistic, community-company, and government-militia conflicts that 
engulf Nigeria’s Niger Delta and Bayelsa State in particular. Each of these conflicts are created, 
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and/or sustained by acts of corruption such as bribery, political patronage, and cronyism in the 
distribution oil revenue.  
 
3.10 Managing Conflicts 
A common proverb in Africa is that “a coconut provides a rope with which it is 
carried.” In this context, the nature of conflicts is the main determinant of how such conflicts 
are managed. Vital to this nature centered conflict management is the level of human 
involvement in the conflicts. Thomas and Kilmann (1977) pointed out the importance of human 
involvement in conflict management by emphasizing that human behaviors in conflict 
situations should determine how conflicts are managed. Using actors’ behavioral approach in 
managing conflicts, I examine direct and indirect behaviors of the communities, MNOCs, and 
governments’ responses to the conflicts. Governments use competitive, compromising, and 
collaborative responses that include but are not limited to denials, cover ups, beefing up 
security, ransacking a community, transfer of personnel to other departments or zones, 
establishing new government departments, and creating anti-corruption agencies. Anti-
corruption agencies and institutions have been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The communities use approaches like compromise, accommodation, competition such 
as taking laws into their own hands, negotiating with other actors, and taking up arms against 
the government. The MNOCs’ approaches include competition, collaboration, avoidance, and 
compromising with other actors in hiring private security guards, funding governments’ 
military actors against host communities, and pulling out of conflict zones. Criminal gangs’ 
rely more on compromise, competition, and collaboration when they escalate violence, destroy 
oil facilities, and form alliances with militia and other criminal groups. The next section in this 
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chapter examines the management of corruption in oil revenue distribution induced conflicts in 
Bayelsa State.  
 
3.11 Conflict Management Styles in Bayelsa State 
Conflict management styles are dictated by the actors’ behaviors during the conflict. 
Thomas and Kilmann’s (1977) study on developing a forced-choice measure of conflict-
handling indicates that human behaviors dictates the styles to use in managing conflicts. 
According to the authors, two dimensional behaviors, assertiveness and cooperativeness drive 
the strategies for handling conflict situations. The strategies are competing, avoiding, 
compromising, collaborating, and accommodating. Figure 3.2 visually represents these 
strategies. 
Fig. 3.2 Thomas and Kilmann’s two-dimensional behaviors and conflict handling strategies  
 
Source: Thomas and Kilmann (1977).  
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This study examines only three of these strategies, competition, collaboration, and compromise, 
because they are commonly used in Bayelsa State toward managing conflicts.  
Competition: Competitive behavior is associated with high degree of assertiveness. It 
is the most commonly used strategy among the parties engaged in the state’s conflicts. Parties 
using this strategy are more interested in the actualization of individual goals at the expense of 
the general goal of the state. Driven by zero-sum thinking where a winner takes all, a party 
exhibiting competitive behavior invests all resources, economic, political, military, and even 
oratory power, available to it into the conflic. Ojakorotu’s (2006) ‘Oillification of the Niger 
Detla Conflicts’ detailed how the federal and states governments used security agencies, law 
courts, and other government resources to assert authority over Niger Delta resource control 
agitators. Osaro (2010) in his work titled “terrorism by NDDC” showed how top government 
officials, corrupt networks, and MNOCs combined assertives styles, competition, collaboration, 
and compromise to rip off Bayelsans and the entire Niger Delta region of billions of oil 
revenues in local and foreign currencies. Individuals and groups such as some leaders of RDCs, 
MEND, and traditional chiefs responded by forming agitation alliances to further their own 
interests.  
Competitive strategies not only escalate conflicts, but also increases the costs of 
conflicts. The proliferation of militia groups in the state, increase in the violent conflict fatality 
rates, misuse and looting of state resources, and other related costs are indicators of the 
unwillingness of parties to try other conflict management strategies. 
Collaboration: This is a midpoint between assertiveness and cooperation, the 
collaborative approach that brings opposing parties together to find middle ground between 
their respective interests and positions that ensures a situation where no one party gains all it 
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wants while the other party do not lose everything either. The various MOU that have brought 
relative peace and increased petroleum output signed and ratified by major actors like the 
government, MNOCs, and host communities in the state are examples of such collaborative 
behaviors. But studies showed that the direction of most of the collaborative strategies of the 
parties is towards consolidating what each group has received. There is greater unwillingness to 
collaborate with opponents especially if a party’s position promises greater advantage over its 
opponents (Collier and Hoeffman 2004; Ojakorotu, 2005; Ron, 2003). This kind of 
collaboration that promotes a particular group’s interests only help to further polarize the 
parties in the conflict. For example, the government of Nigeria, MEND, and other militia 
groups agreed to the 2009 amnesty initiative only when their particular interests were served. 
The long-term interests of the poor Bayelsans and other Niger Deltans who still bear the 
burdens of the conflicts were least considered in the negotiations leading to the amnesty 
initiatives. Writing on neopatrimonialism and the terrain of struggle, Reno (2011) aptly 
described collaborative styles of African governments which Nigeria is included by postulating 
that “African governments became ‘control regimes’ which pursued policies that promoted a 
closed economy, distorted key prices in the macro economy, and heavily regulated industries 
and markets, all to further the short-term interests of incumbent elites” (p. 62). The petroleum 
industry in Nigeria is one of the highly regulated industries controlled by top government, 
political and multinational corporate officials. Collaboration among these elites gives them 
advantages over communities and groups in Bayelsa seeking to participate in the management 
of petroleum wealth. The country’s petroleum products subsidy regime while it lasted, for 
example, benefited the rich people who won contracts to import petroleum products at 
subsidized prices according to Diezani Madueke, Nigeria’s Petroleum Minister.  
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 Compromising: As the name suggests, compromising is both assertive and cooperative. 
The behaviors that the parties exhibit are intended to result in a win-win situation. Both parties 
on the divide gets part of what each wants. This behavior does not postpone issues until a later 
date. On the assertive side of compromise, parties seek and remain unmoved on the 
implementation of agreements, existing laws, and/or modification to such laws. The 
amendments to the constitution, establishment of special agencies and courts, and review of 
MOUs are some areas that assertive behaviors have been used.  
On the cooperative side, parties have negotiated especially the revenue allocation 
formula and MOUs, corporate social responsibilities have been implemented, amnesty has been 
granted to militants, and communities have curbed hostilities to oil companies among other 
cooperative measures. The governments of Nigeria and Bayelsa State, and other actors like the 
MNOCs, host communities, and militants have won some of their goals and given up some or 
suspended them for future negotiations. This approach is not perfect. Some grounds of 
compromise have been broken such as continued kidnapping of MNOCs’ officials, continued 
neglect of the development needs of communities, and MNOCs’ incitement of inter-community 
conflicts like the one between Okoroba and Agrisaba (Ebosa 2014) in Nembe L.G.A. 
This section examined competitive, collaborative, and compromise approaches parties 
used in managing conflicts between them in Bayelsa State. The choice of these approaches by 
the parties stems from the fact that they consider petroleum as a fixed and limited resource that 
sharing it will reduce or deny a party of its perceived entitlement (greed). For example, 
competitive approach assures a winner absolute control of all the petroleum revenue of the 
state. At the same time, it leaves the loser with nothing but grievances since in the process of 
competition, the winner has taken him or her as an opponent, rather than a partner in the 
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development of Bayelsa State. I turn to the next section to discuss the theoretical framework 
that informed this study.  
 
3.12 Theoretical Framework 
Many theories, including human needs theory (Maslow, 1948; Burton, 1990); relative 
deprivation theory (Opotow, 1990); moral exclusion theory (Opotow, 1990); greed and 
grievance theory (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier 2006); and dynamical systems theory 
(Coleman, Wrzosinka, and Nowak, 2005) could be applied to the case of corruption in oil 
revenue redistribution in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. The one most suited for this study is Collier 
and Hoeffler’s (2004) greed and grievance theory.  
Through their work on causes of civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), used the greed and 
grievance theory to explain the causes and continuation of civil wars in developing countries. 
To the authors, greed is violent competition among elites over who controls natural resources 
rents. This violent competition over control of natural resources rents is not necessarily for the 
sake of satisfying interests of the populace that those competitors purport to lead but their own 
personal interests. The natural resources that generate these rents that the elites compete for 
include but not limited to petroleum, gold, diamond, lumber, and fish. Winning control over 
natural resources rents is not usually for the general well-being of the public but mostly for the 
satisfaction of the elites’ self-interests. This is supported by Pandit (2012) in his essay titled 
“Greed Versus Grievances Theories in ‘Economics of Conflicts.” The author contended that 
what motivates elites in resource abundant countries to engage in violent uprising is not 
necessarily the grievances but the self-interest (greed) of those elites which is to control the 
natural resources of their respective countries. These elites could be government officials, 
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insurgent group leaders, community leaders, business, and other elites in the society. In the case 
of insurgent groups, the author stated that “This insurgent groups are more likely motivated by 
control over resources than by actual political differences with government authorities, ethnic 
divisions or other factors typically viewed as root causes of civil war” (p. 1). Some of these 
‘other factors’ that Pandit could be referring to as causes of civil and other violent conflicts 
may include economic deprivation, environmental degradation and cultural clashes. 
Some writer like Nwokolo (2009); Pandit (2013); Ugiagbe (2013) classified these other 
causes of violent conflicts that are not tied to the satisfaction of individual or a select group’s 
interests as grievances. Nwokolo (2009) believes that grievances may not necessarily create 
conflicts but may sustain it. The author was firm in stating that greed is the driver of violent 
conflicts especially where rebels and plundering of resources are involved. However, Ugiagbe 
(2013) identified greed in government leaders that plunders state resources as source of violent 
conflicts. The author stateed that “Reports of public funds diversion by executives in some 
states leaves a sour taste in the bud. Instead of the state government using the revenues paid in 
derivation to right their environments and lives they swindle the revenues into their own private 
pockets thereby compounding the problems of the people in the area” (p. 5). Greed and 
grievances are not mutually exclusive. Rather, each enables the other in the creation and 
sustenance of conflicts. 
The case of the 1998 Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the 
emergence of a violent militia, MEND, provides an instance on the interconnectedness of greed 
and grievances in creating and/or continuing conflicts. The declaration and behaviors of other 
militia groups operating in Bayelsa and other oil producing states further connect corruption 
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exemplified by greed to conflicts. Items 1, 2, and 4 in the declaration are worth quoting 
verbatim. 
1) All lands and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory 
belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival 
2) We cease to recognize all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of 
the right to ownership and control of our resources, which were enacted without our 
participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and The Petroleum 
Decree 
3) …  
4) Ijaw youths in all the communities in all Ijaw clans in the Niger Delta will take steps to 
implement these resolutions beginning from 30th December, 1998, as a step towards 
reclaiming the control of our lives. We are tired of gas flaring; oil spillages, blowout …  
 
I highlighted certain phrases and words in declarations, 1, 2, and 4 because of their 
supposed reference to the public interests rather than the interests of Ijaw elites. Here are some 
behaviors that changed grievances to greed to grievances and vice versa. According to Servant 
(2006), Asari Dokubo, founder and leader of Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), a 
breakaway faction of MEND, started trafficking oil which in declaration #1 belonged to Ijaw 
communities. The privatization of illegal oil proceeds by militia leaders, government officials, 
and community leaders, promoted greed and increased grievances of the masses in Bayelsa 
State. Indeed, Ross (2012) unveiled illegal oil refinery transactions in the Niger Delta that 
demonstrated why some of the Kaiama declarants ceased to recognize in item #2 what they 
termed as “undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities the right to ownership and 
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control of our resources.” Ross’ interview with two Niger Deltans involved in the illegal 
refinery business is reproduced below. 
One of Ross’ interviewee said that “We settle with the army people. If they see money 
in your hand they will take that. If not they will take products (oil) from you. If we have 10 
drums we will give them two. It’s normal.” The other interviewee added that “Many of our 
brothers have died and are injured. We also get diseases from it and rashes on the body.” 
Evidently, the actions of these illegal oil operators and government officials who took bribes 
and/or join in such unofficial transactions were not beneficial to those they claimed in the 
declaration to be fighting for. The very public officials the government employed and used tax 
payers’ money to pay and maintain were equally not working for the interests of the public they 
serve but served their own private gains. In the case of the military, they are part of the civil 
servants in developing countries who are lowly and irregularly paid (Mauro, 2002; Rose-
Ackerman, 2004). In a collective society such as Bayelsa with large extended families, it could 
be difficult for a lowly paid civil servant to maintain his family. The irregular nature of salary 
payments further compounded civil servants’ miseries. Engaging in corruption becomes an 
avenue to sustain their lives. However, investigations have shown that many low paid civil 
servants in Bayelsa State do not engage in bribery online as means of livelihood. However, 
some groups of civil servants have become greedy in their pursuit of lifestyle beyond their 
income.  
Indeed, Oduma (2012) aptly revealed the greediness of these set of civil servants in 
Bayelsa State by positing that “In Bayelsa, it is common to see treasury officials of low-grade 
level erecting huge residential buildings. This category of workers also own massive estates in 
and outside Yenagoa and live a lifestyle that is arguably above their legitimate earnings as civil 
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servants. This is one of the factors that increase the anger of pensioners.” Residential building 
is not necessarily greed. However, owning massive estates by such category of civil servants 
constitutes greed. What those greedy behaviors rather created and/or exacerbated were public 
grievances such as lack of safety, environmental degradation, and lack of development 
infrastructure among other twenty broad grievances contained in the Ogoni Bill of Rights put 
forward by Ken Saro-Wiwa led Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 
1990. 
Collier and Hoeffler’s main argument in this greed and grievance theory which I agree 
with based on the Bayelsa State circumstances is that opportunity (of access to money) that 
greedy behaviors provides for the Asari. Orkah, other militia leaders, government, and 
community elites to actualize their private gains created and/or sustained conflicts. In the case 
of militia leaders, conflicts occur as each groups try to exact influences over certain territories 
knowing full well that the larger the area of its influence, the larger the amount of petro dollar it 
can control. Fighting over territory and control of the resources therein could pitch one group 
against another or in the case of treasury officials and pensioners in Bayelsa State, could lead to 
violent protests in which government properties may be destroyed by angry pensioners.  
This study in the light of the above defines greed as any behavior intended to confer 
societal benefits only to an individual or a group at the expense of all other people and groups 
within the same society. Forms of corruption such as bribes, cronyism, diversion of government 
expenditure, and political patronage, this study believes, are greed because they benefit only 
those involved in them and deny majority of the people in a society their benefits as members 
of the society (Osoba, 1996; TI, 2012; World Bank, 2008; World Bank and United Nations, 
2012). 
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Another argument connecting greed and grievances to violent conflicts is what Ganesan 
and Vines (2008) classified as “actions of a third-party institution seeking to profit from 
resource-rich area.” In the case of Bayelsa State, a third-party organization could be any or all 
of the Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs) operating in the area. Their actions could 
include inciting one community against another, patronizing a militia group through lucrative 
security contracts, and arming members of Joint Military Taskforce (JTF) that Nigerian 
government stationed in the area to maintain law and order. Indeed, Ebosa (2014) noted a third-
party (Nigeria AGIP Oil Corporation, NAOC) action that contributed to conflicts between 
Okoroba and Agrisaba communities. NAOC, like other MNOCs, is out to make as much profits 
as possible. Every conceivable means such as recruiting thugs to harass communities protesting 
MNOCs’ activities, buying off perceived dangerous groups, and blaming sabotage of oil 
infrastructures on communities in order to avoid spending much on clean ups have been used 
by the MNOCs to satisfy their self-interest which is profiting from Bayelsa rich oil resources 
and . The case of SPDC is informative. According to Ecumenical Council for Corporate 
Responsibility (2010), “Shell has at times awarded surveillance and maintenance contracts and 
stay-at-home payments to violent youths, thugs and cult members. These people have used 
their new found economic power to purchase ammunition with which – although unbidden by 
the company – to terrorize their communities” (p. 25). Similarly, according to one of the 
lawyers representing the Yorla community, Shell in 1996 secretly paid off leaders of Yorla 
community for damages resulting from a 1994 oil spillage in the community. This raises 
questions as, ‘Why did Shell not pay the community for the damages instead of paying off few 
elites?’ ‘What could be a possible explanation for any MNOC to prefer paying off a small 
group of people in a society where it operates rather than executing its social responsibility?’  
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One could confidently conclude from this third-party action that paying off a small 
group would leave such company with more profits than embarking on the development of 
swamps. Those terrorizing their communities could achieve two motives that satisfy their 
private and MNOC’s interests. Their personal interests could be to make as much money as 
they could from the MNOC operating within their areas of influence. For them to make such 
money, they need to control who comes to their movements. The MNOC’s interests on the 
other hand include keeping operations going without interference, ensuring that nobody 
monitors their output giving them opportunity to overproduce and make abnormal profits. 
Recall Ross (2012) interview above which exposed how government officials and thugs 
engaged in illegal oil enterprises. Conflicts could likely arise as the mass may clash with thugs 
who they perceived as blocking them from receiving their entitlements from MNOCs. 
In many ways corruption is connected to the complicated story of conflicts in Bayelsa 
State. The greed (i.e., desire and opportunity to get rich through the control of natural resources 
rents) of few elites in the state deprived majority of the populace the benefits they are entitled 
to as members of the society. Elites in the state use a combination of aspects of corruption such 
as bribes, cronyism, political patronage, and looting of state funds to perpetuate control of 
natural resources rents. For example, Ebipade, Bekwewei, and Goodhead (2012) stated that 
former Governor Timpreye Sylva and his cronies used public funds he looted during his 
governorship tenure in Bayelsa State to build choice properties in major cities in Nigeria. The 
elites’ private gains for the elites are satisfied as their perceived entitlements while the majority 
of people are deprived of basic welfare that the state owes them as social responsibility, thus 
promoting corruption which generates and/or sustains grievances in the state.  
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Grievances according to Pandit (2012) include political repression and exclusion, 
economic insecurity and economic inequality. People who are aggrieved over a long time could 
violently protest conditions, policies, actions, and opportunities that they perceived as 
unfavorable to them. The elites, who the status quo favors would be motivated to also use 
violence to prevent change from occurring (Badmus, 2010; Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). The greedy elites are driven by the profits including different forms of payments, 
settlements, incorporations, and pacification strategies they get, often directly, from continuing 
the conflicts with the aggrieved populace (Badmus, 2010). Indeed, Billon (2003) aptly 
described how corrupt leaders in a divided society used the distribution of the spoils of office 
they hold to maintain the status quo by positing that “Leaders retain allegiance of individual 
members and organizations by providing an inescapable economic incentive (access to 
rents/bribes)” (p. 416). We should note that bribes are not the only acts of corruption. Billon 
further averred that inescapable economic incentive can increase grievances as those not 
benefiting from this economic incentive may engage in organized and/or unorganized violent 
rebellion in demanding change.  
Some writers including Williams (2011) and Blattman and Miguel (2008) criticized 
greed and grievance theory because it suggests that greed and grievance behaviors are 
separable, and limitations arise from empirical studies. Blattman and Miguel noted in particular 
that greed and grievance theory that explained a group’s armed behavior “are tested at the 
national level despite obvious difficulties of aggression” (2008, p. 5). But such criticisms have 
not removed the powerful explanations the theory brings in understanding the link between 
corruption and conflicts at the subnational level.  
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The greed and grievance theory is considered most relevant because of its insight in 
creating an understanding of the motivations for people to engage in corruption and the 
negative impact such engagement has on a society. In addition, the theory emphasizes several 
basic factors that link corrupt acts such as bribery, political patronage, cronyism/nepotism, and 
the lack of accountability to conflicts like fierce inter-ethnic competition, host 
communities/MNOCs, and government/militia conflicts. The negative impact of corruption is 
succinctly stated by Theobald (1990) thus, “The political ascendance of naked self-interest 
intensifies social inequalities, encourages social fragmentation and internecine conflicts and 
propels a corrupt society into an unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence” (p. 
130). Corruption is synonymous with self-interest because it serves the interests of a minority 
group of the giver and receiver who are its major beneficiaries while majority of the society 
suffers its negative impact 
Political patronage in modern society is not confined to a particular geopolitical area. 
However, the incentive behind wider use of political incentives is to enable politicians to 
remain in power by retaining the allegiance of voters who are willing to exchange their votes 
for other incentives. In a patron-client relationship or what Joseph (2014) characterized as 
‘prebendalism,’ institutional performance is weakened. This is more noticeable where 
meritocracy is jettisoned for mediocrity (Ayokunle, 2011; Hoffmann, 2012). The recent 
appointment of Patience Jonathan, wife of the current President of Nigeria, as a Permanent 
Secretary (Allwell, 2012; Sahara Reporters, 2012) in the Bayelsa Department of Education is 
seen as an extension of political patronage system in the state by Governor Dickson’s 
administration. Nigeria’s first lady and Dickson are both members of the ruling PDP. Though 
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she later rejected the appointment, the opinion of many people in the state is that the governor’s 
choice of Mrs. Goodluck Jonathan was motivated by party affiliation.  
Evidence from the literature indicates that Bayelsa State within the past decade has a 
history of an accountability deficiencies. For example, unspent funds at the end of each fiscal 
year are never retired for inclusion into the next budget. The NDCB (2008), a public watchdog 
group, provides an insight into what happens to any unspent fund by positing that “Unspent 
funds are calculated and, as a rule, returned to the treasury for eventual inclusion in the next 
budget. But experience has shown that unspent funds exist mainly as fraud chest for corrupt 
officials” (p. 13). As revealed earlier, many leaders in military regimes and emerging 
democracies do not consider themselves accountable to the public. Such a mentality indicates 
that leaders’ desire to satisfy their own interests can come at the expense of those they lead 
(Adebayo 2012; Ewoh, Matei, and Matei 2013). A leader that stole public fund cannot claim to 
serve the interests of those he/she leads. 
Oil rent-seekers epitomize greed through their selfish control of oil revenues and 
distribution routes. As Watts, Okonta, and Kemedi (2004) postulated, “Oil rents have 
historically sustained a parasitic ruling elite” (p. 4). Kleptocracy in corrupt societies is 
widening as rulers devise means such as not retiring unspent funds, granting personal loans that 
never repaid, and distorting costs of projects to steal public funds for their personal use. These 
kleptocrats further enhance their personal gains by implementing highly inefficient economic 
policies and development projects including embarking on expensive development projects, 
expropriating the wealth of their citizens, and using the proceeds for their own glorification or 
consumption (Lanthan, 2001; Vian, 2008). Kleptocrats’ ability to succeed rests, in part, on their 
99 
ability to use a divide-and-rule (i.e., marginalization) strategies, which are made possible by the 
weakness of institutions in these societies (Acemoglu, Verdier, and James, 2004).  
As a consequence of greed in a society that is dependent on non-renewable resource like 
petroleum, the majority of the poor who bear the burden of greed react by communicating their 
list of grievances such as lack of access to education, jobs, development, and security (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004). These grievances resulting from the exclusion of the vast majority of the 
populace from sharing the full benefits of a society membership will according to Klare (2001) 
generate conflicts. Consistent with literature, access to education in Bayelsa State is low (Ortis 
and Cummins, 2011). Kleptomania in the state exacerbated by the culture of corruption as well 
as hurried state pardon granted to convicted corrupt cronies have reduced the ability of the state 
and federal institutions to investigate and prosecute alleged corrupt officials (Ebipade, 
Bekewei, and Inainfe, 2012; EFCC, 2013; ICPC, 2014). 
Related to the greed and grievance theory is the culture of entitlement in Nigeria which 
Joseph (1987) called “the politics of prebendalism.” Many Nigerian (Bayelsan) government 
officials regard ill-gotten wealth as their deserved share of the national cake. Those in positions 
of authority ‘take’ their share and ‘prepare’ for the time they would not be in authority (Isu, 
2013). Those outside the political sphere push, violently or otherwise, to obtain their share of 
the national cake. Hence, both the political elite and the underserved masses of the population 
engage in strategies to promote their prebendal interests. 
Furthermore, the greed and grievance theory is used here because it explains how the 
proceeds of corruption, such as illegal oil deals, special payments, and dominance of others 
enjoyed by militia groups, political elites, and other groups, drive these beneficiaries to 
perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State. Collier (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Reno (2003), 
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and Allen (1999) provided explanation on how personal economic gains by warlords, corrupt 
government officials, and external collaborators from illegal dealings in natural resources, cause 
civil wars in resource dependent societies like Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
violent conflicts in Bayelsa. Ibeanu (2005), as discussed earlier, supported the relevance of this 
approach by pointing to the perpetual conflict between the producers of wealth and the wealthy 
who took the producers’ products by force. 
From this theory, I developed two hypotheses on corruption that seek to show 
motivations for someone who engages on corruption and the effect of his or her action on other 
individuals in a society where they belong. I stated these hypotheses in Chapter 4. I will use the 
results derived from analysis of data I collected during my fieldwork to see if my hypotheses are 
supported in the case of Bayelsa State, Nigeria.  
3.13 Highlight on the Literature and Theoretical Framework 
This chapter on literature review and theoretical framework point to the three major 
sources of oil revenue: 13% derivation, statutory allocation, and excess crude oil, which Bayelsa 
State almost depends only on for its sustenance. The chapter also revealed how the oil revenue 
accruals are being spent, illegal behaviors (forms of corruption) that are obvious in the oil 
revenue redistribution process, and the effects of such behaviors especially in creating and/or 
sustaining conflicts. It further revealed what measures were in place to manage intra-and inter-
conflicts that arose between the redistributors of revenues and consumers.  
The theoretical framework of the study revealed the interplay of greed among the relative 
few who redistributed oil revenues, and the grievances raised by the majority of Bayelsans who 
were adversely affected by the actions of the oil revenue redistributors. Having seen these 
corrupt actions of those opportuned to be in power and their cronies, the grief reactions on the 
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part of the majority of the led citizens of the state and then the generated and sustained conflicts, 
the next chapter of this study explains the adopted methodology for investigating the relationship 
between people’s perception of corruption and perpetual conflicts which this study set off to 
investigate.  
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
“Corruption produces divisions and conflicts, both among those involved in corrupt 
enterprises and between those who are included and those left out” (Johnston 1986). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This dissertation examines how the people’s perceptions of corruption in oil revenue 
redistribution creates and/or perpetuates conflict in Bayelsa State. This chapter focuses on 
methods of data collection and treatments designed to the answer the main research question 
and test the two hypotheses I proposed here. In this chapter also, I presented the main research 
question and two hypotheses; conceptualized and operationalized key variables; discussed the 
research design; sampling frame; sampling technique; and sample size; and background 
information of participants. I also presented the nature of the data, procedures and data 
collection techniques, and approaches to data analysis.  
4.2 Main research question and hypotheses 
4.2a Main research question 
The main research question is, “How does perception of corruption in oil revenue redistribution 
create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State?”  
4.2b Hypotheses 
Based on the review of the literature, I hypothesize that: 
H1: People’s perceptions of corruption create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa  
 State  
H2: Anti-corruption laws and institutions do not prevent conflict in Bayelsa State. 
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4.3 Conceptualization and Operationalization of Key Variables 
The independent variable for this study is corruption and the dependent variable is 
conflict. Corruption as used here implies any act that is not only contrary to legal and moral 
norms, but undermines the capacity of the state to secure the welfare of all its citizens (Osoba, 
1996). It will be measured by the perceptions that the majority of the participants of this study 
hold on bribery, theft and money laundering, distortion of government expenditures, political 
patronage, and cronyism. I used people’s perceptions of corruption rather than actual measures 
of corruption because it is easier to ask someone about his/her perception of corruption than 
actually measuring it. Pioneers of extensive studies on corruption like TI and the World Bank 
rely on people’s perceptions about corruption rather than actual measurement of corruption. 
Indeed, TI (2005) justified the use of people’s perception in the study of corruption on the 
ground that it provides the reality of situations faced by real people and organizations affected by 
corrupt behaviors. Another reason I used perception rather than actual measures is lack of 
existing data at a micro (state) level. Even existing perception index measures at macro level. 
However, the flexibility of perception index makes it easily adaptable at the micro level.  
The second independent variable is Nigeria’s anti-corruption laws and institutions. These 
are rules and regulations like Chapters 12 and 38 of the country’s Criminal Code that define 
behaviors deemed as corruption, set out processes of handling behaviors deemed as corruption, 
and stipulating sanctions to be imposed on people and organizations that violate them. The 
institutions are agencies like the law courts, the ICPC, and the EFCC established to investigate, 
prosecute, and apply appropriate penalties for violators of anti-corruption laws. The effectiveness 
of these laws and institutions is measured by majority of participants’ views on the effectiveness 
104 
or otherwise of the laws and institutions in fulfilling the purposes for which they were 
established.  
The working of anti-corruption laws and institutions means how these various national 
and state laws were promulgated or enacted to curb corruption rather than exacerbate it in the 
state, such as the infamous “advance fee fraud 419” derived from Article 4, Section 1, and 
Paragraph 9 (419) of Nigeria’s Criminal Code. Respondents in this study were asked to express 
their views on the effectiveness of the various anti-corruption mechanisms in tackling incidents 
of corruption in the state. Some of these mechanisms are the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007, 
the prosecution of 419ers and other suspects of economic and financial crimes, agencies such as 
the EFCC, Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), and the ICPC. 
The dependent variable is conflict which is operationalized using Coser’s (1967) 
definition. According to the author, conflict is, “a struggle over values, and claims to scarce 
status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or 
eliminate the rivals” (p. 8). I use this definition because it captures all the characteristics of 
Bayelsa conflicts. For example, there can only be one governor (scarce status) of the state at any 
given time. A lot of values including, but not limited to, the control of oil revenues and other 
resources of the state, and appointment of key state officials are attached to the governorship 
status. Those who compete for Bayelsa State’s governorship seat and other states in Nigeria 
often uses violent means such as unleashing political thugs and militants against opponents and 
their supporters. Those thugs and militants injure and in extreme cases, eliminated opponents of 
their sponsors (Servant, 2006). It is measured by the prevalence of different forms of conflicts 
such as intra- and inter-community conflicts, inter-ethnic conflicts, conflicts between militia 
groups and government as well as company-community conflicts in Bayelsa State. 
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Intra-community conflicts refer to violent struggles within a given community. The 
communities of Bayelsa are, for the purpose of this study, classified as either an oil bearing 
community (OBC) or oil impacted community (OIC). An intra-community conflict here would 
be any violent struggle with an OBC or OIC. 
Inter-community conflict on the other hand is a violent struggle between two or more 
different communities. Nembe community and its Kolokuma/Okpokuma community neighbor 
have had violent conflicts before and after Bayelsa State was created in 1996. Inter-community 
conflict here would be a violent conflict between one OBC and another or between an OBC and 
an OIC. 
Inter-ethnic conflicts refer to violent struggle among the ethno-linguistic groups in 
Bayelsa State. For example, a conflict between Izon and Atissa. Conflicts between militia groups 
and government include the 1999 kidnapping and killing of twelve policemen by Odi militants 
which led to the deployment of Nigerian security forces in the area and subsequent deaths of 
more than 1000 Odi people according to Human Rights Watch (1999). Host community and 
company conflicts occur between OBCs and OICs which are host communities and the MNOCs, 
guests of the host communities. For example, many flow stations and other oil facilities owned 
by the MNOCs have, in several occasions, been damaged by host communities. The MNOCs 
have funded military operations directed against their host communities.  
4.4 The Research Design 
 In this research, an exploratory case study method is used to look for causal connections 
between corruption in oil revenue redistribution and conflicts. The qualitative data collection 
techniques included focus group discussions, participant’s observation, and semi-structured 
interviews. 
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4.5 Sample Frame 
The sample frame/study population comprises the communities and inhabitants 
throughout Bayelsa State. The state, according to NPC of Nigeria (2013), has a population of 
1,704,515 people. I established contacts with organizations (civil society groups, political 
parties, businesses, and corporations) and individuals (civil servants, community leaders, and 
community members) operating in the state before I set off for my fieldwork in the state from 
July 24, 2013 to September 19, 2013. I visited the state’s Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development at Yenegoa where I obtained the list of the communities in the state from 
which I derived my sample communities. All the communities were divided into OBCs and 
OICs.  
The OBCs are those communities that have oil wells and are also impacted by oil 
exploitation risks like oil spillage, pollution, explosion, and displacement. The OICs are the 
communities that are impacted because of oil storage facilities and transportation networks, 
such as pipelines, oil badges, and other loading equipment. Any damage or oil spill, and other 
related oil exploration hazards impact these communities as well. Communities that qualified 
as OBCs and OICs were counted as only OBCs. This step eliminated the problem of counting a 
community twice. 
This dissertation sought to understand how these communities related to each other. 
Understanding such relationships helped to measure their responses to the way Bayelsa State 
government redistributes revenue accruing from oil and oil infrastructure located among the 
two broad communities. Again, stratifying the Bayelsa communities into OBCs and OICs 
helped to study the situational corrupt practices and conflicts. For example, how would an OBC 
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member perceive or interpret an act of corruption perpetrated by his/her business associate, 
and/or someone he/she has any form of relationship with? 
4.6 Sample Size and Sample Technique 
The people of Bayelsa State belong to different ethno-linguistic groups such as Izon, 
Nembe, Ogbia, and Epie-Atissa. They also belong to different organizations including 
religious, community, and civil organizations. Bayelsans participate in different activities such 
as resource agitation, political campaigns, and environmental activism. Therefore, I used a two-
stage cluster sampling technique to select my sample size.  
In the first stage, I stratified the communities into clusters of OBCs, OICs, bureaucrats, 
politicians, and MNOCs. I have previously explained what constitute an OBC and OIC. There 
are federal, state, and local bureaucrats working at respective government offices in the state. 
Politicians belong to the over thirty registered political parties in Nigeria. In general, each 
registered major political party has offices in every state of the federation. Some of the major 
political parties active in Bayelsa State are the PDP, Change Advocacy Party (CAP), Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN), and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Amongst the 
MNOCs operating in the state are Shell BP, Chevron, Texaco, Willbros, and Total. 
 In the second stage, I used purposive sampling to select respondents who have 
knowledge of and were willing to talk about intra- and inter-community conflicts in Bayelsa 
State with respect to territorial claims over oil-bearing lands and properties where oil 
infrastructure transverse. These classes of people are important because of their perception of 
entitlements not only as oil bearing or impacted communities, but as traditional rulers, 
community development leaders, environmental activists, and community, company, and 
government liaison officers. I planned and used the two stage cluster sample techniques 
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because it helped me in narrowing down the Bayelsa population, and changed the 
heterogeneous characteristics of the population into more homogeneous groups for easy direct 
sampling (Bernard 2006).  
Based on the list I created, the eventual clusters that emerged from the two-stage 
approach were four communities (2 OBCs, and 2 OICs) and a cluster each of bureaucrats, 
politicians, and MNOCs. I used quota sampling to select respondents from each subunit of 
every cluster. Moreover, I targeted some specific groups such as the bureaucrats, politicians, 
and MNOCs to obtain specific information like Bayelsa State’s share of oil revenue and its 
redistribution, political appointments, and incidents of corruption. Respondents from these 
subgroups were purposively selected because of the special information relevant to my study, 
which I believe each group possessed. The distribution of population in each cluster before my 
field study is summarized in Table 4.1 below. While in the field, I managed to have access to 
fifty- eight participants as shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.1: Sample Distribution among the Clusters before Research Began 
 
Clusters  Number of 
Participants 
Participants as 
Percentage of the 
Cluster Sample 
Participants as 
percentage of 
Total Sample  
OBCs 
Male adults 
Female adults 
Youths  
Subtotal 
 
8 
6 
10 
24 
 
33.33 
25.00 
41.67 
100 
 
10.53 
07.89 
13.16 
00.00 
OICs 
Male adults 
Female adults 
Youths  
Subtotal 
 
8 
6 
10 
24 
 
33.33 
25 
41.66 
100 
 
10.53 
07.89 
13.16 
00.00 
POLITICAL GROUP 
Political party leaders 
Political appointees 
Subtotal  
 
4 
6 
10 
 
40 
60 
100 
 
5.26 
07.89 
00.00 
BUREAUCRATIC 
GROUP 
Senior level 08 & above 
Junior below level 08 
Subtotal  
 
 
7 
3 
10 
 
 
70 
30 
100 
 
 
9.21 
3.95 
00.00 
MNOCs 8 100 10.53 
Total  76 100 100 
 
Source: Author 
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Table 4.2: Actual Sample Distribution among the Clusters during Fieldwork 
 
Clusters  Number of 
participants 
Participants as 
Percentage of the 
Cluster Sample 
Participants as 
percentage of 
Total Sample 
OBCs 
Male adults 
Female adults 
Youths  
*Subtotal* 
 
8 
4 
10 
*22* 
 
36.36 
18.18 
45.45 
99.99 
 
13.79 
06.90 
17.24 
00.00 
OICs 
Male adults 
Female adults 
Youths  
*Subtotal* 
 
8 
5 
9 
*22* 
 
36.36 
22.72 
40.91 
99.99 
 
13.79 
08.62 
15.52 
00.00 
POLITICAL GROUPS 
Political party leaders 
Political appointees 
*Subtotal* 
 
1 
0 
*1* 
 
100 
00.00 
100 
 
01.72 
00.00 
00.00 
BUREAUCRATIC 
GROUPS 
Senior level 08 & above 
Junior below level 08 
*Subtotal* 
 
 
2 
5 
*7* 
 
 
28.57 
71.42 
99.99 
 
 
03.44 
08.62 
00.00 
MNOCS *6* 100 10.34 
TOTAL 58 00.00 99.98 
 
Source: Author 
 
Greater response percentage (32.76%) came from the youth groups in both the OBCs 
and OICs. The reason is because this age group is the most active party in the state’s conflicts. 
During the fieldwork, the youths showed more interest in participating in this study than other 
subgroups. The youth group is therefore more readily mobilized in conflict situations. This 
youth group, more than other groups when mobilized, violently engage in conflicts. The 
distribution of participants along gender lines was informed by the need to understand the role 
gender played in the conflicts and their management. It was intended also to help determine 
how each gender or class of people laid claim to certain privilege entitlements such as 
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employment, special development projects, chieftaincy protocol tax, and other related 
compensation packages. The political appointees got 12% of their unit allocation because they 
reflected the character of those appointing them.  
In the bureaucratic category, the senior bureaucrats were given a greater priority 
because they have information on accruals of wealth, advised on distribution policies, and were 
the ones implementing public policies on oil revenue distribution. The junior bureaucrats were 
often fronts for their seniors in office (Human Rights Watch 2010). These quotas helped me 
understand and compare the roles of these subgroups in Bayelsa’s conflicts. The use of 
purposive sampling was informed by the fact that comparable data can only be obtained from 
people who have experience and knowledge of the themes under investigation (Maxwell 2005). 
An additional advantage to using cluster sampling was to help analyze patterns in data when 
other conditions remained equal, making it attributable to the various sampled categories or 
applicable across sampled groups depending on the types of patterns found. 
Some bureaucrats were reposted to other areas in the state for one reason or the other. 
Some of the members of the political class served only one term or fell out of favor with their 
parties or political party godfathers before I came to the field or while I was engaged with other 
participants. Leaders of political parties, as godfathers, influence political appointments and 
other rewards for political support. These and many other factors made these two subgroups 
hard to find in the population. I requested my initial contacts from these two subgroups to 
recommend their colleagues who I reached for interview. The system of asking initial 
participants in a research exercise to recommend other potential participants to a researcher is 
called ‘chain referral.’ Chain referrals technique and purposive sampling are the best 
techniques to use when selecting hard to find population (Bernard 2006). At the end of the 
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fieldwork, 58 participants out of the 76 originally, proposed were interviewed. In the section 
that follows, I provide background information on the participants. 
4.7 Background Information of Participants 
Age requirement 
Participants in this study were grouped into youths, adult females, and adult male 
categories (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In the data collection instrument (interview guide) which was 
approved by my committee and the Institutional Review Board, I used age groups like 18- 28, 
29-39, and so on to represent the youths, female and male adult populations. The convention in 
Nigeria is to classify people between the ages of 18 and 39years as youths and people who are 40 
years and above as adults. I have adopted this convention in classifying participants in this 
dissertation. This rearrangement is summed up in Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3:  
Category of Participants from the Various Grouping 
Category  Male  Female  Total Number of 
Participants 
Percentage 
Youths 
OBC 1 
OBC 2 
OIC 1 
OIC 2 
Politicians 
Bureaucrats 
MNOC Officials 
17 
3 
4 
4 
4 
0 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
23 
6 
5 
4 
5 
0 
1 
3 
40 
Adults 
OBC 1 
OBC 2 
OIC 1 
OIC 2 
Politicians 
Bureaucrats 
MNOC Officials 
24 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
4 
3 
11 
3 
1 
2 
3 
0 
2 
0 
35 60 
Total 41 17 58 100 
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 In Table 4.3, the youth participants made up of males and females constitute 40% of all 
the participants in this study. These youths are purposely selected because of their knowledge in 
corruption and conflicts in Bayelsa State. From two oil bearing communities (OBC 1 & 2) 
involved in this study are seven male and three female youths. The oil impacted communities 
(OICs 1 & 2) have eight male and one female youth participants. There was no youth 
participants in the sample from the political cluster. The bureaucratic category has only one male 
youth participant. Among the MNOCs official category are one male and two female youth 
participants.  
The adult population constitutes 60% of the total sample population. Within that 
population, the OBC 1 & 2 have eight male and four female participants. The OIC 1 & 2 have 
eight male and five female participants. There is only one male participant from the political 
subpopulation. The bureaucratic category has four male and two female adult participants. The 
smallness of this population stem from the sensitiveness of the issues corruption and conflicts 
being studied. Not many people are willing to participate in the study for safety reason and 
cultural practices. Some levels of conflicts were ongoing at the time of this study thus hindering 
my effort to reach larger number of people. Furthermore and most importantly, after 
interviewing the 50th participants, subsequent interviews I conducted yielded no new information 
from what previous interviews provided. In other words, I reached saturation point after 
interviewing the 50th person. Finally, there are three male and zero female adults from the 
MNOCs officials’ category. The next table summaries educational background of participants. 
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Table 4.4:  
Educational Qualifications of Participants 
Highest Education attained Number of Participants Percentage 
Completed Elementary 
School 
12 21 
Completed Middle School 17 29 
Completed High School 18 31 
Completed College Degree 11 19 
Total 58 100 
 
According to Table 4.4, participants who completed Elementary School make up 21% of 
the sample population. Those who completed Middle School constitute 29%. Also, 31% of the 
participants completed High School. The remaining 19% completed College Degree. From my 
field note, most of the participants within the elementary and high school level are found in the 
youth population. Among the youth population, majority of the boys stopped at middle school 
level. Finally on the background information of participants, I sought to establish residency 
requirements of the participants by asking them how long they have lived in Bayelsa State. Next 
to educational qualification is the length of time participants resided in Bayelsa state prior to this 
study. 
Table 4.5: 
How Long Participants Lived in Bayelsa 
Period Lived (Years) Number of participants Percentage 
5 - 10 3 6 
11 - 16 11 19 
17 - 22 10 17 
23 - 28 13 22 
29+ 21 36 
Total 58 100 
  
In the question guide, the minimum residency requirement for participation in this study 
is 5 years. The percentage of the participants who have lived in the state for 5-10 years is 6. 
Participants who have lived in the state between 11-16 years constitute 19%. Those who have 
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lived between 17-22 years are 17%%. For 22% of the participants, they have lived in the state for 
23-28 years. Finally, 36% of the participants have lived in the state for more than 29years. The 
data I collected from these participants were used to answer the main research question and to 
seek support of the hypotheses stated in Chapters 2 and 4 of this dissertation. Following the 
background information of participants is a discussion of the nature of data used in this study.  
 
4.8 Nature of Data 
 Two types of qualitative data, primary and secondary data, were collected for this study. 
I collected primary data by triangulating focus group discussions, participant observation, and 
semi-structured interview. Secondary data were collected from the review of literature, specific 
court records on corruption convictions, government publications, newspapers and magazine 
articles, political party pamphlets, news release by militant groups, reports from international 
organizations, and other publications. The primary and secondary data complemented one 
another and reinforce the reliability and validity of the findings in this study. I discussed the 
procedure and technique used in collecting my primary and secondary data in the next 
paragraph. 
4.9 Procedure and Data Collection Technique 
4.9a Semi-structured interview: I traveled to Bayelsa State during summer of 2013 to conduct 
one-on-one semi-structured interviews with fifty-eight participants. Each interview took place 
at homes, school and religious buildings, and other places preferred by the interviewees. I 
traveled by boat or canoe depending on the location of the interviewee’s preferred meeting 
point. On the average, each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. Before each interview 
session, I sought and obtained informed consent, signed or thumb printed, from the 
116 
participants. Through semi-structured interviews, I obtained firsthand information about 
participants’ perceptions of corruption in the collection and redistribution of the state’s share of 
oil revenues. I equally obtained their views on the causes of conflicts in the state. Majority of 
those views helped to establish the connection between corruption and conflicts in the state. 
The connection between corruption and conflicts helped to demonstrate to some critics of greed 
and grievance theory who said that it relied heavily on quantitative data that the theory can rely 
on qualitative data. The questions used in the semi-structured interviews helped me to obtain a 
common set of data vital to this study such as: 
 The origin, causes, and dynamics of conflicts in the state; 
 Parties to the conflicts and conflict management strategies in the state; 
 Sources of Bayelsa State’s revenue and its redistribution; 
 Perceptions about misuse of public resources in the state; 
 Mechanisms for handling public resources perceived to have been misused; 
 Inter-ethnic relations in the state; and 
 Way participants wanted issues in the state to be handled in moving forward. 
Conducting semi-structured interview in a conflict environment and on a sensitive issue 
like corruption comes with ethical and security concerns. My knowledge of the local language 
and experience in working in a related volatile environment in the country’s middle belt region 
helped in this Bayelsa study. I saw semi-structured interview as best suited for this study 
because I had a little or no chance for a second interview with most of the respondents.  
Meeting with some bureaucrats and politicians, in particular, for a second time might 
not be feasible because the nature of their offices put them in position to move from one post to 
another throughout the country. I believed semi-structured interview increased my response 
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rate, compared to a survey. I was able to get 58 responses out of the 76 participants I initially 
targeted. 
The semi-structured interview allowed me to bring up new questions during the 
interview or probe for additional information following the interviewees’ responses. Using this 
approach, I was able to asked questions relating to the various conflicts in the state and their 
causes. Information obtained was used to answer the main research question and to test the two 
hypotheses stated above. Next, I discuss another data collection technique known as participant 
observation. 
4.9b Participant Observation (PO): In a work titled “Research Methods in Anthropology,” 
Bernard (2006) defines PO as a process “which involves the researcher getting close to the 
people and making them to feel comfortable enough with your presence so that you can 
observe and record information about their lives” (p. 342). PO has different levels ranging from 
non-participatory to complete participation. I did my best to remain at the moderate PO level. 
At this level, a researcher is not neither a passive nor a very active participants in meetings, 
protests, and other conflict behaviors like the main parties involved in the conflicts. Moderate 
PO level allowed me to maintain a balance between "insider" and "outsider" roles thereby 
reducing a researcher’s bias that could occur in a data collection technique of this nature 
(Dewalt, Dewalt, and Wayland, 1998).  
During the PO, I observed the activities and meetings of some purposely selected 
community organizations like the men, youth, and women’s groups. I attended a ward (district) 
meeting of one of the political parties as a youth wing member. At the meeting, we tried to 
manage conflicts within and between party members. I also observed signs of property or areas 
destroyed during violent conflicts or projects abandoned as a result of war or arson, illegal oil 
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bunkering and illegal refineries and their operators as they engage in those activities. An 
advantage here is that participants expressed their opinions or behaved naturally rather than 
acting to satisfy the researcher (Bernard 2006). PO helped address the issue of validity threats 
by providing a firsthand account from the participants and allowed me to develop rapport with 
various actors within the communities being studied. Finally, I supplemented the above two 
techniques with focus group discussions which I discussed in the next paragraph.  
4.9c Focus Group Discussion (FGD): I ran a separate FGD with each of the two OICs, and 
OBCs. This brought the total number of FGDs I conducted to four. I invited twelve participants 
from each subunit of the two OBCs and two OICs to discuss some specific themes that were 
common among their respective groups during the semi-structured interview. This would have 
given me twelve participants per an FGD. However, in the two FGDs held for the two OBCs, 
five and four participants turned up for the first and second meetings. Similarly, during the two 
FGDs organized for participants from the OICs, only three and four participants respectively 
showed up. 
 
Table 4.6 
FGD Participants and themes discussed 
FGD Number of Participants Actual Themes Discussed 
 01 (OBC)  5 Kolokuma/Opokuma 
Strategy 
 02 (OBC)  4 Kolokuma/Opokuma 
Strategy  
 01 (OIC)  3 Stealing versus reparation, 
Special projects, Oil pipeline 
and illegal refineries, and 
Kolokuma/Opokuma 
strategy 
 02 (OIC)  4 Stealing versus reparation, 
Special projects, Oil pipeline 
and illegal refineries, and 
Kolokuma/Opokuma 
strategy 
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The FGD participants were picked from the members of the OBCs and OICs who did 
not participate in the semi-structured interview sessions. The reason for picking up non-
participants of the semi-structured interviews include fact checking, collecting expanded 
opinions on the major theme being studied, and obtaining clearer understanding of themes that 
were confusing but common among participants who took part in the semi-structured 
interviews. For example, more than eighteen participants repeatedly referenced 
Kolokuma/Opokuma strategy during the semi-structured interviews. It was one of the topics I 
sought clarification about during the focus group discussion. Less than twelve people showed 
up at a time during the four FGDs. An advantage this low turnout provided was that it 
prevented the usual difficulty of managing a large group, like not giving each panelist time to 
speak. The rule of thumb in an FGD is between 6 and 12 participants to avoid one or two 
influential participants dominating the discussion or other participants not getting enough time 
to talk (Bernard 2006).  
In addition to clarifying themes from the interviews, FGDs also provided me with an 
opportunity to generate an indigenous policy recommendation for addressing local issues. I 
triangulated these techniques, semi-structured interview, participant observation, and focus 
group discussions, to enhance the reliability and validity of findings that came from this study. 
Studies have shown that when several data collection techniques are used and the same results 
are produced, researchers are more confident of the validity of the findings. 
My fieldwork was planned to last between 74-90 days based on an average calculation 
of 1-2 interviews in a day. It would have given me enough time to interview my original target 
of 76 participants. However, it lasted only 40 days. The most important reason I stopped at the 
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40th day was because I reached saturation point. Saturation point is a stage during the data 
collection process where any new data collected does not add new information on the issue 
being studied (Glaser and Strauss 1967). I reached this point after interviewing the 50th 
participants. Participants 51-58 mostly repeated information already provided by other 
participants before them. Secondly, some participants from the political, multinational, and 
bureaucrat clusters started canceling interview appointments scheduled earlier without 
committing to a new date. Another factor that shortened my fieldwork period was few 
occasions I interviewed 4 participants in a day. Those occasions doubled the average of 1-2 
interviews a day I originally calculated. Other days that I did not have interviews schedule were 
spent searching other data sources such as government publications, news releases, and 
newspaper and magazine articles. In addition, four days were used to conduct the four FGDs. In 
the next paragraph, I discussed data analysis technique. 
4.10 Data Analysis 
I did thematic and content analyses. I did thematic analysis by interpreting responses 
from the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions on the major themes. Major 
concepts like bribery, looting of public funds, cronyism, kidnapping, forceful acquisition of 
property, inter-community conflicts, militant-government conflict, and conflict transformation 
efforts were coded. Common themes were analyzed and used to test the hypotheses postulated 
in this dissertation. The coding of these themes was done manually as coding software like the 
QSR Nvivo 9 is not compatible with my data. The incompatibility of the software with my data 
was caused mainly by the accent and languages captured in the majority of my data. The 
content analysis of court and other documents helped me to look for patterns and categories of 
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elected officials’ involvement in acts of corruption. It also helped to compare how participants 
perceive the effectiveness of various anti-corruption measures and how they actually worked.  
4.11 Ethical Considerations 
I submitted my research instrument to, and received approval from, the Kennesaw State 
University Institutional Review Board. I adhered to the Kennesaw State University IRB ethical 
code. Research in Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta region, does not require national 
approval. However, I undertook the direction of a faculty at the Niger Delta University in 
Wilberforce. I earlier made contact with Dr. Edet in the Department of Sociology. Before 
starting the field, he updated me with the local research code that related to interviewing chiefs, 
women, and young men. Signed informed consent was collected from most of the participants 
who can read and write. I read and interpreted the consent form for few participants who could 
not read and write. I requested and obtained their verbal consent thereafter. 
In this chapter, I have discussed the background of participants in this study and 
methods I used to collect, present, and analyze data. I now move to Chapter 5 where I present 
and analyze data on oil revenue redistribution and corruption in Bayelsa State.  
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Chapter 5 
Oil Revenue Redistribution and Corruption in Bayelsa State 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I focuse on Bayelsa State’s three sources; statutory allocations, 13% 
derivation, and ‘excess’ crude of oil revenues. Data sets from the state’s 2011, 2012, and 2013 
budgets are used in analyzing these three sources of oil revenues and the state’s redistributions of 
accruals from them. The chapter also analyzes acts and/or the Bayelsans’ perception of 
corruption in the redistribution of these oil revenues. The analysis of acts and/or perceptions of 
corruption are supported by data from court documents, EFCC, and other anti-corruption 
agencies, and fieldwork I undertook during the summer of 2013 in Bayelsa State. In doing the 
analysis, I present data first as a tables then I follow up the presentation with analysis and 
discussion of each data set. This chapter is important because it expands the explanations I 
discussed in Chapter 3 of the three oil revenues sources, which the government of Bayelsa State 
almost only depends on. It also reveals how much revenues accrue to the state from the three 
sources in 2011, 2012, and 2013. Furthermore, this chapter shows how the revenues accruing 
from oil over the three-year period were redistributed in the state and the perceptions of 
corruption among Bayelsans.  
5.2 Bayelsa State’s Annual Petroleum Revenues 
Below, I explain the three main sources of Bayelsa State’s annual income from 
petroleum. As earlier stated, they are statutory allocations, 13% derivation, and excess crude. 
These are terminologies used and understood in the Nigerian political economy. 
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5.2a Statutory Allocations  
The constitution of Nigeria empowers the national government to collect and distribute 
revenue to different tiers of governments in the country. Indeed, Section 160, Subsection 2 of the 
Nigerian Constitution (1999) stated that “Any amount standing to the credit of the federation 
account shall be distributed among the federal and state governments, and the local governments 
of each state.” In Chapter 2, I pointed out that one of the justifications for the creation of Bayelsa 
State was to bring the Nigerian government nearer to people who live hundreds of miles away 
from Abuja, the seat of the national government. The FGN, in accordance with this constitutional 
directive, gives the statutory allocations to the thirty-six states of the federation as provided in 
the statute. The federal statutory allocation is a pool of all federally collected revenues that are 
shared among the three levels of government – federal, state, and local.  
Extant literature in Chapter 3 revealed that Nigeria almost depends on a single 
commodity, petroleum resources, for more than 80% of its annual revenues (Ekpo, 2004; Obi, 
2004; Ojakorotu, 2005). This is further confirmed by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2000-
2013 Federal Account Operation Data. For each of the fourteen years covered in the CBN data, 
crude oil accounted for more than half of all federally collected revenues. For example, in the 
2011, 2012, and 2013 fiscal years, oil accounted for 79.6%, 75.6% and 69.9% respectively of the 
country’s revenues. Non-oil revenue sources, such as import and export duties, company taxes, 
and federal income taxes account for the remaining fraction.  
Bayelsa, like other states of the federation receives statutory allocation which is made up 
of revenues from oil and non-oil sources. The FGN often does not separate total amount of funds 
remitted to states into oil and non-oil revenues. My study is on the oil revenue components alone. 
So to separate oil revenue from non-oil revenue in the statutory allocations (SA), I take the 
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percentage value of petroleum revenues in the federal budget for each year and subtract it from 
the SA Bayelsa received for that particular year (see Table 5.2 below). The percentage of oil 
contribution to the SA in each fiscal year is provided by the CBN. For example, the total value of 
Bayelsa State’s share of SA for the same 2012 was N25.283 billion (Table 5.2). The CBN’s 
(2012) quarterly economic report revealed that oil contributed 75.6% of Nigeria’s income for 
that fiscal year. The contribution of oil to Bayelsa State’s revenues for the 2012 fiscal year was 
therefore obtained thus: 75.6/100 x 25.283/1. This gave me N20.22 billion which I added to the 
already determined 13% derivation and excess crude oil (again, see Table 5.2). The reason for 
doing this is because this study is examining revenues accruing to the state from oil sources 
alone. This process is summarized in Table 5.2 below. Amounts received from statutory 
allocations are not stable because of fluctuations in oil prices and the allocations principles 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
5.2b 13% Derivation 
The 13% derivation is a calculated value of the total oil products given to an area from 
where the oil is derived. What this means is that when any quantity of oil is sold, 13% of the oil 
price is removed as an entitlement for the nine oil producing states including Bayelsa. An 
example is the 2012 oil export of 830,772,048 million barrels of crude oil (National Bureau of 
Statistical, 2012). Out of the proceeds from the sale of this quantity of crude oil, 13% was 
deducted for the nine oil producing states. From the pool of this 13%, each member state 
received a share based on the quantity of oil extracted from its territory. Bayelsa’s 13% 
derivation value of N84.397 or about $562.65 million using the 2012 exchange values of $1 = 
N150 (Table 5.2 below) for the 2012 fiscal year made it the third highest receiver of the 13% 
derivation after Akwa-Ibom and Rivers States. 
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5.2c Excess Crude Oil 
The Excess Crude Oil revenue is the marginal income that is derived from additional oil 
output after the original output figure is met. For example, let’s say a daily output of 2.2 million 
barrels is the production cap. The value of any output above this 2.2 million cap is the excess 
crude oil. This additional money derived from extra output can fluctuate because of surge in oil 
prices, natural disasters, or man-made disasters. The CBN (2012) attributes surge in oil prices in 
the international oil market as a major factor responsible for increase in the monetary value of 
excess crude oil. To support its conclusion, the bank reported that surging oil prices almost 
increased the country’s excess crude oil earnings by four-fold “from $5.10 billion in 2005 to over 
$20 billion by November 2008” (CBN, 2012, p. 14). This surge can make a government happy 
because it has discretionary money to spend on public works. 
However, excess crude oil revenue faces a decline when oil prices fall in the international 
oil market. As crude oil is sold in barrels, producing above the 2.2 mbpd output, depending on 
how much the price fluctuates, will not increase the revenue generated from it. This decline has, 
according to the CBN (2012), led to huge drawdowns on the positive figures of surge in oil 
prices. The money generated from excess crude oil is usually deposited in a dedicated account 
known as the ‘Excess Crude Account (ECA)’ which was established in 2004. It is from the ECA 
that the FGN provides excess crude revenue to Bayelsa and other oil producing states. Like the 
13% derivation, the amount each state receives from the ECA is determined by the quantity of 
oil derived from the state and the amount generated from the sale of the excess product. 
But unlike the 13% derivation, not all money generated from the sale of excess crude is 
given to the oil producing states. After the producing states’ share is deducted, the remaining 
balance in the ECA is shared to other states of the federation, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), 
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and FGN. In Table 5.1, the country’s oil exports from where excess crude is derived are 
presented. It is cogent to note that the country’s oil production is not always in excess. I have 
created a column in Table 5.1 that summarizes reasons given by the NNPC) to explain some of 
the major increases or decreases in oil exports between 2011 and 2013.  
Table 5.1: Annual Oil Export from 2011 – 2013 
 
Year  Export (million 
barrels) 
Increase/Decree 
(million barrels) 
Increase/Decrease 
Reasons 
 2011  822,082,224  -42,619,877 vandalism, wear & 
tear, imports of 
refined petroleum 
products, labor 
unrest 
 2012  830,772,048  +8,689,824 New licenses, 
reduced 
disruptions in 
production, rise in 
international oil 
consumption 
 2013  762,045,201  -68,726847 Effect of 2012 
flood, vandalism, 
imports of refined 
petroleum products 
Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2013). Annual Statistical Bulletin 
Reasons for the increase and decrease in oil output and by extension, the unstable 
revenues accruing to federal and state governments are many. According to the NNPC (2013) 
bulletin, sabotage of oil pipelines by criminals, disputes with oil bearing and oil impacted 
communities, and wear and tear associated with oil equipment usage and age of equipment 
constantly reduce the quantity of output. The negative figures in the 2011 and 2013 production 
figures showed the effects of these man-made obstacles to the actualization of oil production 
figures. 
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In addition to the man-made problems, natural disasters like the 2012 flood that 
submerged Bayelsa Sate also contributed to the decline in production. The unstable nature of oil 
prices on the international market also affected the total revenue from oil. A decrease in the price 
means that the same output fetches lower income while an increase fetches more. The next 
section presents and analyzes data on Bayelsa State’s oil revenues for 2011, 2012, and 2013. 
5.3 Summary of Bayelsa State’s Annual Revenues from Oil Resources 
Except in 2011 when Bayelsa’s receipts from ECA and SA were not available, receipts 
for 2012 and 2013 fiscal years are presented in Table 5.2 below. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, 
Bayelsa is a mono-cultural economy. Out of over fifteen different natural resources provided in 
Chapter 2, crude oil (petroleum resources) generates most of the state’s revenues. Therefore, 
Bayelsa State’s annual budget like the national budget is mainly dependent on oil revenues. As a 
matter of fact, the CBN’s account operation data (1980-2013) revealed that for more than four 
decades, oil (resources) revenues have accounted for more than 65% of Nigeria’s annual revenue 
while non-oil revenue sources accounted for less than 35%. It is important to note that when 
figures are available, amounts received from the 13% derivation, excess crude oil, and statutory 
allocations are clearly stated like in the 2012 and 2013 fiscal years. I have earlier in this chapter 
explained how I derived the net percentage value of Bayelsa State’s SA for each fiscal year. 
The percentage value I took for each fiscal year is the fourth quarter. I took the fourth 
quarter value because that represents the final value of petroleum contribution to the federal 
revenue annually. It is also the basis the federal government uses in projecting revenue for the 
coming year. From the CBN’s fourth quarter economic reports for 2011, 2012, and 2013, oil 
resource contributions to the federal budget were 79.6%, 75.6%, and 69.9% respectively. This 
process is summarized in Table 5.2 below. 
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Table 5.2: A Three Year Contribution of Oil Revenues to the Overall Annual Budget of Bayelsa 
State 
Year  Total Income 
(N billion) 
Revenue from Oil (N billion) 
 2011  162 (about $) 13% Derivation 133.77 
Excess Crude Oil NA 
(79.6/100) of SA NA 
 _________________ 
Total 133.77 or (82.57%) 
 2012  206.509 13% Derivation 84.397 
Excess Crude 31.193 
(75.6/100) 25.283 of SA 20.226 
 ________________  
Total 131.816 or (63.83%) 
 2013  285.930 13% Derivation 160.706 
Excess Crude 45.500 
(69.9/100) 27.68 of SA 22.144 
 ________________ 
Total 228.35 (78.16%) 
Source: Bayelsa State Government Annual Budget Report (2013). 
Central Bank of Nigeria Fourth Quarterly Reports (2011, 2012, and 2013).  
 
According to Table 5.2, in 2013, 78.16% of the state’s total revenue of N285.930 billion, 
an equivalence of $1.78 billion (at the rate of $1 = N161) was derived from oil. A breakdown of 
the 2012 budget of the state showed that oil revenues accounted for 63.83% of that year’s 
revenue of N206.509 billion or $1.28 billion. Finally, the same oil revenues accounted for 
82.57% of the state’s revenue of N162 billion or $1.04 billion @ $1 = N156 (the exchange rate 
for 2011 was $1=N156). Table 5.2 shows a few things that are pertinent be noted. It shows 
inconsistency in the amount received per year. Another point is that the excess crude oil and 
statutory allocation values are missing for the year 2011. The government of Bayelsa State 
receives all these revenues on behalf of Bayelsans as provided in Appendix 2 (Concurrent List) 
of Nigeria’s 1999 constitution. These revenues collected by the state according to national and 
state laws must be redistributed to citizens of the state. The table further confirms the fact that 
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Bayelsa State almost depends entirely on petroleum resources for its revenues. I now turn to the 
next section to discuss how the states redistributes its oil revenue accruals. 
5.4 Oil Revenue Redistribution in Bayelsa State 
The state government redistributes its revenues discussed in the previous section to the 
citizens and institutions in the state through many budget expenditure items such as human 
capital development, education, development infrastructures, and healthcare. The state’s annual 
budget which is a statement of expected incomes and expenditures provides the means for the 
redistribution of oil revenues. As in every public accounting process, an annual government 
budget must be backed by a legislation passed by an appropriately constituted body. The 
constituted body that makes such legislation in the state is the BSHA. Appendix 2 of the 
Nigerian Constitution (1999) vests executive powers on the governor of a state. The governor 
may, subject to the provisions of the Budget Act made by the BSHA, exercise directly the 
redistribution of these oil revenues through the Deputy Governor, Commissioners, or other 
Commissions established for this purpose (Figure 2.4). In Table 5.3 below, I present, from the 
2012 state budget, a summary of government expenses paid for by redistributed oil revenues. 
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Table 5.3: Selected Avenues Bayelsa State Government Redistributes Oil Revenue Based on the 
2012 State Budget 
 
Expenditure Items Amount (N billion) As a Percentage of Oil 
Revenue (128.23 b) 
Personnel  24.4  19.02 
Urban and Regional Planning  04.0  3.11 
Housing   03.7  2.88 
Environment   02.1  1.63 
Water supply  02.0  1.55 
Manpower Development   00.54  0.42 
Youths  01.00  0.77 
Sports   04.9  3.82 
Social Development   00.52  0.40 
Information  02.5  1.94 
Health   08.1  6.31 
Education   23.7  18.48 
Rural Development   00.00  00.00 
Works   38.1  29.71 
Transport   03.1  2.4 
Commerce   00.00  00.00 
Power   09.1  7.09 
Industry   00.56  0.43 
Fisheries   00.3  0.23 
Forestry   00.18  0.14 
Livestock   00.32  0.24 
Agriculture (Crops)  03.1  2.41 
 
Source: 2012 Bayelsa State Budget  
 
There are twenty-one expenditure line items in the 2012 budget through which the state 
government spent a total of N128.23 oil revenues. The governor together with his assistants 
(Figure 2.4) supervised the implementation of these budgeted line items. From this data set, two 
line items, rural development and commerce, received zero naira during the fiscal year. The non-
allocation of funds to those areas may stem from insufficient funds, other levels of government 
provided funds for or took direct responsibility for rural development, or rural dwellers may not 
have had a strong representation at the budget office to lobby on their behalf. The review of 
literature revealed that rural dwellers in Bayelsa State are impacted by lack of development 
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projects in the countryside. Whatever the reason, the rural development sector and those 
impacted by its development or lack of it are likely to feel neglected because they do not receive 
consideration like their counterparts in other sectors within the state. The neglect of rural 
development can explain the grievances such as unemployment, lack of healthcare, and access 
roads of rural dwellers against the government of the state (Ekpo, 2004). The line item that 
received the highest allocation of 29.71% of the total revenues was works which covers 
construction and maintenance of roads, waterways, bridges, and other infrastructural 
development projects. It was followed by education with 18.48% of the total allocations. Eleven 
other expenditure line items received between one and nine billion naira. The remaining six 
expenditure line items got less than a billion naira. Looking at Table 5.3, some systemic 
exclusionary behaviors targeting rural dwellers that make up more than half of the state 
population are quite noticeable.  
The traditional occupation of the creek’s (rural) dwellers as explained in Chapter 2, 
include fishing, crop cultivation, lumbering, and livestock rearing. It is not a coincidence that 
these traditional means of livelihood received little or no attention by the government because 
they yielded little revenue compared to what oil resources generated. It is also revealed in 
Chapter 2 that the oil wells and other oil infrastructure are located in the rural areas. I now turn to 
participants in this study and documents that demonstrate the behaviors of some governors and 
their associates who were responsible for redistributing the state’s oil revenues for answers about 
why the rural areas are excluded.  
5.5 Corruption in Oil Revenue Redistribution 
My main research question is: How does perception of corruption in oil revenue 
redistribution create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State? To provide answers to this 
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question, I examined state, court, and anti-corruption agencies’ documents as well as 
publications from local and international sources, for cases of corruption. I interviewed 
Bayelsans during my fieldwork in order to ascertain their perceptions of corruption in the 
redistribution of the state’s oil revenues. I cross-checked participants’ perception of corruption in 
oil revenue redistributions with relevants documents on public officials in the state investigated 
and convicted or discharged in corruption cases. Forms of corruption have been discussed in the 
literature review (Chapter 3) of this study. The data I obtained from participants’ general 
perception of corruption in Bayelsan is summarized in Table 5.4 below. Note that the 
background information of these participants was provided in Chapter 4 of this study. 
Table 5.4: Participants’ Perception of Corruption in Bayelsa State 
 
Perceptions  Frequency of 
Responses 
 Percentage of 
Respondents 
A lot – that is why we cannot develop like others  56  100 
Pervasive and prevalent through all the tiers of the 
state administration  
 54  96 
Career civil servants and political appointees grant 
personal loans to themselves & never repaid them  
 49  86 
Our traditional chiefs are corrupt  49  86 
Our past and present politicians, families, and 
Friends are corrupt  
 38  68 
Government and oil company contractors are corrupt  37  66 
The court, investigators, and companies perpetuate 
corruption in the state  
 30  54 
Multinational oil corporations introduced bribery in 
our communities 
 28  50 
Nigeria’s military is corrupting the communities  5  9 
Corrupt communities always extort corporations  5  9 
Corruption is only a conspiracy by the anti-
governor’s groups 
 3  5 
Journalists in the payroll of opposition parties found 
corruption where There is None 
 2  4 
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The total number of Bayelsans who participated in this fieldwork was fifty-eight. Two 
participants from the MNOCs did not respond to this question. The non-participants said that 
redistribution of oil revenue in Bayelsa State was not part of their work. The data presented in 
the above table therefore came from only fifty-six participants. According to the data in Table 
5.4, 100% (all the fifty-six) of the participants admitted knowing “a lot” about corruption in 
Bayelsa and attributed the state’s lagging behind in development to corruption. These 
participants have coded words such as ‘brown envelope,’ ‘kola,’ (a contraction for kolanut), and 
‘torch’ for describing corruption. They also have the perception that money was used to buy 
positions of authority and those in authority embezzled public funds. Their perceptions 
confirmed World Bank’s (2008) conclusion on one of the forms of corruption I discussed in 
Chapter 3. In that conclusion, World Bank pointed that private parties could use bribes to buy 
many things provided by central or local governments while public officials seek bribes parties 
to supply those things sought by private parties. 
One of the coded words, kola, used by participants to describe corruption confused 
because kola is a traditional symbolic fruit a host gives his or her visitor on arrival to show the 
visitor that his/her visit is highly appreciated. Thus associating such symbolic fruit with 
something as bad as corruption got me even more confused. I, therefore, asked participants to 
explain how giving or receiving kola has become a corrupt act. Most of the answers given to me 
by the participants are summed up in a single sentence made by Isu (pseudonym for one of the 
participants) during interview in 2013. According to him, “Kola is money (bribe) given to 
gatekeepers in any office you want to transact business with in Bayelsa State in order to have 
access to senior officials.” Most of the remaining participants echoed the same sentiment by 
affirming that that if you do not bribe your way pass the low level staff, your file may be missing 
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and/or effort to see the chief or any other senior staff may be blocked by those lower level 
officials. 
Explaining the meaning of torch (flashlight), another participant in this study used an 
analogy to explain that “Middle managers in this chain of corrupt hierarchy are in the dark tunnel 
that you must pass through to get to the final authority. You need to flash your light (give bribe) 
in order to see your path to the final authority. If you fail to flash your torch, middle managers 
will turn you around until another person takes your position or wins the contract.” I was made to 
understand that the torchlight must be brighter than the kola. What this means is that if you give 
N100 (about 70 cents) to a gatekeepers, you must give N1000+ (about $5.80) to the middle 
managers.  
The brown envelope analogy represents bribes given to the top level managers or 
directors. Almost the size of USPS mailing boxes, brown envelopes in the manner some of the 
participants explained have to contain more (money) than white or official envelopes you can 
slip into the hands of lower level staff. Most of the participants claimed that winning a 
bigcontract depended on the size of your ‘brown envelope.’ Beyond the envelope is the sack, 
known by the funny name ‘Ghana must go,’ a reference to the time of forced repatriation of 
Ghanaians from Nigeria. Money in ‘Ghana must go’ bags show up in political meetings, as 
bribes meant for governors, commissioners and other top political appointees, and leaders of 
militant groups operating in Bayelsa State in order to win big contracts, secure top political 
appointments, and provide security for top officials of major oil companies operating in 
territories controlled by militia groups.  
The opinion of 96% of the participants is that corruption is pervasive and prevalent 
through all the tiers of the state administration and its institutions. Bayelsa practices federalism 
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modeled like Nigeria’s federal structure. Three levels of government, the state, local, and 
kingdoms exist in this model. Each governmental level has a chief executive, governor, local 
government chairman, and king. To administer their respective levels of governments, each chief 
executive uses state ministries and agencies, local government departments, and communities in 
the kingdoms.  
In the opinion of 86% of the participants, career civil servants and political appointees 
grant personal loans to themselves with no intention of repaying. They further contend that the 
beneficiaries never repaid the loans. As a participant who works in one of the State’ ministries 
(government’s departments) pointed out, calling it a personal loan makes it sound legal. His 
position was that the purported personal loans are unspent public money that ought to have been 
retired at the end of a budget year. But instead of retiring the money, career civil servants and 
political appointees distribute it among themselves thus confirming what had been revealed in 
the literature that money flows into the state but disappears on arrival (Nossiter, 2012). Another 
86% of the participants perceive that corruption in the state exists only among the traditional 
chiefs. Most of the youths in this category of participants provided evidence to support their 
assertion.  
To collect a state identity card or local government of origin verification form, the youths 
claimed that a letter identifying such youths from the King and/or first-class chief of their 
community was required. Before the designated official gave such identification letters, the 
person requesting the identification is made to pay an illicit sum of money ranging from N5000 
to N10,000 to the issuing official. They also claimed that no receipt was issued after payment to 
show that an official payment has been made and no explanation to what the money paid was 
used for. A youth showed me one of such letters he collected from a chief. The letter shown to 
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me bore the seal of the community’s chief. I knew the seal because it was from one of the few 
chiefs I interviewed during my fieldwork, but I was unable to verify if any money or the claimed 
amount was actually paid.  
There is no doubt that corruption in Bayelsa exists among elected officials and their 
associates. According to 68% of the participants, past and present politicians and their families 
and friends are corrupt. Their view is supported in the literature which revealed that two past 
governors of the state, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and Timpreye Sylva, as well as their associates, 
corruptly enriched themselves with public funds (Ebipade, Bekewei, and Inainfe, 2012; StAR 
and World Bank, 2013). The knowledge of 66% of the participants about corruption in the state 
was that government and oil company contractors were corrupt. More than half (54%) of the 
participants believed that the court, investigators, and companies perpetuated corruption in the 
state. 
Half of the participants claimed that their communities knew nothing about corruption 
until they started interacting with multinational oil corporations. A woman leader participant in 
this study, Mary (pseudonym), narrated how stealing, for example, was introduced in her 
community. Her narration is quoted verbatim below. 
I remember when we were growing up in Okembiri (pseudonym) community in the late 
1960s through 1970s. Our house we built without fence, doorposts were put in place to 
keep out wild animals, prevent cold entering into the rooms during harmattan (winter) 
season, and keep out occasional floodwater. There were never locks, burglary proof, or 
any kind of anti-burglary device in and around homes. If by accident you dropped any 
valuable on the way or in your house, any person who finds it will never sleep till he or 
she finds the rightful owner. Honesty was at the heart of our relationships within the 
family and in the community. Things changed when ABCK (psuedonym) came to our 
community on August 29, 1978 for geo-seismic survey. During that period, people we 
don’t know where the company recruited them from started stealing and hiding geo-
seismic equipment they stole in some of the community resident’s home. After work, 
they will come back to reclaim those stolen properties and give large amount of money to 
those residents who kept those stolen items for them. From holding stolen property to 
learning what company officials do with stolen items, our youths and some seniors 
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started stealing from those of their friends who would bring items to them to keep 
custody of till when the company staff will return to claim them. When the company left 
after six months of survey work, there was no more equipment to steal. Easy ways to 
becoming rich which stealing and counter-stealing brought vanished. The amateur thieves 
or those that did not manage their ill-gotten wealth during the boom period started 
stealing from co-residents. Thus the art of stealing public and private properties was 
introduced in our community (July 28, 2013).  
 
A few participants (9%) opined that the presence of Nigeria’s military in their 
communities was a corrupting influence. They explained that the military units and personnel 
posted in the area used checkpoints to extort money from motorbike taxi operators; some other 
personnel engaged in illegal petroleum products deals, and even reported that personnel paid 
bribes to their commanding officers to influence transfers to Bayelsa communities. This group of 
participants accused the military of patronizing commercial sex workers, inciting communal 
violence, and arming militia groups. Another 9% of the participants claimed that corruption in 
the state originated from some local communities that extorted money from multinational oil 
corporations. According to this category of participants, residents of communities, especially the 
leaders, extort money from corporations by claiming outrageous damages to the community 
stemming from oil exploration activities, duplicating names of property owners, and even 
inciting residents against companies.  
A small percentage (5%) of the participants, claimed that Bayelsa is a corruption free 
state. According this group, any perception or rumor of corruption was only a conspiracy by the 
anti-governor’s group operating in the state. Such anti-governor’s group consisted of members of 
the opposition parties or those within the same party but who had lost favor with the governor. 
Finally, 4% of the participants agreed with the 5% that said Bayelsa was a clean state. But, 
unlike the counterpart that laid their conspiracy theory on the anti-governor’s group, the 4% 
participants stated that the so-called corruption in the state was the making of journalists on the 
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payroll of opposition parties who found corruption where there was none. It is evident from 
Table 5.4 that most of the participants believed in the existence of corruption in Bayelsa State. 
My next step was to find, from the participants, specific acts of corruption that were perpetrated 
in the process of oil revenues redistribution in the state. 
Building on the findings in Table 5.4, I tested participants’ perceptions of corruption in 
the state’s oil revenues redistribution. Answers to this question provided understanding about 
how corruption creates and/or perpetuates conflicts in the state. The specific question I asked 
each participant was: What do you know about corruption in Bayelsa State’s oil revenue 
redistribution? The responses of participants are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Specific Forms of Corruption in Oil Revenue Redistribution 
 
Participant’s opinions  Frequency of 
Responses 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
Budgeting items that never get implemented 56 97 
Inflating contract costs and pocketing the excess 53 91 
Asking for bribes before approving development 
projects in certain areas  
51 88 
Using ghost companies and NGOs to steal public 
money 
45 78 
Secretly granting scholarships to children of chiefs, 
parliamentarian, commissioners, Regional 
Development Committee Officials, and other 
wealthy people in the society 
44 76 
Awarding contract to associates and ethnic based 
companies 
38 66 
Diversion of our oil money to fund political groups 
in the name of women empowerment 
21 38 
No corruption in the state because we spent money 
as approved in the budget 
3 5 
 
All the fifty-eight participants responded to this question. The people’s perception of 
corruption in Bayelsa’s oil revenue redistribution varies and in some cases overlaps among the 
participants in this study. To ensure uniformity, I used the following acts of corruption: bribery, 
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stealing, cronyism, distortion of government contracts, and political patronage (Morgan 1986) 
already discussed in the literature review (Chapter 3) to analyze these varied and overlapping 
perceptions in Table 5.5.  
One of the acts of corruption occurring in oil revenue redistribution was stealing of public 
funds. The redistributors of oil revenue according to participants, steal public funds in many 
ways. One of the ways was by intentionally budgeting line items that were never implemented 
according to 97% of the participants. The participants believed that money allocated to those line 
items in the budget are stolen by those who allocated the funds. Their reason for this conclusion 
was that the items such money ought to have been spent on were, in some cases, never started by 
some ghost contractors or were substandard if completed. What happened in the health sector of 
the state provides some insight. In 2008, the state government, as part of its healthcare plan for 
Bayelsans, approved $200 million from the revenue that accrues monthly to the state from excess 
crude oil revenue (Nossiter, 2012). Nossiter (2012) further gave a breakdown of $2.6 million 
supplementary budgeted healthcare line items as follows: $2.6 million (an equivalent of N4.21 
billion) for AIDS facility; $2 million (N3.24 billion) for the renovation of a hospital at Igbogene; 
and $3.3 million (N5.35 billion) for hospital construction in the state.  
On paper, this idea to provide these healthcare facilities for the people was commended 
because of its potential to improve healthcare delivery in the state. Unfortunately, participants in 
this research believed that the idea was, with all intent, an avenue for oil revenue redistributors to 
steal a total of N12.b billion or $7.9 million of public funds. The literature supported 
participants’ beliefs especially in Nossiter’s (2011) article titled “Riches Flow into Nigeria, but 
Are Lost after Arrival.” Nossiter observed in the paper that there were no hospitals in Igbogene 
that needed renovation, and officials of the State Ministry of Health were unaware of the money 
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approved for an AIDS facility or construction of a hospital. There are many questions demanding 
answers when the intended beneficiaries claimed that such projects were never implemented.  
According to 91% of the participants, another way stealing is perpetrated in the state is 
through the inflation of costs of government contracts. A government could award contracts for 
the construction of roads, bridges, new hospitals, schools, and other development infrastructures 
that could improve the life of the people it governs. Bayelsa State, as previously noted, lacks 
almost all of those infrastructures. In providing them, the government could use direct labor or 
contract the work to registered companies. Using direct labor implies that government officials 
would buy the materials and provide the manpower needed to execute the work and such 
manpower was available in the Ministry of Works or recruited directly as daily paid labor. It was 
always cheaper using this process, but the quality of work would not be guaranteed and also 
could take longer to complete. While using contractors could increase costs and lead to works 
being abandoned by dishonest contractors, this method has some advantages over direct labor. 
For example, the quality of work and timely completion of the work could be assured when 
honest contracts execute government work. 
Participants are not necessarily against the use of contractors to renovate old 
infrastructural facilities or build new ones because of the inherent advantages of contractor-
executed jobs over those completed by direct labor. The grievance expressed by 91% of 
participants above was that oil revenue redistributors who awarded the contracts inflated the 
costs of those contracts so that they could pocket the extra sum. According to these participants, 
oil revenue redistributors increased contract costs by conniving with contractors to mark up the 
original costs from 5-20% depending on the value of the original contract costs. For example, let 
us say the original contract cost for the construction or renovation of a dilapidated elementary 
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school is N8 million for the construction or N5.3 million for renovation. Those who award the 
contract may add the value of 5-20% of the N8 million or N5.3 million to the original cost. Some 
participants who claimed to be former and current government contractors among these 
participants provided more insight on how this practice works. 
When asked to explain how oil revenue redistributors inflated the contract costs, a former 
government registered contractor obliged. He explained that he had a ‘first-win’ option for every 
contract bid in a government agency (name withheld). He enjoyed that privilege over other 
registered contractor because of an illegal business relationship with the manager of the agency 
he used to execute contract for. There was a stipulation in that business relationship (oral 
agreement) that the contractor would be awarded contracts at inflated costs of 20% over the 
actual value. The contractor shall deduct this 20% and hand it over to the manager as soon as he 
receives payment for executing that contract. Business was going well for two of them until they 
fell apart over what happened to be a ‘miscalculated 20% value of cost.’ He regretfully narrated 
how they bid on and won contracts. According to him, a successful contractor was one that had 
an influential person among the clique that redistributed oil revenues. When a contract 
opportunity arose, the oil revenue body would decide who among them got the contract. Then an 
invitation to bid would be thrown open for registered contractors to fulfill public bid protocol. 
After all bids are received, members will convene under the pretense of reviewing submitted bids 
in order to select the winner. The influential person would emerge as the winner of the contract. 
However, he/she could not use his/her name as the contractor because it is against the law for 
some who awards contracts to be a contractor to the same agency.  
Continuing, he explained that a contractor favored by this influential person within the 
contract board would submit a contract review form after a long delay period claiming that the 
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inflation rate has increased between the periods the contract was tendered and when it was 
eventually approved. For example, a winning bid price of N3 million (about $18,189) may 
almost double to N5.7 million ($34,550). The reason given to the public for the increase, 
according to this contractor, ranges from an increase in the costs of materials to an increase in the 
value of property that needs to be destroyed to give way for the new projects. When the contract 
work is ‘completed’ and payment made, the contractor subtracts the excess cost and gives it to 
the influential person at the contract board. I put the word ‘completed’ in quotation marks 
because this contractor participant told me that contracts may not be completed before a 
complete payment is made especially if the big boss is about to leave office or needed the money 
for whatever reason. If the contractor fails to cooperate with this influential person, that marks 
the end of his/her business with the agency. He claimed that he lost favor not because he failed to 
cooperate but the big boss miscalculated the value of an extra 20% in the original contract cost. 
The boss accused the contractor of short-changing him and vowed not to transact any other 
business with him. This contractor concluded his narration by quoting the government official’s 
last statement to him thus: 
Damian!! (pseudonym of the contractor), I took you as my brother and friend. I was 
totally committed to helping you feed your family, educate your children, and help your 
business grow. I gave you contracts that I would have given to other contractors who 
were even willing to show more appreciation than you have ever shown for my goodness 
towards them. What have I received in return for being good to you? A stab at my back. 
You have closed the door by yourself. As long as I live and remain in charge of this 
agency, you will never win another contract here. 
 
After he quoted this government official, he sighed and said that he regretted cooperating with 
the official to inflate contract costs.  
When I asked the contractor why he regretted cooperating in inflating a contract value, he 
replied “By conniving with him (referring to the government official), we took away money that 
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would have been used in providing goods and services to the public and placed it in the hands of 
an individual.” His second regret was that the society was structured in such a way that he could 
not survive if he did not follow such dirty play. Seven other local contractors corroborated his 
view by admitting that winning a contract is about giving at least 5% kickback depending on the 
value of the contract. 
However, an interviewee who claimed to be a successful contractor with one of the 
government agencies countered the views of some of his former colleagues. According to him, 
there is nothing secretive about the bidding process. He also stated that he did not see anything 
wrong in giving tips to clerks in the office where transactions occur. When asked to clarify his 
comment, he obliged and started by commending the clerks at contract bidding offices. 
According to him,  
Those clerks greet you every time you step into the office. They help you file your 
documents correctly. They even provide you a seat if you have to wait long before 
you see the senior officials. How much do they receive at the end of the month as 
salary given the work they perform every day? Showing appreciation has nothing 
to do with contract costs. 
 
This view expressed by the interviewee further highlights the difficulty of defining what 
constitutes corruption according to World Bank (2012).  
His last rhetorical question, “How much do they receive at the end of the month as salary 
given the work they perform every day,” confirms what Montinola and Jackman (2002) stated 
that bureaucrats in developing countries like Nigeria and Argentina pay bureaucrats poorly. He 
did not answer the question of how much was too little or too small to give as a tip. He accused 
people who claimed contract cost inflation of either being out of touch with the rate of inflation 
in the country or crying foul because they could not meet contract bid requirements. 
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Another act of corruption perpetrated in oil revenue redistribution in Bayelsa State was 
bribery. According to 88% of the participants in Table 5.5, oil revenue redistributors asked for 
bribes before approving development projects in certain areas. A traditional ruler I interviewed 
during my fieldwork confirmed that it was no longer a secret that anyone who wanted to be 
attended to in any government offices in the state must pay bribes. He described how his 
delegation to the state’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development was made to pay 
a bribe before his community project filed earlier and declared missing mysteriously resurfaced 
once the bribe was paid. The project was the renovation of a ten classroom block for students of 
the only elementary school in a community of 15,000 people. Two pictures (Figure 5.1, A-B) 
taken during my fieldwork showed the condition the ten-bedroom block and one of the 
classrooms in this particular block.  
 
Figure 5.1 (A): 
The Ten-Classroom Elementary School Building Needing Renovation 
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Figure 5.1 B: 
A Classroom in Figure 5.1(A) where I held a Focus Group Discussion on 08/29/2013 
 
It was in this classroom that I held one of my four focus group discussions. Earlier in this 
chapter, a contractor hinted that tips or gifts voluntarily given to a government official for 
rendering prompt service, did not constitute bribery. I asked the chief whether what his 
community delegation gave to the Ministry official was not a gift in appreciation of his/her effort 
at finding their missing file. This chief took me on a tour of his community’s gift giving protocol 
which is reproduced verbatim here. 
When a visitor comes to our community, we welcome him/her. As a community that 
embraces strangers, we provide the best hospitality that includes cultural dance, local 
food, and a tour of important places in our community that symbolize who we are. On the 
last day of his or her visit, we send our visitor back with local crafts and blessings of our 
ancestors (prayer) usually performed by the chief priest. It is not in part of our gift giving 
to talk money in a sac or envelop to someone who did not visit our community. Even 
where you (referring to me) come from, gift is what comes from your mind not what you 
are forced to give out. You can see that there is no relationship between bribe we were 
forced to pay in that office and gifts my community gives to our visitors (August 10, 
2013). 
 
Some other participants told me that they paid bribes to get licenses for their small 
businesses, to register their companies, and some taxi cab operators even confirmed that any 
driver that wanted to get an instant Bayelsa State’s annual taxi emblem only needed to pay a 
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bribe to the state Inland Revenue officials. This belief supports what TI (2013) confirmed that 
the cost of doing business in places like Nigeria and other corrupt countries of the world is 
increased by bribes paid to public officials. 
Also, participants believe that oil revenue redistributors in the state continue to steal 
public funds using ghost companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Those who 
made this assertion (78% of the participants) questioned the secret behind astronomical growth 
in the number of NGOs operating in the state and the type of work they were doing. This set of 
participants said that oil revenue redistributors float companies and NGOs not for legitimate 
business or rendering services to the public but as safe routes to further steal money coming into 
the oil revenue purse. These NGOs, as not-for-profit organizations, are tax exempt. To maintain 
their tax exempt status, the NGOs were not allowed to operate as business entities. But 
participants accused oil revenue redistributors of ignoring tax laws by using NGOs they founded, 
or on whose boards they served, to corner contracts as well as deny the government of taxes 
business entities would have paid. A youth leader knowledgeable in how bogus companies were 
used to corner contracts by their owners stated that “The big ogas (referring to top officials) have 
companies that exist on paper. What they do is to break down a given contract project into many 
parts with subtitles like main contractor, subcontractor logistics, subcontract clearing, and 
subcontractor community liaison. Under pressure, you will see the main contractor. The subs are 
ghosts” (July 10, 2013). These participants further alleged that the floaters of the ghost 
companies and NGOs felt safer stealing from the public with ghost companies because no one 
could trace their incorporated addresses or any ghost member of the Board of Directors.  
To support his view, the above participant cited contracts awarded for elementary school 
rehabilitation, a water bore-hole, and a health center project, that were all abandoned in his 
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community after contracts were awarded to three companies. He said that nobody could trace the 
any of those companies. He said that the only visible work at those contract sites are erected 
billboards that have stood at the project sites for the past two year. There was no contactor 
information or address of the companies that won bids for the contracts. When we visited the 
health center site, I saw a 7 by 3 foot billboard that had almost completely been covered by 
bushes with the inscription “proposed site for the construction of modern health center for…” 
Other words in the billboard were missing. My guard cannot explain if the missing words were 
deliberately left out by the pseudo contractor or wiped out by rain, or eaten by termites. He 
jokingly said that “We have approximately two NGOs per person in Bayelsa State” (July 10, 
2013).  
This set of participants likened this activity of the oil revenue redistributors to an advance 
fee fraud commonly known as ‘419.’ The term ‘419’ is an acronym for Section 419 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code. According to this criminal code, corruption is a crime punishable upon 
conviction to a fine and/ or prison term for anyone or any organization who defrauds people or 
the government of their money and property. Bosco (pseudonym), a member of one of the 
Regional Development Committees (RDCs) observed that,  
In our community, the number of NGOs is greater than the entire number of residents. 
Ask me what they are doing? Nothing I know of besides sharing our community’s share 
of oil revenues. Some claim that they are empowering the people, peacemaking, creating 
awareness, environmental this or that and other incomprehensible jargons. The NGOs 
and their founders in the name of empowering our community defraud us of any little 
money given by MNOCs and government for our community development (July 15, 
2013). 
  
Another form of corruption used in oil revenue redistribution is cronyism and nepotism: 
Participants identified a pattern of corruption in oil revenue redistribution that favored families 
and associates of commissioners, parliamentarians, local chiefs, ethnic-based companies, and 
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other wealthy citizens of the state. According to 76% of the participants, oil revenue 
redistributors granted scholarships to children of chiefs, parliamentarians, commissioners, and 
other wealthy people in the society while families of the vast majority of poor families that 
needed educational financial assistance were neglected. A student activist who participated in 
this study had a lot to say about what he referred to as ‘scholarship magic’ in the state. This 
participant nicknamed ‘SSABS’ explained his experience. He gave himself the nickname in 
derision of the number of times he had applied for the Bayelsa State scholarship, hence Senior 
Scholarship Applicant of Bayelsa State (SSABS). He had been applying for the state’s 
scholarship to help him complete his bachelor’s degree in Engineering from the University of 
Port Harcourt located in Rivers State of Nigeria. Here is the transcript of our conversation. 
Me: SSABS! You described Bayelsa State’s scholarship scheme as ‘scholarship fraud.’ Can you 
explain what you mean by that? 
SSABS: Do you know what fraud is? 
Me: No (feigning ignorance). Please explain to me … (SSABS cut in before I could finish my 
sentence) 
SSABS: The scholarship board is misrepresenting what we were told was the aim of the state’s 
scholarship fraud [scheme]. Bayelsans were told that the scheme is part of the government plan 
to assist low income families to send their children to school. To qualify, your family’s annual 
income should not exceed N40,000 ($223 using the 2013 exchange rate of $1 = N180). In 
addition, a beneficiary must score at least 180 points in the Joint Admission Matriculation Board 
(JAMB) exam (JAMB is like SAT in the United States). There are other paper work 
requirements like an identification letter from a traditional ruler and local government chairman. 
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Those who are already in colleges can still apply with supporting documents from college, 
community, and local government. 
Me: Did you meet those requirements SSABS? 
SSABS: How, then, did I become a SSABS?  
Me: Why then were you not granted a scholarship? 
SSABS: That is why I called it scholarship fraud. Each academic year, majority of us from the 
poor families that the scholarship was established to serve purchase the application form which 
costs N1000 ($6). We fill it out and attach documentations as required. The only information we 
get when we submit our forms at the State’s Ministry of Education, if we are lucky, may be an 
official statement that says “Successful beneficiaries will be contacted as soon as the board 
finishes screening all applications.” 
Me: If the board is conducting screening of applications, how then can it be accused of fraud? 
SSABS: Did you believe the board was actually screening applications? (Again, he did not give 
me chance to answer him before he continued).  
By advertising the sale of scholarship forms, the scholarship board defrauded us of the 
little N1000 ($6) each of us has. The members before starting the purported screening 
exercise have ready-made names composed of sons and daughters of those in high places. 
Those names will be given the scholarship while our forms may be stacked at a corner in 
the boardroom or incinerated. Ask the so-called board if they do publish the result of their 
screening exercise. I am not the only one telling this story. Ask the Ministry to show you 
the number of those who apply for the scholarship each year. Of course it will not show 
you. But as a senior applicant, I can tell you from experience that it is declining. My 
conclusion is based on the fact that the sales and end dates for the purchase and 
submission of completed forms in recent years are extended more than four times. Does 
this mean that the number of poor people in Bayelsa State is declining? I will say no. 
Look at me for example. After parting with my N1000 for more than three times without 
a common explanation as to why I have consistently failed to make the list, I gave up 
trying. I am sure that is also the case with other people like me who have nobody to speak 
for them. Do you know why they refuse to publish the names of the beneficiaries? It is 
because publishing it will expose their deceitful acts. The names will also confirm what 
we already know, the commissioners, parliamentarians, and other names in high state 
offices.  
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SSABS’ story validated Joseph’s (2014) view on clienteles and prebend politics in Nigeria. He 
stated that “In Nigeria, an individual seeks the support and protection of an oga or a ‘godfather,’ 
while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods – loans, scholarships, licenses, plots 
of urban land, employment, and promotion” (p. 56). It is evident from this dialogue with SSABS 
that he had no oga to support and protect him hence he did not get the scholarship after repeated 
trials.  
In a participant’s opinion that further supported SSABS’, this practice contributes 
significantly to the 80% uneducated rural population in the state. The NDCB, a coalition of 
several civil society organizations in the region, confirmed this participant’s view. In the 
organization’s (2012) review of how Bayelsa State’s fisherman education scheme is performing, 
it discovered that the educational scheme has collapsed. It further noted that there was no 
comprehensive record showing student graduation rates, no proper account of the billions of 
naira budgeted each year for the scheme, and no conscious effort to recruit teachers and other 
administrative personnel.  
Shedding more light on the perpetuation of cronyism and nepotism in the state, 66% of 
the participants said that oil revenue redistributors awarded contracts to themselves and close 
associates especially co-ethnic-based companies. Participants said that a publicity stunt known as 
‘local contract content’ intended to give contracts not exceeding N3,000,000 ($20,000.00) to low 
level contractors in the state irrespective of their ethnic origins was narrowly interpreted along 
ethnic lines. Participants claimed that if one is a low level contractor but is not from the same 
ethnic group with the leader of a group awarding the contract, that person cannot get the contract. 
Even participants among the low level contractors from the same ethnic group where the project 
is to be executed, claimed that one needed to be a family member or connected to power brokers 
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before one could win any oil revenue funded contracts in the area. By this claim, participants are 
affirming what Joseph (2014) described as ‘an exchange relation role’ in which power brokers 
provide benefits to clients who in turn, reciprocated by offering general support and assistance to 
the power brokers. I was unable to substantiate these claims made by participants as my request 
to interview officials of one of the agencies that four participants accused of ethnicizing local 
content contracts was turned down.  
Another group of participants (38%) said that political patronage was another form of 
corruption used in oil revenue redistribution in Bayelsa State: According to this group of 
participants, oil revenues are diverted to fund political activities including hosting party 
delegates and conventions and funding the activities of the women and youths’ wings of the 
ruling Party, PDP. Participants stated that the state’s micro economic empowerment scheme was 
an extension of the PDP membership drive. The aim of setting up the micro economic 
empowerment scheme is to provide economic empowerment to women in the state by granting 
them soft loan to run their trading, craft, farming, and other small businesses (Bayelsa State 
Micro Economic Bureau, 2012). But instead of making the program unconditionally available to 
all Bayelsa women, this set of participants claimed that for a woman to get loans, she had to be 
an existing or new member of the PDP.  
Finally, 5% of the participants said corruption does not exist in Bayelsa States oil 
revenues redistribution as those charged with the management of all revenues accruing to the 
state from the oil sector are used in accordance with the state’s budget guidelines. According to 
one of the participants from this group, anybody crying and alleging corruption in the state must 
be among those we (referring to those that manage Bayelsa’ oil revenues) did not allow to use 
the state’s resources for their personal purposes. 
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The foregoing presentation and analysis of oil revenue redistribution and corruption in 
Bayelsa State revealed how much the state depends on oil resources for its revenue. It further 
showed how the state spends the money it realizes from oil. The perception of most of the 
participants was that bribery, stealing of public funds, cronyism, and political patronage among 
other acts of corruption were prevalent and pervasive in the distribution of the state’s oil 
revenues. 
5.6 Effects of Corruption in Bayelsa Communities 
Participants’ opinions show how deeply the challenges of corruption are felt in Bayelsa. 
When I asked them to describe how corruption affects their communities, most of the 
participants stated negative effects of corruption in their communities. There were a handful of 
participants who presented a positive image of corruption. The various views of participants are 
presented in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6 
The Effects of Corruption 
Responses  Frequency of 
Responses  
Percentage of 
Responses 
Justice in the state is for the highest bidder  42 72 
Destruction of our traditional values  38 66 
Made corrupt official to live above their income 37 64 
Created a greedy class  23 40 
Improved inefficient bureaucracy 21 36 
 Caused Ethnic conflicts 21 36 
Violent land disputes 17 29 
 
From Table 5.6, corruption in the redistribution of oil revenue in Bayelsa State has had 
several major effects in the state. As a result of corruption, majority of Bayelsans have lost faith 
in the justice system. According to 72% of the participants, justice in the state is for a very few 
who can afford to buy it. These participants said that they pray every day not to get into conflicts 
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with the state’s wealthy class who holds the state’s courts in their pockets. A participant told me 
his personal encounter with an adviser to current Governor Henry Dickson. His story seems to 
suggest that either he did not pray hard or his prayer not to get into conflict with Bayelsa State’s 
wealthy was not answered. This participant and the said governor’s adviser (names withheld) 
were in conflict over a piece of property. In this case as narrated by the participants, the 
participant had his Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) dated 1994 – two years before the state 
was created in 1996 – to prove that he was the rightful owner of the property. The adviser, 
through a means this participant could not explain, obtained a C of O on the same property dated 
2012. The 1994 and 2012 C of Os were tendered as evidence by the participant and the adviser. 
Note that the adviser retained an attorney while the participants had none. He said that the court 
ruled in favor of the governor’s adviser. He further stated that the presiding judge in his ruling 
stated that “The 1994 C of O was revoked.” When was the C of O revoked? Why was it 
revoked? Was the revocation communicated to the owner? These and more related questions 
were not answered by the court.  
The participant thought he knew what happened. He said “My land was taken from me 
because of the power of money and connection. The political adviser has more money and 
connection to influence the judge. A poor man like me has neither money nor connection.” I 
went to verify his story at the State High Court in Yenagoa where he said the case was heard. 
The Court Registrar told me that I can only obtain a copy of the ruling if (a) I am a party to the 
case, (b) an attorney representing one of the parties, and (c) an order from a higher court 
requiring him to release any information related to the case I have interest in. I was unable to 
contact the governor’s adviser as the participant did not give me his contact information.  
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He has vowed to fight to the end. Fighting to the end does not mean taking his case all the 
way to the Supreme Court. He has lost faith in the law courts and Department of Land and Rural 
Development, a government agency that issues C of O. His alternative choice, according to him, 
is to go traditional. I later learned that ‘going traditional’ means using juju (voodoo) and/or 
engage in physical fight with the political adviser until either he or the adviser surrenders or one 
party eliminates the other. This participant’s determination to see to the end of the property 
conflict with the political adviser reaffirms what Coser (1964) in Chapter 3 of this work 
described as the goal of opponents in conflicts. Coser’s said the aims of opponents in conflicts 
are to “neutralize, injure, or eliminate the revivals.” 
On how it affects traditional values of the people, more than half (66%) of the 
participants said that Bayelsans of old valued honesty and hard work; women were highly 
respected and our good names were religiously protected. These participants, however, regretted 
that those old values have been abandoned for less honorable ones. Some examples that 
participants provided to support some of the values they described as less honorable include 
women who were highly respected turning to prostitution; citizens of the state who abandoned 
honesty and hard work to pursue easy wealth through corruption; and young people who show 
no respect to seniors. Furthermore, participants noted that community members no longer stand 
for one another. The desire for money has changed that culture. Cases of community leaders and 
uneducated and powerless property owners resurfaced. According to the participants, in the old 
Bayelsa, whether you were educated or not, and whether rich or poor, nobody took advantage of 
another. Rather, the society worked as a body to ensure that the interests of everyone were 
protected. 
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The new Bayelsa lost these old values according to the participants. This group of 
respondents also said that the expanding conflicts between community leaders and owners of 
property get dirtier when a new property owner wishes to develop his property. He/she must pay 
off traditional leaders before any development can take place on the property. This unspecified 
amount doubles if the property owner is not an indigene of the community. If the property 
happens to be located near an oil facility, the property owner faces constant financial exploitation 
from the leaders because of the expectation of big compensation package from the oil 
companies. Some other traditional rulers govern from outside their kingdoms. Participants 
mentioned two first class-chiefs, one second class-chief, a host of other lower ranking chiefs, and 
members of the regional development communities who left the countryside to live in the cities. 
The participants said that relocating is not too serious an issue but the problem is that these 
absentee chiefs (mostly first- and second-class chiefs) debase their highly respected seats by 
shuttling between one oil company offices and another office begging young managers who 
ought to be their great grandchildren for contracts. The behaviors of these Royal Fathers before 
the company officials encourage the latter to treat the community’s customs and traditions with 
contempt. 
As part of the decay in the Bayelsa State, corrupt officials no longer hide their 
misconduct as shown in their lifestyle. The way those corrupt officials show off their ill-gotten 
wealth prompted 64% of the participants to declare that corruption made officials to live above 
their incomes. A participant who worked at a constituency office queried how a BSHA clerk 
with an annual income of less than N750,000 ($5,000) per annum could have a sum of N3.5 
million ($23,333) lodged in her account and two additional choice properties valued at over N20 
million ($133,333) in Yenagoa. Four other participants from this 64% group went a step further 
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to reveal that flaunting of wealth among low level civil servants in the state had become a 
bragging right. In 2013, an interviewee puts it this way:  
An administrative assistant who was my neighbor borrowed N100 ($0.4) to attend an 
interview for her present job six months ago is now super rich. Only two months on the 
job, she purchased a house and moved in. She has started developing a commercial 
property which she intends to rent out upon completion. In addition, she bought a BMW 
3 series which she cruises around the city. (August 8, 2013) 
 
Administrative assistants, gatemen, messengers, and most public servants below grade level 05 
are usually low level public servants in Nigeria. It would be impossible for a low level civil 
servant who earns a low income to attain such level of investment within a short time except 
he/she has other sources of income. However, Oduma (2012) as noted in Chapter 3 of this study 
revealed that in Bayelsa state, a low level civil servant could use corruption to achieve these 
investments. The author categorically stated that “In Bayelsa, it is common to see treasury 
officials of low-grade level erecting huge residential buildings. This category of workers also 
own massive estates in and outside Yenagoa and live a lifestyle that is arguably above their 
legitimate earnings as civil servants” (p. 100). This kind of life style could potentially spell doom 
for a society like Bayelsa. 
 The cases of former Governors Alamieyeseigha and Sylva further showed how public 
officials in the state live above their incomes. Former Governor Timipre Sylva served the state 
from 2007 to 2012. Assuming his annual salaries as governor was N12, 000,000, he would have 
earned N60, 000,000 over the cause of five years he spent in the Government House in Yenagoa. 
This estimate contrast with the way he lived and properties he acquired during this five-year 
period. We should not lose sight of the fact that he was temporarily removed as governor in 2008 
as shown in Table 2.2 of this dissertation. Table 5. 7 below summaries his additional properties 
that the EFCC seized in 2012.  
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Table 5.7: Former Governor Timipre Sylva’s Fresh Bayelsa Loot Seized by EFCC 
 
Property Type Property Value  
A Duplex at Cachez Estate, Mpape, Abuja N310,000,000 (about $2,066,667) 
A Mansion at Ademola Adetokunbo Crescent, 
Abuja 
N700,000,000 (about $4,666,667) 
Total N1.1 billion (about $6,667,333) Base on $1 
=N150 in 2012. 
 
Source: ThisDay Newspaper (2012): EFCC Uncovers Fresh Bayelsa Loot. 
 
One can easily see the wide gap between the governor’s income and the value of new ill-
gotten properties he owned. It is instructive to note that these two properties in Table 5.7 are 
different from previous properties EFCC impounded from Sylva when he was first arrested in 
2012. Even when I estimated the annual salary of governor Sylva to be N100 million (which is 
highly unlikely) per annum, it will take him 20 years as governor of Bayelsa State to make a 
billion naira. The actions of Sylva in Table 5.7, the administrative assistant who had been in 
office for only six months, and other high and low public servants in the state are consistent with 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2006) definition of greed discussed earlier in Chapter 3. The authors 
define greed as “elite competition for the control of natural resources rents” (p.97).  
In the attempt to maintain this kind of lifestyle and for other people wanting to measure 
up to those living a livelihood above their income, a new greedy class, according to 40% of the 
participants, emerged in Bayelsa State. Greediness is exhibited in behaviors like lack of concern 
for the welfare of others and insatiable desire to grab every available resource at expense of 
others entitled to a share of such resource. It is greediness that Collier and Hoeffler (2006) noted 
in the theoretical framework of this study that resulted from gains rebel leaders made from 
resources located in territories they controlled that motivated them to reject efforts to end 
conflicts. Similarly, Joseph (2014) in the literature review section of Chapter 3 affirmed the 
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culture of selfishness among officeholders in Nigeria through the manner those individuals and 
their clique exhibit prebendal behaviors. Agbiboa and Maiangwa (2012) in the literature 
explained this behavior thus “State offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by 
office holders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their cronies” (p. 
117). It is important to note that the few office holders and their cronies who display these 
greedy behaviors do not constitute half the population of Bayelsa which according to the NPC is 
1.7 million people. Consequently, the actions of those who constitute less than half of the state’s 
population left a majority of the Bayelsans persistently in penury (Joseph, 2014).  
In the opinion of 36% of the participants, corruption has helped to improve the state’s 
inefficient bureaucracy. Certain bureaucratic processes, like approving construction sites, and 
granting different forms of permits are delayed in many instances. The delay is explained by the 
deliberate effort of bureaucrats to earn extra income outside of their official engagement (Mbaku 
1996). Some of these participants explained the difficulties aspiring entrepreneurs face before 
they can get permission to establish small scale businesses, establish private school, and other 
employment generating businesses. The fastest way to eliminate the delay, the participants 
stated, is to offer ‘brown envelops’ to the people working on your file. Brown envelops are a 
nice way to say bribe. It means to put some money in a brown envelop and hand it over to the 
person you are seeking a favor from. The people working on a person’s file in this context were 
the career bureaucrats. These positive remarks that participants made on corruption agree with 
two positive things about corruption revealed in this study’s literature and theoretical framework.  
The first positive side of corruption is that it improves social welfare by reducing 
cumbersome regulations (Leff 1964). The lamentation of a retiree in Bayelsa State civil service 
and one of the participants in this study supports Leff’s conclusion. According to the participant, 
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collection of pension entitlement when one retires from the state civil service is like going 
through a hell fire. The volume of paperwork, endless wait and frequent visits to pension office, 
and inability of officers who oversee pension scheme to do the work for which they are paid 
have resulted in retirees dying before drawing any money from their pensions. He said that some 
pensioners who succeeded in receiving their entitlements approved on time did so by reaching an 
‘understanding with pension fund managers.’ This understanding with pension managers, paying 
them bribes, removes any obstacles such as paper work, endless waits and frequent visits to 
pension office as well as inducing managers of pension scheme to remain on their seats, that 
would have delayed the approval of one’s pension entitlement.  
The second positive effect of corruption as revealed in Chapter 3 of this study is that it 
rewards poorly paid bureaucrats by providing them a complementary income (Montinola and 
Jackman, 2002). The authors’ conclusion is that developing countries, like Nigeria and 
Argentina, underpay workers. For these lowly paid workers to meet up with inflationary trends in 
their respective countries, another kind of income must be available for them. In Nigeria where it 
may not be too easy to hold two jobs, corruption may be a secondary source of income available 
to its low income bureaucrats. 
According to 36% of the participants, corrupt acts such as cronyism, political patronage 
and bribery caused ethnic conflicts in the state. The chapter on literature review showed these 
acts of corruption alone and in conjunction with one another created and/or perpetuated conflicts. 
For an example, Amuwo (2012) while contributing to the link between distortion of government 
expenditures and conflicts posits that “Public servants and elected officials can cause delays so 
that they could get opportunity to extract bribes, individual bribers can improve their individual 
situations at the expense of the polity, the net losers” (p. 173). Amuwo’s reference to individual 
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briber takers and the net losers (the society) demonstrates the existence of divisions in a society 
which, in this case, are the gainers and losers. Divisions within a society create conflicts 
(Johnston, 1996). 
Bayelsa State is a heterogeneous ethno-linguistic society (Chapter 2, Pp. 39-40). The 
ethno-linguistic groups could be individualized. Individual ethnic groups could use their point 
persons in government offices to distort government expenditures by doubling expenditures of 
government programs that benefit their group while at the same time, cutting expenditures for 
other ethno-linguistic groups served by the same government. The ethno-linguistic groups whose 
government expenditure programs were slashed would definitely feel deprived should they 
perceive that their ethno-linguistic counterpart denied them of such entitlement. Consistent with 
justice seeking or grievance according to Collier and Hoeffler (2006), groups seeking justice 
occasionally use violence to draw attention (Pandit, 2009). This position is further explained in 
the next chapter where I discussed corruption and conflicts.  
Finally, corruption is responsible for violent land disputes according to 29% of the 
participants. Bayelsa State is 95% swamp land. The remaining 5% is fiercely competed for by 
the state’s population of 1.7 million people. One of the attributes of a fiercely contested object 
like land is that competitors mobilize every means available to win. The incident described 
above, between a participant in this study and an adviser to the governor of Bayelsa shows how 
conflicts over land can be explosive. Next I explored more the implication of justice being for 
the highest bidder as expressed by 72% of participants in Table 5.1 above.  
My curiosity was aroused by opinions expressed by 72% of the participants who said that 
one of the effects of corruption is the commercialization of justice (justice is for the highest 
bidder). I sought to find out what effect such expression has on the state’s zero corruption 
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tolerance policy. I ask them, if justice is for the highest bidder, how does it affect the Bayelsa 
State’s claim of a zero tolerance for corruption?  
 
Table 5.8: Effects of Justice for the Highest Bidder on the Bayelsa’s Zero Tolerance for 
Corruption 
 
Responses  Number of 
Respondents = 58  
Percentage of 
Responses 
Resulted in several cases of contempt of 
court by rich people 
40 95 
People lost faith in the judicial process 36 86 
Jungle justice became an alternative to the 
court system 
36 86 
Increased in the stealing of public funds 19 45 
Zero tolerance applies to people who 
cannot pay for justice 
14 33 
 
From Table 5.8, one of the effects of justice in the state being for the highest bidder 
according 95% of the participants is that it enabled rich people to be in contempt of court without 
consequences. Participants stated that rich people use their ill-gotten wealth power to influence 
the transfer, demotion, and, or dismissal of judges that ruled against them. Thus creating fears 
among judges and magistrates as they stand to lose their jobs for crossing path with those 
enriched by corruption.  
Accompanying the above-the-law status of those enriched by corruption is the public’s 
loss of faith in the judicial process according to 86% of the participants. These participants 
queried the rationale of going to court if one knows that an opponent is untouchable by the law 
and its administrators. A participant went as far as defining justice as “the process of giving to 
the rich people what belongs to the poor people.” This situation applies to rich and poor 
communities or communities that have connections to those in power and other communities that 
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do not have such power network. Thus in Bayelsa, it is common practice for rich communities to 
use their connections and money to encroach on properties of the poorer communities.  
Participants opine that all it takes a rich community is to find and annex a weak 
community’s property especially where such property lies on a crude oil belt. Who can speak for 
the weak community? From where will it mobilize fund to finance a protracted court case against 
a more powerful neighbor? When the cost of seeking for ‘justice’ that hardly passes for a justice 
is greater than the gain, the affected community will give up. These participants claimed that rich 
communities and individuals bought justice leaving their poor opponents frustrated and angry. In 
their anger, the losing parties sought for alternative ways of settling scores with their more 
prosperous opponents. 
The alternative and less expensive form of justice poorer communities and individuals 
resort to in a corrupt environment is ‘jungle justice’ according to 86% of the participants. Jungle 
justice is a situation in which people take the law into their own hands by shaming, beating or 
killing people for alleged crimes or offence they may or may not have committed. This is an 
alternative forced on the people by the commercialization of justice. The Anti-Corruption 
Internet Database (ACID) agrees in its 2013 article entitled “Modern Corruption in Nigeria’s 
Judiciary-Case of Justice Ayo Salami and Justice Katsina-Alu.” The organization stated that 
“that the judiciary is not the defender of equity and justice, at least, not for those without the 
means to procure judgments that reverse the ills of the society.” Also in agreement with this view 
is the FFP (2011) in its article titled “Unlocking Nigeria,” noted that jungle justice is not only 
used by communities and individuals but also by the Nigerian Police Force. The organization 
observed that in Nembe L.G.A of Bayelsa that , “there were several reports of impunity on the 
part of the security outfit code-named “Famou Tagbei,” in which suspects were tortured and 
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killed without due process of law” (p. 10). Police often complain that when they risk their lives 
to arrest criminals, the law courts set the criminals free or impose very lenient punishment on 
them. Such actions by the law courts put the life of the policemen that arrested the criminals in 
danger. That explains why the police anti-crime unit known as ‘Famou Tagbei’ also uses jungle 
justice. The danger of this alternative court system is that more innocent people can get hurt, 
killed, or denied justice than the court process.  
The view of 45% of the participants is that selling of justice has increased the rate and 
amount of public funds stolen. The rate here refers to the frequency with which public money is 
stolen while the amount refers to the figure value of the stolen money. These same participants 
stated that corrupt individuals have realized that if you steal more money, you can use it to buy 
justice and, even if you lose your case, you still have a large amount of money to spend later. 
Therefore, it is a shame to steal only one million naira when you can get praises for stealing ten 
times that amount. The case of James Ibori who stole $250 million of public fund in Delta State 
and Ighodalo whole stole a $245.00 worth of Sony Ericsson phone (Odesola 2013 and Tran 
2012) is instructive. The former governor got a 13-year jail term for stealing public fund while 
Ighodalo got a 45-year jail term for stealing a private phone that is not worth one-millionth of 
$250 million.  
It is the view of 33% of participants that the zero tolerance policy of Bayelsa applies only 
to those who cannot afford to pay for justice. The cases that involved former Governor Ibori and 
the person who stole cellphone above provide a concrete evidence of how Bayelsa and the 
Nigerian society preach and practice zero tolerance policy. Similarly, upon all the documented 
convictions of former Governor Alamieyeseigha Diepreye over corruption in Bayelsa, Nigeria, 
and Britain, he spent only two years in jail and received a state pardon (EFCC, 2013; UN StAR, 
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2013). This former governor remains a free and clean courtesy of the state pardon. These 
contrasts with poorly paid bureaucrats in the state who may be serving longer jail terms for 
stealing or embezzling N20,000 public funds. Some people in the state may have been jailed for 
a longer term for exposing top officials who stole public funds. 
Tables 5.6 and 5.8 have shown effects of corruption in Bayelsa. Those effects of 
corruption have, according to participants, fueled grievances that include anger, frustration, 
disappointment, and helplessness in Bayelsa State and among its communities. These findings 
are consistent with Oduma (2012) who posited as noted in Chapter 3, theoretical framework 
section, that “In Bayelsa, it is common to see treasury officials of low-grade level erecting huge 
residential buildings. This category of workers also own massive estates in and outside Yenagoa 
and live a lifestyle that is arguably above their legitimate earnings as civil servants. This is one of 
the factors that increase the anger of pensioners” (100). In what ways have Bayelsans 
communicated these grievances? I move to the next chapter to discuss corruption and conflicts in 
Bayelsa State.  
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Chapter 6 
Conflicts and Corruption  
6.1 Conflicts and Corruption in Bayelsa 
In the preceding chapter, I presented and analyzed thepeople’s perception of corruption 
in oil revenue redistribution in Bayelsa State. In the present chapter, I will present and analyzes 
data on the impact of the various perceptions of corruption on conflicts in Bayelsa State. The 
results of the analysis in this chapter will be used in two ways. In the first place, they will be 
used to answer the main research question: How does corruption in oil revenue redistribution 
influence conflicts in Bayelsa State? In the second place, the results are used to support or 
reject hypothesis #1: Perception of corruption create and perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa. I start 
by looking at common conflicts in Bayelsa State 
6.2 Common Conflicts in Bayelsa State 
In Chapter 3, I discussed extant literature on dominant conflicts such as intra- and inter-
community conflicts, host community and oil corporation conflicts, and government and militia 
groups’ conflicts in Bayelsa State (see pages 82-91). I asked participants in the semi-structured 
interviews to describe most common conflicts they experienced in the state. My intention for 
asking this question was to see whether the participants’ experiences agreed with those forms of 
conflicts discussed in the literature chapter. Starting with individual participant’s personal 
knowledge of conflicts in this state, I asked specifically: In your opinion, what are the most 
common forms of conflicts in the state? The common themes in their responses are listed below 
in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Responses on the Most Common Conflicts in Bayelsa State 
 
Responses No of Respondents 
= 58 
Percentage 
Conflicts are between the communities and oil 
companies  
55 95 
Conflicts in the state are only in the 
communities  
53 91 
We have clashes between the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) and Militants 
51 88 
Conflicts among ethnic groups 51 88 
Criminal gangs clash among themselves 50 86 
Youths clash with government occasionally 32 55 
Conflicts in the state is between political parties 31 53 
Peace loving Bayelsans are in conflict with 
enemies of the state 
15 26 
 
Data from Table 6.1 shows an almost unanimous agreement on most of the conflicts 
participants perceived as common in Bayelsa State. The most common conflicts in the state 
reported by 95% of the participants are those involving oil companies and the host communities. 
Host communities are the areas where crude oil and oil exploration infrastructures are located. 
One of such areas is Olobiri. Olobir was Nigeria’s first crude oil discovery site in 1958. Other 
oil-bearing communities include Nembe, Sagbama, and many other communities that host 
several oil wells, drilling equipment, oil pipeline networks, and operational bases for most of the 
multinational corporations operating in the state (see Table 2.3 for summary list of communities 
in Bayelsa State that have crude oil deposits). Where things functioned properly, the presence of 
oil operations in these Bayelsa communities brought benefits such as employment, infrastructural 
development, and improved healthcare facilities. The MNOCs are conscious of the effects their 
oil operations have on the communities. Consequently, they undertake, in collaboration with the 
government, to provide compensation to communities for properties and means of livelihood 
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destroyed. Equally, they take steps to control the effect of hazardous substances that result from 
oil drilling, refining, and distribution that devastate host communities.  
Participants claimed that most of the MNOCs refused to acknowledge that their activities 
degraded their environment, contributed to people losing their main source of livelihood –
farmland, fish, and crafts, and concentrated oil revenue benefits in the hands of very few elites in 
the society, as well as other forms of hardship the communities suffered. Renner (2002) in the 
literature review chapter agreed that the profiteers of oil revenue benefits were few domestic and 
foreign few elites by positing that, “In many developing countries, the economic benefits of 
mining and logging operations accrue to a small business or government elite and to foreign 
investors” (p. 8). For example, participants stated that when the compensation packages were 
paid, they were inadequate. In other instances, compensations paid passed through many 
intermediaries such as chiefs, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and some 
remote oil corporation officials before reaching the intended communities. A participants 
answering a question on why compensation packages have to pass through many hands before 
reaching the communities said that: 
The individuals and organizations that claim to be intermediaries between our 
communities and oil companies are nothing but deduction points and publicity machines 
of the oil companies. Any amount of money oil companies, individuals, and 
organizations publicized as have been given to any of our communities never got to us as 
announced. Each individual or organization involved in the chain of delivering the 
announced compensation packages ducts at source certain amount before passing the 
remaining to the next person/organization within the line. These deductions the justify by 
using terms like administrative, collection, and contract fees which an uneducated people 
hardly understand or questioned. When the money finally reaches the communities, we 
may be lucky to get half of the total amount announced.  
 
One of the outcomes of unfair distribution of benefits in a society could be that only few 
privileged individuals and groups benefit at the expense of the populace as Renner (2002) 
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confirmed above and affirmed by other writers such as Obi (2010), Ojo (2012), and Shaxson 
(2007). Concentration of societal benefits in the hands of a few could create and/or sustain 
grievances in a society. Aggrieved people could engage violence as a means of communication 
their grievances. 
 A participant summed up the view of his colleagues by arguing that, “We cannot fold our 
hands and remain silent while our children and women starve, our means of livelihood removed 
from us and used in enriching people who do not feel the impact of the operations of oil 
corporations in our land. We have learned in a bitter way that these companies can only respond 
to our needs when we use violence against them.” Indeed, Pandit (2012) agreed that grievances 
can motivated deprived groups to fight against perceived injustices by postulating that “A key 
grievance motivating many fighters has been lack of access to education.” The violent responses 
by host communities’ perceived benefits deprivation were not instantaneous. Many of the 
participants in this group acknowledged that violence was a last resort for them following long 
period of the authorities (oil corporations) concerned not listening to their peaceful demands. An 
example was the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights which contained 20 broad perceived grievances the 
ethnic groups continued to suffer in their association with other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. 
The Ogoni Bill of Rights was non-violent when compared to the militancy of the 1998 Kaiama 
declaration by the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC).  
An analysis of the views expressed by the 95% of participant’s in this dissertation over 
conflicts between host communities and oil companies revealed four stages that developed from 
non-violence to violent confrontations. I identified from this analysis four main stages in the 
conflicts between host communities and oil corporations. The stages are road blockage and 
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demonstrations, disruption/stoppage of operation, vandalism/destruction of oil facilities, and 
hostage taking. 
Road blockage and demonstrations:  
Host communities often block entrance to oil exploration facilities and deny access to 
company officials. The issues in conflict at this stage include grievances such as environmental 
pollution, threat to life and property of communities, disregard of community customs and 
traditions by oil and government officials, and threats to their traditional occupations. Anikpo 
(1998) provided an informative summary of causes of host community vs MNOCs conflicts by 
postulating that  
Oil production, like all vigorous capitalist enterprises tend to deepen the matrix of social 
inequality and to destroy – not just the local economy or material conditions of existence 
but also the entire cultural cosmos within which communities define themselves, perceive 
their collective interests and derive their social cohesion (p. 6).  
 
In environments where these issues highlighted by Anikpo exist, conflicts are likely to 
arise between perceived victims and their victimizers. Discarded tires, broken pots, placard, and 
forming human shields are mostly used to block roads and display some of these deepening 
grievances like destruction of host communities’ economic bases and debasement of 
communities’ cultural norms. For instance, fishermen who earn their living by fishing in Bayelsa 
State waters lost their means of livelihood because of the construction of superstructure of a 
liquefied natural gas plant and fuel storage tanks that moored their fishing waters (O’Neill, 
2007). The conflict at this stage is mostly peaceful as exemplified in Figure 6.1 below where 
Izon women protested half naked against what they claimed was ‘disrespect of women’ by oil 
workers who patronize commercial sex workers in the state. Among the many effects of this 
patronage of commercial sex workers in Bayelsa, according to Ekine (2005), Jike (2004) and 
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Odoemene (2011), is women’s sexual exploitation by Bayelsa men, state officials (security 
agencies), and petro businesses officials. 
Figure 6.1: Bayelsa Women Protesting Rise in Prostitution in Yenagoa 
 
Source: www.googl.com/womenprotest_chevronng/url.html. 
 
Disruption/stoppage of operation:  
At this stage of MNOCs-host community conflicts, community members move beyond 
blocking entrances to actually going into the facilities to occupy them. Such occupations often 
prevent oil workers from doing their jobs. Supervisors may be forced to close down operations 
for safety reasons. The NNPC cited disruption/stoppage of oil operations as one of the reasons 
Nigeria’s excess crude oil revenue decreased sometimes in 2011, 2012, and 2013 (see Chapters 3 
and 5 of this dissertation). 
Vandalism/destruction of facilities:  
The conflicts become more serious and violent here. Facilities are burnt down or vandalized. 
Some criminal elements within the protesters often capitalize on an occasion such as this to 
assault company workers and vandalize oil facilities. The NNPC in the literature review chapter 
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of this study (p. 91) identified vandalism as one of the factors that reduces the country’s total oil 
output. The communities often blame the destruction of oil pipelines on greedy company 
officials who want to make illegal money by siphoning petroleum products to sell at the black 
market. The companies in turn blame oil bunkerers in the communities for the sabotage of 
facilities. 
Hostage taking:  
Community youths and other groups in Bayelsa’s creek areas took oil company officials 
hostage as one of the ways to express their grievances. In effort to rescue their workers, 
companies solicited help from the Nigerian security forces. The security forces could might 
negotiate with the hostage takers or use force to free the hostages. Negotiation may end up with 
ransom being paid to the groups that hold the hostages especially if they were taken for ransom. 
But where those hostages were not taken for ransom or corporations and countries of origins of 
the hostages have policies that prevented them from paying ransom to terrorists, then security 
agencies could storm known or suspect places where hostages were kept. Storming militia 
group’s hideout usually exacerbate the conflicts because militants may attempt a rescue 
operations for their colleagues captured by security agencies. If that fails, they may take new 
hostages as bargaining chips for the freedom of their captured colleagues. There were many 
instances where hostages have died in attempted rescue operations or when individual hostages 
attempt to flee from their captors. In his book titled “International Terrorism,” Shanky (1999) 
summed up this stage of conflicts between host communities and oil corporations by reporting 
that in 1998, six hundred oil company officials were held hostage in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region. Some of the hostages could be released after some kind of negotiated agreements 
between the hostage takers, government, and/or MNOCs.  
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In addition to potential death of hostages, hostage takers, and security personnel involved 
in the operation could also die. I could not confirm the exact number of hostages, security 
personnel, and hostage takers who may have died in Nigeria during such rescue operations. The 
reason is because such numbers are difficult to obtain. During a focus group discussion with 
participants from the OICs, most of the participants who were dismayed by the criminal 
intensions of some community members described how hostage and kidnapping strategy were 
orchestrated in their communities.  
To them, kidnapping was not their communities’ way of life. Kidnappers take field staff 
working in the oil companies as bait to lure the top officials of the companies to come to the 
communities with the aim of negotiating for the release of their workers held hostage. When the 
top officials arrive for the negotiations, the lower level hostages are released while their bosses 
are held in their place. Participants said that ransom paid on low level staff is not as big as what 
might be paid per boss, especially expatriate bosses. Therefore, kidnappers increased the original 
amount of ransom that must be paid before the top officials were released. The participants said 
some company and government officials as well as innocent community members caught in the 
cross fire during rescue operations to free those kidnapped have been known to die. They could 
not give accurate account of the number of people who died as a result of kidnappings. 
Another common conflict in Bayelsa State according to 91% of participants in Table 6.1 
is community conflicts. In my chapter on literature review and theoretical framework (p. 82), I 
discussed two major types of community conflicts, intra- and inter-community conflicts. The 
first is intra-community conflict, i.e., among the parties within the same community. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, I stratified Bayelsa State in OBCs and OICs in Chapter 4: 109-110. 
A conflict confined within an OBC or OIC is an intra-community conflict. The case of conflicts 
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among indigenes of Kolokuma/Opokuma served as an example. The conflict within this OBC 
arose over improper deals in property ownership, leadership positions in the regional 
development committees, and other internal issues bordering on due process. These conflicts 
resulted in the deaths of many people (FFP, 2013).  
The other type of conflicts are inter-community conflicts, which involve two different 
communities in the state. Such conflicts involving Izon v Atissa, ethnic groups, oil-bearing and 
oil-impacted communities, electorates and politicians, and other different communities in the 
state served as examples of inter-community conflicts. Like intra-community conflicts, inter-
community conflicts resulted in the death of many people, destruction of property, and 
kidnapping of community leaders and ordinary citizens (Nwachukwu and Uzoigwe, 2004).  
Yet, Bayelsa State’s conflicts are not confined within and between communities. 
According to 88% of the participants, the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) and militants in the 
state were engaged in violent confrontations. The JTF is composed of personnel drafted from 
Nigeria’s Navy, Air Force, Army, and Police to protect oil facilities and restored order in the 
troubled Niger Delta region (Chiluwa, 2011). The JTF was established in 2006 by the Olusegun 
Obasanjo and Abubakar Atiku administration. Most of their conflicts according to the 
participants are over the sharing of proceeds from their illegal enterprise they run through 
roadblocks. According to participants sympathetic to the militants, the JTF officials are greedy. 
They said that JTF officials and militants set up roadblocks and collect security fees from 
passersby. Through the security fee travelers pay per trip to the creeks, the collectors (the 
militants) hand over the proceeds to their criminal enterprise partners (the JTF officials). Mutual 
mistrust exists among these partners based on the testimonies from participants. The JTF accused 
militants of not returning all security fees collected and militants accused JTF of not giving 
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accurate account of all the money handed over to them. A constant result of this mutual mistrust 
according to participants is violent conflict that resulted in deaths among members of this 
criminal association over the sharing of the illegal fees collected. A few other participants stated 
that some of the taskforce members belonged to the illegal oil cartel that stole oil products and 
sold them in the black market. According to this few participants, sharing proceeds from such 
illegal deals was a major source of conflicts among members of the cartel. A member of the 
taskforce who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that the involvement of any member of 
the taskforce in any illegal oil activities was part of series of sting operations to capture the 
masterminds of illegal oil businesses.  
I personally witnessed how this criminal enterprise flourished and caused conflict among 
the partners. During my fieldwork in August 2013, I was traveling for a boat to an interview 
appointment when the following ill-tempered dialogue ensued between an off-duty Nigerian 
police officer and a militant who, I was made to understand, was collecting security fees for later 
sharing between the JTF and the militant’s group. My source told me that the MEND, one of the 
main militant groups in Bayelsa State controlled that territory. 
Militant: Oga!! wey ya money? (Pay your security fee) 
Off-duty officer: Which kan money? (Which kind of security fee are you demanding?) 
Militant: No open eye for me or I go bolo ya eye. (Do not act stupid or I’ll kill/maim you) 
Off-duty officer: You sabi de person you de talk to like dat? (Do you know who you’re 
addressing in such manner?) 
Militant: Weda you be Goodluck (referring to Nigerian president) you go pay and if you 
no pay wetin happen you for creek no call us. (Even if you are Goodluck, you must pay. 
If you refuse to pay, whatever happens to you in the creek, do not call us for help) 
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Off-duty officer: I be indigene and a policeman. Na we dey provide security (I’m an 
indigene of Bayelsa and a policeman. We are the ones that provide security not your 
group) 
Militant: Na so una go talk. Wen yawayi commot you go run. Wen we suffer collect 
money, una go say we no give una all. (That is the way you policemen talk. When a 
problem arises, you will be the first to run. When we (referring to his group) suffer to 
collect money, your group (the JTF) would want us to return every amount we collected) 
Off-duty officer: Police no collect money from you and government no say make you 
collect money from people. (Police does not collect money from you and the government 
did not authorize you to collect money from people passing through this way) 
Militant: As you talk am now, we don take am. Na dis go come bring fight between we 
and una tomorrow if any JTF say make we bring am money. (We have taken it as you 
said. But there will be trouble tomorrow if the JTF demand that we give them money we 
raised from the security fee collection exercise) 
As the dialogue continued and temper flared between the two, another militant asked the 
one collecting money to leave the stubborn policeman and collect from other people. The 
militant proceeded to collect money from other travelers. I observed sometimes when this 
militant will glance threateningly in the direction of the off duty police officer. Each time he 
glanced in that direction, he would shake his head in a way that may mean ‘we will get you 
later.’  
The 1990s saw significant escalation of militant activities that disrupted oil production in 
the Niger Delta region. Such disruptions affected Nigeria’s oil revenues (NNPC, 2011, 2012, and 
2013). Following those disruptions, Nigerian petroleum industry became according to Odoemene 
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(2011), “a perfect conduit for corrupt government officials of successive administrations and 
petro business executives to enrich themselves” (p. 126). The JTF team was deployed in the state 
by the FGN to help restore law and order like preventing resource control protesters, militants, 
and other criminal gangs from disrupting oil exploration and production activities. But the 
objective of deploying them seems to have been abandoned for other unlawful activities as the 
conversation above revealed. The argument here is that the JTF’s official duty is to provide 
security for Nigeria’s economic resources, citizens, and foreigners in the region. Illegal taxation 
of people in the form of security fee is not part of its official duty. Engaging or partnering with 
militants to exploit the people and government constitutes a deviation from its normal duty 
which, in itself, is corruption (Osoba, 1996).  
Inter-conflicts among Bayelsa State’s ethno-linguistic groups are common according to 
another 88% of the participants. A sixty-five year old traditional ruler in one of the oil-bearing 
communities admitted that conflicts between the Izon ethno-linguistic group and its Atissa 
counterpart started before he was born. According to stories he claimed his father told him, the 
two groups were the first settlers in what is today called ‘Bayelsa State.’ From what he was told 
by his father, the Atissas were welcomed and given some plots of land to settle and farm by the 
Izons who were the first to arrive. He further said that during the early years the two ethno-
linguistic groups co-existed, peace reigned among the two groups. Conflicts emerged when the 
Atissas started encroaching on lands belonging to the Izons. At the early stage of those conflicts, 
the groups observed minimum restraints. But today (referring to his generation), he said, 
conflicts between my people and the Atissas have taken a more violent turn. In terms of history, 
this traditional ruler’s account of ethnic conflicts confirms revelations from the literature review 
chapter, especially the work of Anikpo (1998) entitled “Communal Conflicts in East Niger 
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Delta: A Cultural Matrix.” According to the author, communal conflicts in the Niger Delta 
region is historical predating the discovery of oil.  
Also, 86% of the participants said that clashes among criminal gangs were common as at 
September 2013. There were oil bunkerers, drug cartels, and militia groups who specialized in 
hostage taking, thugs doing the dirty jobs of their political godfathers, and those who specifically 
sabotaged oil installations in order to steal oil products. Participants said that these groups often 
clash among themselves for various reasons, ranging from territorial control to fighting for 
lucrative private security protection contracts awarded by oil companies. Those who did not win 
contracts stage attacks against the interests of the militia groups that won the security contracts 
(Servant 2010). Such attacks fuel counter attacks on the personnel and property of the gangs. A 
case in point, which occurred in Rivers State in 2006, involved territorial control and chieftaincy 
of Okrika community conflicts between the Bush Boys militia group and the Niger Delta 
Volunteers (NDV) (Peterside, 2007). The Bush Boys and their sponsors, having been defeated by 
the NDV, lost Okrika as their base but relocated, according to Peterside, “Okuru-ama, an out-
post Okirika community, from where it launched regular attacks on NDV positions in Okirika” 
(p. 8). Peterside reported that fighters from the NDV militia group invaded Okuru-Ama in 2001 
and burnt down the community as a punishment for harboring the Bush Boys. 
It is common in Bayelsa State for the youths and government to clash over oil revenue 
benefits like employment, scholarships, development projects, and environmental issues 
according to 55% of the participants. Youths from the OBCs and OICs believe that government 
does not redistribute these benefits fairly in the state. Most participants in this group believe that 
government officials responsible for oil revenue redistribution placed familial, clique, and 
personal interests over the collective interests of Bayelsans in the redistribution process. An 
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example was the case of SSABS in Chapter 5. SSABS applied for the state scholarship several 
times to enable him finish his education. His story demonstrated that only students of chiefs, 
commissioners, and other students connected to powerful individuals in Bayelsa State received 
scholarships.  
When youths held peaceful protests against such perceived corrupt act, government 
responded with JTF deployment. This manner of government response to civil actions confirmed 
views expressed in the literature review chapter by scholars such as Ikelegbe, (2006), Obi, 
(2010), Ojakorotu (2005), and Omotola, (2006) on Nigerian government’s quick resort to the use 
of force in handling peaceful protests in Nigeria’s Delta region. Ikelegbe (2005), for example, 
used his work titled “The Oilification of Niger Delta Conflicts” to show how the government 
deploys Nigerian soldiers to communities even in situations that would have been resolved 
through dialogue. Those soldiers killed, raped, and destroyed property in the region. HRW 
(1999) reported that Nigerian soldiers deployed by the Obasanjo administration in Bayelsa’s Odi 
community massacred more than 3,000 villagers, raped women and little girls, and burnt the 
community. Such use of more than proportionate force may cause peaceful protesters, especially 
youths, to abandon their non-violent approach and take to violence as a means of communicating 
their grievances.  
Peterside (2007) aptly describes the behavior of Niger Delta youths when they cannot 
induce the government to curb corruption within its establishments like ministries and members 
of various taskforces who used their positions to engage in illegal deals in petroleum products or 
win concessions through peaceful means. In his work titled “On the Militarization of Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta.” Peterside opined that, “Having failed to win concessions through peaceful means, 
the youths have been inexorably excited to militantly protest” (p. 4). Thus the militarization of 
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the area failed to achieve the government’s primary objective of providing security but added to 
the corruption of JTF officials and militants. It also added to the existing grievances such as 
unemployment, marginalization, and inequality thus setting the stage for constant government 
and youth clashes.  
In the opinion of 53% of the participants, conflicts among the multiple political parties in 
the state are rampant. The political parties compete for control of the state’s government 
knowing that any party that controls the state government controls over oil resources and rents 
derived from this enterprise. Finally, 26% said that common conflicts in the state are not among 
any particular group within the state, but are the collective responsibilities of peace-loving 
Bayelsans to retaliate against ‘enemies’ of the state who are out to cause trouble. The perception 
of participants discussed up to this point demonstrated a general awareness of the most common 
conflicts in the state. The next section discusses the link between these conflicts and corruption 
in oil revenue redistribution. 
I wanted to find out how these conflicts identified by the participants are linked to 
corruption in oil revenue redistribution. I asked participants to explain the factors that fuel these 
forms of conflicts. Their responses are presented in Table 6.2 below. The responses obtained 
from this probe was used to answer the main research question: How does perception of 
corruption in oil revenue redistribution create and/or perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State? The 
responses are also used to seek support or rejection of hypothesis #1: Acts and/or perception of 
corruption create and perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa.  
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Table 6.2: Conflicts Types and Links to Corruption in Oil Revenue Redistribution  
 
Conflict Type Link to Oil Revenue 
Redistribution 
Number of 
Respondents 
= 58  
Percentage  
 Conflicts are between the 
communities and oil companies 
Cronyism in 
employment practices, 
bribes, and other 
compensation packages 
51 88 
Conflicts in the communities Mismanagement, theft, 
imposition of leaders, 
exploitations, and 
bribery 
42 72 
We have clashes between Joint Task 
Force (JTF) and Militants 
Greed, theft, bribery, and 
patronage 
42 72 
Conflicts among ethnic groups Diversion of projects, 
stealing, bribes, property 
lines, greediness, and 
cronyism 
36 62 
Criminal gangs clash among 
themselves 
Territorial control, theft 
of petroleum products, 
greediness, and oil 
company and political 
elite patronages 
36 62 
Youths clash with government 
occasionally 
Imposition of leaders, 
militarization of the 
state, cronyism and 
nepotism in employment 
practices, distribution of 
loans, and other youth 
benefits 
33 57 
Conflicts in the state is between 
political parties 
electoral frauds, 
imposition of leaders on 
communities, and 
struggle to control oil 
resources 
31 53 
 
How is each conflict type linked to corruption in oil revenue redistribution? Participants 
in this study have expressed so many ways they perceived the spate of conflicts in Bayelsa State 
were linked to corruption. according to 88% of the participants in Table 6.2 above, the conflicts 
between host communities and MNOCs are because of various acts of corruption perpetrated by 
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many of the MNOC officials. The perceived corrupt behaviors include cronyism in employment 
practices, bribery, and embezzling other compensation packages. Participants said that some 
Nigerian staff members of the MNOCs employ their family members and close associates 
whenever a position becomes available even when the newly employed may not be indigenous of 
the host communities. They further stated that MNOCs promote members of some ethnic groups 
into management positions at the expense of their own ethnic men and women. For example, 
promotions in the work place were based on who you know and membership of the major ethnic 
groups in Nigeria according to an electrical technician who works for one of the MNOCs 
operating in the state. Explaining why cronyism and other forms of corruption create and 
perpetuate conflicts between host communities and MNOCs, a participant during my fieldwork 
explained thus 
I have worked in THK Oil Company (pseudonym of an oil company) as an electrical 
technician for the past eight years. We were four (interviewee mentioned names of all 
four of them) recruited May 20, 2005 as electrical technicians. Two of us, Steven and 
myself, are from here. The remaining two came from Abia and Kano States. While me 
and Steven (Steven is a pseudonym) have remained in the same position since the past 8 
years, Stanley and Abdullahi (pseudonyms) have received double promotions. It is not as 
if they work harder than us. I can vow that those two of co-workers got their promotions 
through the influence of our personnel manager and operations manager who are their 
relatives. Now that they got their promotions through the back door, they no longer treat 
us as their mates but as messengers they can send on any mean errand. It got to a point I 
had to confront Abdullahi last month when he directed me to wait at the gate for an 
expatriate who was to visit one of our field plants. I refused to carry out such directive 
because it was an act of humiliation to my own person and also, I was not employed as a 
gateman. He wrote me up for insubordination and the company suspended me for over 
two months now. I am at home with no salary to feed my family while he is collecting his 
own salary. Do you think that if the resources here are in Kano that Abdullahi and his 
people will allow any us to rise to the top or boss them around? Unless I do not return 
after my suspension period. If I do return, that place will not be conducive for him and 
me (Interviewee, August 3, 2013). 
 
If this interview’s account is true, Stanley and Abdullahi’s promotions were as a result of 
cronyism which Joseph (2014) in the literature review (p. 67) described “A strategy of both 
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survival and upward mobility in Nigeria.” As a form of corruption, cronyism according Johnston 
(2008) “produces divisions and conflicts, both among those involved in corrupt enterprises and 
between those who are included and those left out” (Pp. 71-72). Indeed, line nine of the 
interviewee’s account above reveals such division. The conflict that followed such division and 
the resolve of one of the opponents to continue the conflict could be gleaned from the last four 
lines of the interviewee’s account. As with most conflicts, the goals of a party or parties’ to the 
conflicts include to injure or eliminates the opponent (Coser, 1967). The dialogue below between 
the interviewee and myself shows the technician’s perception of why some company workers get 
promoted ahead of others.  
In an attempt to see if the participants can separate ethno-linguistic perceptions and 
company official work practice, I asked these participants whether their family members or 
ethnic men and women were more qualified or have the skills required for the positions for 
which they were overlooked by the MNOC officials. Majority of them claimed that they have 
more qualified indigenes for such positions but were overlooked because they had nobody at the 
management position to speak for them. Having nobody at the management position to speak for 
them could translate into two things. The recruiting manager or panel recruited people based on 
family or friendship relationships (cronyism) rather than on qualification. The manager or panel 
recruited new staff based on ethnic affiliations (ethnicism). While it may be easy to prove a case 
of cronyism by determining the relationships between the recruiter(s) and the recruited, it might 
be difficult to prove a case of ethnicism especially in a panel recruitment system. As I discussed 
in Chapter 3, this act of cronyism contrasts with rule-based practices because it puts relationships 
below rules and regulations guiding the conduct of official activities (Hooke, 2008). The rule-
based hiring requires a manager to hire best qualified hands to fill existing vacancies (Reh, 
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2013). I was not able to get any information on MNOCs’ recruitments between 2011 and 2013 
because those corporations do not provide information on their personnel practices to a 
researcher.  
A few other participants did not answer my question but asked me how many of the 
community candidates I thought were more qualified than the alleged cronies of the MNOC 
officials – a typical Nigerian way of dismissing the obvious. Some MNOC participants among 
this 88% group also linked conflicts between their communities and MNOCs to the bribes 
community leaders demanded from the MNOCs. If the companies refuse to offer bribes to those 
leaders, they would incite their communities against the companies. Those officials stated that 
whenever a company refused to give bribe, those leaders incite their youths to attack oil 
installations, steal materials, and kidnap or wound workers forcing company to call on Nigerian 
government for security protection. Participants from communities denied this bribery claim by 
company officials, and counter-claimed that the companies were the ones trying to corrupt them 
by offering bribes to their leaders in order to allow them to cheat host communities.  
Another form of corruption that creates and/or perpetuates community-company conflicts 
identified by this 88% of participants is stealing of public funds. They said that this form of 
corruption in oil revenue takes away development funds and put them into private hands thus 
keeping the affected communities in Bayelsa underdeveloped and creating hostilities between 
communities and companies. A case of N35,000.00 (about $2,333.00) monthly gas money one of 
the MNOCs used to pay to two neighboring communities (an OBC and an OIC) was narrated at 
four different interviews by participants from the two communities. This money is part of the 
obligations of the MNOC (name withheld) under the GMOU between the company and the two 
communities where the company had oil production and distribution facilities. This MNOC 
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usually pay this money to the communities through an NGO. Jack (pseudonym) had this to say 
about the money and the NGO, 
For four months, September, October, November, and December, 2012, Regional 
Grassroot Empowerment (RGE) (pseudonym of the NGO) collected our gas money from 
ABZ (pseudonym for the MNOC). Not a naira (Nigerian currency, N) was remitted to our 
community. We used our own money to buy gas with which to operate the electric 
generator that provides light in this community and to guard oil equipment so that they 
were not stolen by thieves. We (referring to the community) did not know that our 
neighboring community where the founder of the NGO came from connived with their 
member (owner of the NGO) to share our own portion of the gas money. We only learned 
that they cheated us in January this year (2013) when we marched to the office of the 
MNOC to demand for the payment of the arrears of gas money it owed us. When we sent 
a delegation in February to our community neighbor to demand for our money held by 
them in the past four months, they attacked members of our delegation with machetes and 
burnt two cars that conveyed our delegates to the community. The case is pending in the 
state high court at Yenagoa (capital of Bayelsa State) (Jack, July, 2013). 
 
A second participant acknowledged that both the OBC and OIC were involved altercation 
over a missing amount of money the two communities owned jointly but denied that the 
concerned OBC connived with any organization or person to embezzle or steal money belonging 
to the two communities. I asked this participant how the money jointly owned by the two 
communities got missing. The answer I got was that RGE told the community that ABZ was yet 
to pay gas money for the past four months as there was a computer glitch in their accounts office. 
The OBC community believed what RGE said and was waiting patiently knowing that ABZ 
would pay any outstanding debt the moment they rectified the computer glitch. This participant 
further said that it was while they were waiting on the ABZ that the neighboring OIC came with 
two truckloads of youths and attacked the OBC without any provocation. However, a 
participants without referring to the altercation between the OBC and OIC stated that a 
contractor organization through which ABZ paid gas money to the two communities was 
185 
involved in embezzlement of fund. He said that most of the problems MNOCs faced were 
created by them because of the way they patronize all sorts of companies and individuals.  
Agreeing to this assertion, Ajayi (a pseudonym), a member of one of the RDC 
particularly criticized the practice of giving community benefits through a secondary medium 
instead of directly to the communities and individuals directly affected. Ajayi further questioned 
the rationale in giving such items to known criminals who parade as leaders. Talking in an angry 
tone, he pointed to the case of former Governor Alamieyeseigha Diepreye. In a heightened tone 
that sounded angrier than when he started, he said that,  
A small part (N1.4 billion in local currency and $1.3 million in foreign currency) of our 
state’s oil revenue the EFCC recovered from Alamieseigha and other unaccounted 
amount lodged in private bank accounts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, 
and other western countries would have greatly lifted the state from its underdeveloped 
status were such amount actually given directly to our communities. Can you tell me if 
Alamieyeseigha, one of our former governors, is a community? If he (Alamieyeseigha) is 
not a community, why then should he be given oil revenue meant for communities?” This 
is one of the reasons you hear youths burning houses belonging to all these thieves who 
steal our money. Sometimes, some idiots who were given N2 or N5 by these thieves 
would attempt to stop our youths from demanding the return of the money looted by the 
likes of Alamieyeseigha.  
 
Ajayi’s sentiment did not include the summary judgment granted in the U.K. civil 
proceeding against the same former Governor Alamieyeseigha and his company in which the 
sum of N3 billion cash and properties worth another N3 billion (StAR and World Bank, 2013) 
were recovered by the FGN and transferred to Bayelsa State Government. 
The assertion Ajayi and other participants made is consistent with the work by Watts, 
Okonta, and Kemedi (2004) entitled, “Economies of Violence: Petroleum, and Politics and 
Community Conflicts in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” which I highlighted in the literature review 
chapter of this dissertation. The authors succinctly stated that “Conflicts at the local level (intra-
community conflicts) emerge from challenges to customary forms of community governance, 
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precipitated by the presence and activities of oil operations” (p. 3). It is the conclusion of Anikpo 
(1998) that such challenges to local custom destroy a community’s cultural cosmos including 
hospitality to strangers, respect for seniors, and other moral values. 
To 72% of the participants, corrupt acts such as mismanagement, theft, exploitation, 
bribery, and imposition of leaders to manage oil revenue redistribution created and/or 
perpetuated violent conflicts such as assassinations, robbery, and arson within the communities 
in Bayelsa. An assassination attempt on one of the traditional rulers that led to the death of one 
of his bodyguards and the cancellation of an interview appointment I scheduled with him 
stemmed from allegations of embezzlement of the community’s share of the oil funds. Similarly, 
a scan of the literature on intra-community conflicts would show that the Ogoni Four (of 
neighboring Rivers State) allegedly killed by the Ken Saro-Wiwa faction of the MOSOP were 
accused of taking bribes and betraying the Ogoni cause. Their death resulted in the then military 
government of Nigeria rounding up Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis also known as the 
“Ogoni-Nine.” They were tried and convicted of killing the Ogoni Four. The military tribunal 
that tried the Ogoni Nine sentenced them to death by firing. The plea by the local and 
international community for the Ogoni Nine’s death sentence to be commuted to a life sentence 
or a lighter jail term was never heeded. They were summarily executed the next day. 
Concerning conflicts JTF and militant groups in the state, 76% of the participants link the 
conflicts to greed between the two criminal enterprises. Most of their conflicts according to the 
participants are over the sharing of proceeds from their illegal enterprises such as renting arms 
and ammunitions to militants, directing militants to collect illegal fees from travelers, and the 
direct sabotage of oil infrastructure. On renting of arms to militants, participants pointed to the 
amnesty program initiated by the late President Yaradua in 2009 and continued by President 
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Goodluck Jonathan, which took away arms from militants in exchange for cash, training, and 
resettlement and re-integration of ex-militants who accepted the amnesty initiative. Such 
program, they said, removed military and other high caliber weapons from militants. Some of the 
recovered weapons that were in useable conditions were given to government security agencies 
like police and members of the JTF. Participants claimed that some unscrupulous JTF members 
rent their official weapons to militants who use them to commit armed robbery, kidnapping, and 
other acts. In the process of committing these violent acts, participants said that militants clashed 
with vigilante groups set up by communities to guard oil facilities and the communities.  
Thus, some JTF members and other criminal elements cooperate and share proceeds from 
Nigeria’s criminal oil enterprise. This assertion was supported in Ross (2012) investigative 
report on Nigeria’s booming illegal oil refineries. Quoting one of his informants, Ross said that, 
“We settle the army people. If they see money in your hand they will take that. If not they will 
take products (petroleum products) from you. If we have 10 drums we give them two. It’s 
normal.” So, the source of the JTF and militia gangs’ cooperation was also a cause of conflict for 
them. 
Participants concluded that those militants and criminal gangs may return borrowed 
weapons with cash. But some militants or gangs may return borrowed weapons without paying 
the agreed rental fee claiming that they were unsuccessful in the operation for which the 
weapons were borrowed. According to participants, returning borrowed weapons without the 
agreed rental fees earn such groups detention at a JTF facility until such rental fees are paid. 
While in detention, group whose members were detained may plan and execute a rescue 
operation which mostly ended up with deaths on both sides. I was unable to immediately verify 
this participants’ conclusion.  
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Through the security fee travelers pay per trip thorough the creeks, the collectors 
(militants) hand over the proceeds to their criminal enterprise partners in the JTF. There exists 
mutual mistrust between these partners over the actual amount collected and accounted for at the 
end of every operation. In the participants’ view, conflict emerged when the JTF officials give 
militants a small portion of the proceeds from the security fees collected. Militants usually refuse 
such small amount given to them because of the level of insults security fee payers and even 
some security personnel (see dialogue between a militant and an off duty police officer in pages 
7 and 8 of this chapter) hurled at them. In refusing the amount given to them by the JTF officials, 
participants continued, they (militants) demanded at least 50% of the total proceeds from 
collecting security fees.  
The ethnic versus ethnic conflicts among the ethno-linguistic groups—, Izon, and Isoko, 
according to 62% of the participants, are caused by the diversion of development projects funded 
with oil revenue, stealing of land, money, and other oil benefits that oil revenue confers on a 
given ethnic group, offering bribes to deny an ethnic group its share of the oil revenue, and other 
practices like giving an ethnic group’s employment quota to another group or cronies of the 
person or group making the employment decisions. In the theoretical framework (greed and 
grievance) section of this dissertation, Collier (2000) explained that the intensification of 
objective grievances, diversion of development projects, giving an ethnic group’s employment 
quota to another ethnic group, and stealing of public funds, create and/or sustain conflicts 
because affected groups believe that their struggle for justice is a worthwhile cause.  
Most of the participants who have listed many of the grievances that create and/or 
perpetuate conflicts among Bayelsa’s ethnic communities exonerated the MNOCs operating in 
the state of creating such conflicts because, as they stated, those ethnic groups have been fighting 
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each other before the discovery of oil in 1958 and subsequent coming of MNOCs into the area. 
However, they blamed the MNOCs of perpetuating the conflicts by inciting an ethnic group 
against another, providing arms for ethnic youths militias, and using them to intimidate 
opponents. Ebosa (2014) report titled “Bayelsa Oil Community Accuses Agip of Fueling 
Communal Clashes,” supported the above assertion by participants. Quoting a leader of one of 
the kingdoms in a conflict over an oil spill cleanup contract awarded by the Nigerian Agip Oil 
Company (NAOC), one of the MNOCs operating in Bayelsa State, the author writes: 
The company was using divide and rule tactics in resolving issues associated with 
oil spill incident which occurred in the area on February 16. NAOC had deployed 
a contractor to clean up the site with 20 ‘armed-to-teeth security operatives and 
over 50 Agrisaba youths.’ Agip has in its custody documents which indicate that 
the impacted area belongs to the host, Okoroba Kingdom (p. 2). 
 
Two main conflict ingredients from NAOC’s action in the above quote may have created 
or sustained conflicts between Bayelsa’s two sub ethno-linguistic communities. The two conflict 
ingredients are: (1) Diversion of contracts to Agrisaba, which under a Local Content Agreement, 
ought to be awarded to an Okoroba based contractor. And (2) Using 20 armed security 
operatives. I could not verify if the security operatives were members of the JTF or a private 
security company. Recall that in the literature review chapter, weapons given to party thugs by 
their patrons were not always retrieved when patrons and their clients ended their relationship. 
Past experience of what abandoned thugs do with unretired weapons can help in understanding 
the fears of Okoroba kingdom whose community is hosting armed security operatives and youths 
from another kingdom. 
In the views of another 62% of the participants, conflicts among criminal gangs are 
influenced by a struggle for territorial control, theft of petroleum products, and patronage of the 
gangs by the government, political elites, major redistributors of oil revenue, and oil companies 
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themselves. Supporting the views of these participants is the work of Ibaba and Okolo (2008) 
titled “Resolving Militia Conflicts in the Niger Delta: The Role of Mediation.” The authors noted 
that oil companies and governments of the Niger Delta states use the militia groups to secure oil 
operations. The money attractiveness of filling the security gap on behalf of government and the 
handsome reward accompanying it encourages violent competitions among these groups. The 
end goal of the conflicts is to subdue other groups and become the most powerful gang in the 
area (Ibekwe and Ewoh, 2012).  
On the conflicts between youths and government, 57% of the participants put the cause 
on acts of corruption such as imposition of unpopular leaders on them and, cronyism and 
nepotism in employment opportunities created with oil revenue. Some leaders annoy the youths 
especially by using their family members to fill most important positions. To make matters 
worse, development projects and environmental issues dear to the hearts of the youths are 
overlooked hence the youths are engaged in violent protests, destruction of government property, 
and in some extreme cases, the killing of government officials. The Odi killing of twelve 
policemen in 1999 is an example. 
Conflicts between the political parties, raised by 53% of the participants, are caused by 
electoral frauds, the struggle to control oil revenue, and the imposition of leaders on 
communities. Nigeria’s elections like in the United States tend to be winner-take-all. In a 
plurality decision or winner-takes-all, Coleman, Goldstein, and William (2014) posited that, 
“The candidate that receives the most votes wins the seat being contested; all other candidates 
lose” (p. 308). It is not only the seat that is lost here. The accolades that follow the seat like 
determining who gets what, where, and when of the oil revenue are won and lost by contestants. 
Participants further said that corrupt politicians use their ill-gotten money to sponsor thugs, 
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paramilitary, and militia groups to foment trouble in the state. One of the politicians in this group 
and a contestant in the state’s 2012 violent election year said of the thugs and their sponsors:  
During elections, incumbent political office holders used public funds they stole to recruit 
jobless youths, arm, and set them loose on political opponents. These thugs will 
intimidate, maim, and sometimes assassinate their patrons’ opponents and voters. After 
elections in which the politicians stole victory, thee youth thugs are abandoned by the 
patron. These thugs when harassing opponents failed to realize that once the election is 
over, they will be abandoned by their patrons then they’ll face some of the relatives or 
those people they kicked, punched, knifed, and shot thereby creating a dangerous revenge 
environment. 
 
The political environment in communities polluted by the actions of thugs and their patrons 
becomes volatile once an electioneering period is over. While winners celebrate, losers may go 
home to plot revenge on the death of their loved ones killed by thugs of the winners or to make 
governance difficult for the victorious party. The desire by losers to make governance difficulty 
in Bayelsa may have combined with corrupt behaviors of elected officials in creating and/or 
sustaining political instability in the state which I depicted in Table 2.2 of this dissertation.  
The past governors of the state who, by virtue of their positions, sat at the top of the oil 
redistribution hierarchy could have had their eyes set on the oil benefits judging from their 
records and the manner in which they left office. For example, former governors Alamieyeseigha 
and Sylva have by their behaviors told Bayelsans that they came to power not to serve the people 
but to loot the state’s treasury. In the case of Alamieyeseigha, the amount of public funds he 
looted which the EFCC have recovered as at 2012 stood at $10 million (StAR and World Bank, 
2013). Sylva is in EFCC’s custody facing embezzlement charges related to the sum of N650 
million (about $3.94 million) belonging to Bayelsa State (Ebipade, Bekewei, and Inainfe, 2012). 
Issues related to the repatriation of those funds belong to Bayelsa State are the sources of the 
ongoing litigation war between the EFCC and Governor Dickson’s administration (Oyesin, 
2014). Before addressing the implication of Table 6.2 on the main research question and 
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hypothesis #1, I want to sort out participants’ opinions on the effects of these conflicts on their 
communities. Their views are presented in Table 6.3 below. 
 
Table 6.3: Effects of Conflicts on the State and its Communities  
 
Options  No of Respondents =58  Percentage  
Destruction of life and property 56 97 
Underdevelopment of the state 54 93 
Increased rate of corruption 53 91 
Division in the state 50 86 
Drive away investors  49 84 
Damage to the state’s image 47 81 
 
Conflicts in the state have multiple effects as shown in Table 6.3 above. The most 
significant perceived effect related to the outcomes of conflicts is the destruction of life and 
property as attested to by 97% of the study’s participants. A woman participant who worked with 
a MNOC resigned from her job and relocated to another community after her ordeal in 2009 
when protesting youths stormed the MNOC’s field office where she worked as a cleaner. This 
participant painfully recalled that incident and how it left her mentally and physically wounded. 
Here is an extract from her story. 
It was around 9.00 am on September 5, 2009. My coworkers and myself have settled for 
a normal day work at the office. We heard some commotion outside. Initially, we thought 
that the security guards were having some misunderstanding with some visitors to the 
company. It was when the noise became louder and some of the words such as burn, kill, 
and drag being uttered by the crowd gathering at the gate that we became apprehensive of 
what was coming. Angry youths had invaded our workplace. The security men were 
outnumbered and overpowered. The entrance and exit routes were blocked. We were all 
trapped. The protesting youths headed to the administrative block. We thought for a 
second that they were not after us but the management of the company. This thought did 
not entirely remove the fear that overtook us but it did momentarily gave us a little relief. 
For reasons I cannot explain because I had no clue of what happened at the administrative 
building, the mob left the administrative building and headed our way. As protesting mob 
entered our building, office equipment such as tables, chairs, fan, and other portable 
items were either destroyed or carried by them. We did not stop them because we have no 
power to do so. This was the extent I could recollect before the worst happened to me. It 
was four days later at a hospital bed that a doctor told me that I was gang raped.  
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This participant at this point could not control her tears. She stopped talking to me and 
sobbed for about five minutes. I offered her a facial towel from a pack I had in my small bag to 
wipe her tears. I patiently waited for her to calm down. After another interval of ten minutes, she 
apologized to me that she cannot continue with the interview because of the trauma she was 
going through. The only decision she made after she was discharged from the hospital was to 
resign from her job and leave the city where this incident happened. She vowed never to return 
or pass through that city where her world changed for the worse until she departs ‘this wicked 
world.’  
Indeed, information from the literature also showed that Bayelsa conflicts have resulted 
in thousands of lives lost including the Odi massacre where 3,000 lives were lost and, the 
Odioma Nigerian Soldiers operation that left 1500 dead – to name only two examples (HRW, 
1999; and International Crisis Group, 2006). 
Conflicts have contributed to the underdevelopment of the state according to 93% of the 
participants. Participants said that during conflicts situation, people’s houses, cars, public 
properties are destroyed, and people’s blood are spilled. Those killed could have been those who 
would have developed our communities. A community leader among this 93% of the participants 
stated that,  
When my community (referring to the community he led) was attacked by people from 
Etoremeigh community (pseudonym) on December 2, 2012, they destroyed our farmland, 
stole our livestock, and burned down my people’s houses. The government refused to 
help us rebuild. Look at how my community is looking like a ghost city. It will take us 
several years to get to the level we were before the senseless assault on us by the people 
of Etoremeigh 
 
Tokpo (2012) study confirms that the state lacks development projects, no functional 
health services, low education, and other development infrastructures. Consistent with the 
194 
literature, some of the ultimate goals of violent conflicts include injuring, maiming, and 
eliminating opponents; and destruction of schools, hospitals, roads, and other development 
infrastructure (Wilmot and Hocker, 2006). Historically, war has fostered development. As a 
result of conflicts, the rate of corruption in the state increased in the opinion of 91% of the 
participants. According to the theory of greed and grievance, greedy officials regard their offices 
as lootable resources that can generate benefits for themselves and their cronies. Among the 
greedy office holders therefore, their inordinate clamor for private accumulation of public funds 
is unfettered. Accumulation of Bayelsa’s oil revenues by few privileged Bayelsans has left a 
majority of the citizens of the state chasing the few resources that are left over. The depleted 
resources of the state like few jobs, scholarships, and political offices chased by the majority of 
the citizens of the state increase their grievances against those office holders who appropriate the 
state’s wealth. Thus violent conflicts like armed robbery, kidnappings, and intra and inter group 
conflicts, and violent political competitions abound. 
The case of former Governor Tamipreye Sylva who ruled the state between 2007 and 
2011 is instructive. The former governor followed the footstep of his predecessor, 
Alamieyeseigha Depreye, by looting Bayelsa State’s money. Sylva misappropriated N627 
million ($4.18 million) while in office. As of 2012, a year after Sylva left office, the EFCC 
uncovered new criminalities of the former governor. In an October 2012 report titled “EFCC 
Uncovers Fresh Bayelsa Loot,” ThisDay Newspaper, one of Nigeria’s daily Newspaper, stated 
that, 
Peace of mind is still far from the home of the immediate past Governor of Bayelsa State, 
Chief Timipre Sylva as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has 
swooped on him again making more startling discoveries in the investigation of the 
looting of Bayelsa State treasury by the former Governor… Among the new discoveries 
linked to the former Governor include, a duplex valued at N310 m situated at Cachez 
Estate, Mpape, Abuja. Another is a mansion valued at N700 m located off Ademola 
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Adetokunbo Crescent in highbrow Wuse 2, Abuja. The Wuse mansion was allegedly 
acquired in the name of Marlin Maritime Limited, a company owned by Timpre Sylva (p. 
1).  
 
Fast forward to 2013, Bayelsans and current Governor Dickson seem to be fighting to recover a 
remaining part of Sylva’s loots.  
According to 86% of the participants, conflicts have divided the Bayelsa society. 
Participants claimed that when they once lived together in peace, the various communities and 
neighbors built bridges to link one community to another. They further stated that annual 
ceremonies were held between neighboring communities to celebrate peace. Those joyous 
ceremonies, participants claimed, have been overtaken by intermittent attacks on one another. 
Here is how a senior citizen recalled what he called ‘the peace days of our fathers.’  
When we were growing up, our parents would take us to the bank of the ocean on the 
second week of November each year to observe a week long fishing competition. 
Fishermen from our kingdom and our neighboring Nembe kingdom (real name) would 
jump into their fishing canoes with the fishing gears and sailed into the deep ocean to 
catch fish. Some rules for the competition included: 1) no fishing canoe should be two 
miles near each other; 2) you must rush to rescue a canoe near you if it is in a distress, 
and 3) no fishing net should be left in the water overnight. At the end of each day’s 
competition which ended towards the going down of the sun, fishermen will anchor their 
canoes by the bank of the ocean, repair or replace their nets for the next day’s 
competition. Fish caught by each group was judged by retired fishermen. The judges, at 
the end of the week long competition, would announce the kingdom whose group made 
the biggest catch. Meanwhile, spectators including this participants will be cooking and 
enjoying the fish caught by the competitors. The competitions not only unite the 
kingdoms involved but also taught fishermen and spectators how to cooperate in times of 
trouble. It also created opportunity for match making and inter-kingdom marriage and 
cementing of peace among neighbors. Such was our world growing up. Things have 
changed today. We do not hold fishing competition anymore. We now sell our brothers, 
neighbors, and communities to oil companies and government to make money for 
ourselves. We do not see ourselves as one but different individuals and groups out to do 
whatever it takes to get rid of one another. 
 
The sentiment echoed by this senior citizen is consistent with views expressed by conflict 
scholars like Johnston (2008) and Coser (1967). In Chapter 3 (Pp. 71-72), Johnston (2008) 
concluded that corruption divides a society and produces conflicts. Coser (1967) in the same 
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chapter (p. 79) contended that in a divided society, opponents competing over values and claims 
to scarce status, power, and resources aim to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the rivals. The 
theoretical framework, greed and grievance theory (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006), further provides 
link between corruption and conflicts by expanding the violent competition for scarce resources 
necessary for the attainment of parallel goals of the greedy few and their aggrieved counterparts. 
In their discussion of causes of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler identified two main groups 
of actors seeking control and access to scarce natural resource rents with which to achieve their 
opposing goals in a country experiencing civil war. Pandit (2012), characterized the two 
opposing groups as “loot-seekers (greed) and justice-seekers (grievance) (p. 1). Greedy elites 
plunder natural resources and use their control of state security apparatus to keep justice-seekers 
out of their lootable resources (Pundit 2012). I discussed stealing or laundering of public funds in 
Chapter 3, page 66, as a form of corruption through which few greedy public officials enrich 
themselves with public funds at the expense of the general public. Greed begets grievances by 
creating unequal oil revenue benefits redistribution between the greedy elites and the aggrieved 
public. This unequal oil revenue benefits redistribution motivates the relatively justice-seekers to 
engage in conflicts. This is especially true in conflicts between militia groups and government in 
Bayelsa State (see Chapter 3: 83-92). Table 6.2 further summed up the various conflicts and their 
association with many forms of corruption. Such conflict as antagonism between the JTF and 
militants, youths and government, and the rest of the stakeholders in the Bayelsa conflicts and 
inter-communities resulted from a combination of two or more perceived corrupt behaviors of 
public officials at various points of oil revenue redistributions.  
According to 81% of the participants, Bayelsa conflicts created negative images of the 
states. Some participants among this 81% claimed that people and organizations outside the state 
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refer to Bayelsa as the kidnapping capital of Nigeria. Some other participants say it is a state 
where any character can become governor and help himself to state funds without hindrance. 
Some of the participants said that the Bayelsa State of old was a society of decency; its people 
valued honesty and hard work; women were highly respected and the people’s good names were 
religiously protected. But this set of participants sadly noted that corruption has destroyed those 
great traditional values of their communities. For example, women that were highly respected 
have turned to prostitution; citizens of the state have abandoned honesty and hard work to pursue 
easy wealth through corruption; and young people show no respect to seniors. 
Again, a subgroup among this 81% added that the bad reputation the state has acquired 
added to the economic woes of the state. Potential investors who would have contributed to the 
rapid development of the state withdrew because of safety concerns for their lives and 
investments according to participants. Shell BP, one of the major MNOCs operating in the state, 
sold its onshore shares to a consortium for $102 million after several years of cat and mouse 
game with the Bayelsans (Eze, 2014). Such giant company pulling out of oil operation in the 
state could potentially lead to other major MNOCs to pull out of Bayelsa State’s oil fields.  
At this stage, I return to Table 6.2 to answer the main research question and seek support 
or rejection of hypotheses #1. It is evident that bribery, looting, cronyism, and other forms of 
corruption create and/or perpetuate various conflicts in Bayelsa State. These conflicts include 
intra- and inter-community conflicts, host community-MNOC conflicts, Militant-JTF conflicts, 
youth-Government conflicts, and conflicts among political groups. The first stage of corruption 
creating and/or sustaining Bayelsa State conflicts is by dividing the state into dichotomous 
groups of greedy elites and aggrieved groups or loot-seekers and justice-seekers (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2005; Pandit, 2012).  
198 
This agrees with a conclusion in the literature review chapter in which Johnston (1998) 
asserted that “Corruption brings divisions and conflicts in a society.” Also, the theoretical 
framework, greed and grievance theory, states that greedy behaviors leads to grievances. Pandit 
(2012) listed many grievances that emerge in a society dominated by greed to include economic 
inequality, political exclusion and repression, unemployment and lack of opportunity. Indeed, the 
privatization of public funds by past governors and other few other privileged individuals and 
groups in Bayelsa State have increased grievances such as unemployment, lack of development 
projects, and a lack of educational assistance for poor people in Bayelsa as Table 6.3, SSABS’s 
dialogue, and other such experiences in Chapters 5 and 6 have proved. Greed and grievances 
have goals that are incompatible, a conclusion supported by Wilmot and Hocker (2006) 
definition of conflict as, “An expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who 
perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their 
goals” (p.11). Analysis of collected data and revelations from the literature and theoretical 
framework show that corruption in oil revenue redistribution create and/or perpetuate conflict in 
Bayelsa State by dividing its communities; concentrating the state’s oil revenues in the hands of 
very few individuals like governors, top government officials, political godfathers, chiefs, and 
their cronies; and creating a majority population of who feel grieved because they do not get 
what they perceive as their entitlements (employment, development, and education to mention 
just a few) as members of Bayelsa society. 
In support of hypothesis #1, this analysis of collected data and revelations from literature 
review support the hypothesis that, – people’s perceptions of corruption in Bayelsa State’s oil 
revenue redistribution create and/or perpetuate conflicts. Many authors in the literature review 
chapter such as Adebayo (2012), Johnston (1998) and Osoba (1996) concluded that corruption is 
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a deviation from accepted ways of doing things in the society. The dialogue between a militant 
and an off duty police officer which I reported in pages 7 and 8 of this chapter, and participants’ 
perceptions on the various causes of conflicts in Bayelsa in Table 6.2 indicate how JTF officials, 
elected officials, and political appointees as well as career civil servants, chiefs, community 
leaders, contractors, etc. deviated from acceptable ways of performing their duties. Such 
deviations, including bribery, stealing of public funds, and acts of patronage and cronyism 
contributed to the emergence and/or perpetuation of various forms of conflicts plaguing the state. 
In the face of these conflicts, Bayelsans are relying on laws and institutions in the country and in 
the state to curb corruption and conflicts it created and/or sustained. The next chapter examines 
some of those laws and institutions.  
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Chapter 7 
Anti-Corruption Laws and Agencies, and Conflict Prevention  
7.1 Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Laws and Agencies, and Conflict Prevention in Bayelsa State 
In Chapter 6, this dissertation showed how Bayelsans’ perceptions of corruption created 
and/or perpetuated conflicts in Bayelsa State. In the present chapter, I examine some of the laws 
and institutions put in place to fight corruption. Participants’ opinions on the effectiveness or 
otherwise of the laws and institutions discussed here are used to test hypothesis #2 which states 
that “Anti-corruption laws and institutions do not prevent conflicts in Bayelsa State.” From the 
literature review and theoretical framework, I have presented empirical support that corruption in 
public affairs is not only contrary to legal and moral norms, it undermines the capacity of the 
state to secure the welfare of all its citizens (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Osoba, 1996; TI, 2013). 
Osoba’s view is supported by Moustafa (2013) who posited that “corruption is now recognized 
to be one of the world’s greatest challenges. It is a major hindrance to sustainable development, 
with a disproportionate impact on poor communities and is corrosive on the very fabric of 
society.”  
In Table 3.2, a ten year cumulative average score of Nigeria according to TI’s index 
showed that indeed corruption is one of the greatest challenges facing the country and its 
subunits like Bayelsa. For example, Nigeria in the course of those ten years remained among the 
most corrupt countries in the world. On a scale of 0-10 of CPI where 0-4 means that a country is 
highly corrupt and 8-10 means that a country is very clean, Nigeria’s most improved record was 
in 2008 when its score was 2.7 (Table 3.2). Attempt to make further progress in the fight against 
corruption prompted the country to enact new anti-corruption laws and amended existing laws to 
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keep up with the complexities of modern corruption. Looking at some of Nigeria’s anti-
corruption laws one can see the following:  
7.2 Selected Anti-Corruption Laws and Institutions in Nigeria 
7.2a Anti-Corruption Laws 
The Nigerian Criminal Code has many important chapters and many subsections devoted 
to corruption. Chapter 12, Sections 98-111: “Corruption and Abuse of Office,” makes it a crime 
for public officials to steal, solicit, offer, and/or receive bribes. It prohibits public officials and 
private individuals and organization from engaging in an unauthorized buying or selling of any 
public property, engaging in acts of extortion, and other acts deemed to albeit corrupt practices. 
During the period of regionalism, the Northern and Southern regions of the country had laws 
intended to prohibit any form of corruption. The national and subnational laws operate within 
their jurisdictional areas. In case of a clash between the regional and national laws, the national 
laws stand supreme over the regional ones. 
The Chapter 38 of the Nigerian Criminal Code: “Obtaining Property by False 
Pretenses,” prohibits individuals and organizations from cheating. The most popular section in 
this chapter is Section 419 A-B. What made this section popular is a criminal action through 
which fraudsters illegally obtain money and other material benefits from victims by making them 
pay money in advance and never supply or fulfill any part of an agreement for which an advance 
was given. In the international arena, it is known as ‘Advance Fee Fraud’ but in Nigeria, it is 
called ‘419,’ an acronym for Section 419 A-B of the Criminal Code.  
Other chapters in the Criminal Code, such as Chapters 43, 44, and 45, make it a criminal 
offence for anyone to commit forgery of certificates, signatures of public officials, monetary 
documents like checks and currency as well as other related materials. The Nigerian parliament 
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has passed new laws since the beginning of the 4th Republic in 1999 aimed at modifying or 
adding new sections to the various anti-corruption laws. For instance, Act No 5 of the National 
Assembly entitled “Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences of 2000.” 
A section of the 2000 Act of the National Assembly that covers modifications and 
updates in the anti-corruption effort is titled “Offences and Penalties.” This section has nineteen 
subsections starting from Subsection 8-25 which I have summarized in Table 7.1 
 
Table 7.1: Summary of Sections and Corruption Offences in the 2000 Act 
 
Sections  Offences  
8 Accepting Gratifications 
9 Giving or Accepting Gratification through Agent 
10 Acceptor or Giver of Gratification notwithstanding that Purpose 
was not carried out or Matter not in Relation to Principal’s Affairs 
or Business 
12 Fraudulent Acquisition of Property 
13 Fraudulent Receipt of Property 
14 Offences Committed through Postal system 
15 Deliberate Frustration of Investigation by the Commission 
16 Making False Statements or Return 
17 Gratification by or through Agents 
18 Bribery of Public Officer 
19 Offence of using Office or Position for Gratification 
21 Bribery in Relation to Auction 
22 Bribery for giving Assistance etc in regard to Contracts 
23 Duty to report Bribery Transactions 
24 Dealing with Property Acquired through Gratification 
25 Making False or Misleading Statements to the Commission 
 
Source: Nigeria Law Organization (2013).  
 
Successive military regimes such as Ironsi (1966); Murtala/Obasanjo (1975-1979); and 
Babangida (1985-1993) promulgated decrees that targeted corruption. The Decree No. 5 of 1966 
titled “Investigation of Assets,” empowered the head of state to require public officers to declare 
their assets before and after leaving office. The purpose was to identify and prosecute those who 
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may corruptly enrich themselves. The promulgation of this decree led to the establishment of 
military tribunals to try public officials and their associates who violated the law. Any person 
convicted by the military tribunals of violating this decree could not participate in politics or 
hold public office (Agbese, 2004). That military regime that enacted this decree did not last for a 
year before a counter coup removed it from power. Despite the fact that not much was recorded 
on this decree’s effectiveness, it served and remained as one of the anti-corruption laws untill 
1989 when the Babangida regime amended it with Deree No. 9 of 1989. The 1975 Decree of 
Murtala/Obasanjo regime extended the scope of anti-corruption measures by establishing the 
Assets Investigation Panel with power to investigate serving military governors, federal 
commissioners, and other high-ranking officials.  
These anti-corruption laws, executive orders, military decrees as amended or changed 
provided a legal framework to fight corruption. The Nigerian National Assembly (NAAS), made 
up of the Senate and House of Representatives, took a step further to ensure that these anti-
corruption laws are effective in curbing corruption and restoring domestic and international trust 
in the country by establishing new institutions to help enforce these laws. I now examine 
institutions established to help in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.  
7.3 Anti-Corruption Institutions 
The major institutions this study examined are the law courts, ICPC, and the EFCC. Both 
the ICPC and EFCC were established in this current Nigeria’s 4th republic. The courts have been 
existing even during the colonial period. 
7.3a Nigerian Courts 
The law courts in Nigeria are hierarchically structured. At the federal level in order of 
ranks are the Supreme Court (highest court in the country), Courts of Appeal and a Sharia Court 
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of Appeal in Abuja, and Federal High Courts. Some of the federal high courts spread in the six 
geopolitical zones of the country are courts of first instance where those involved in corruption 
and financial crimes are prosecuted. The structure of the Nigerian judicial system is summarized 
in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Hierarchical Structure of Federal 
 
 
 
The Federal High Courts are where the two main anti-corruption agencies, ICPC and 
EFCC, which I will discuss later in this chapter, prosecute accused corrupt individuals and 
organizations. The federal high courts are trial courts for federal crimes and other offenses and 
civil actions relating to the constitution of Nigeria. The Sharia Appeal Court in Abuja handles 
interstate related Islamic cases. The special military tribunals and appeal courts handle military 
related cases only. The constitution clearly outlined the type of cases each of these federal courts 
can entertain. Corruption of any kind can originate from a federal high court and go through the 
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Appeals Court in case of an appeal on the ruling in the federal high court, and finally to the 
Supreme court. At the state level, the State High Court is the highest court that deals with issues 
within the jurisdiction of a state.  
Some predominant Muslim states in Nigeria have Sharia Courts instead of High Courts. 
Appeals from the Sharia courts are made to the Sharia Court of Appeal in Abuja. Below the state 
high or Sharia courts are magistrate courts and customary courts.  
The Bayelsa State Court System 
In keeping with the federal structure of Nigeria, states have their own judicial structures 
which deal with cases covered by state laws. As stated in the preceding paragraph, the highest 
court at some states is known as the “State High Court.” A state with predominant Islamic 
culture can in place of the High Court operate a Sharia Court. The constitution provides choice 
for non-Muslims to request for cases involving them to be heard in High Courts. Below the state 
High/Sharia Courts are Magistrate and Customary Courts that deal with minor corrupt acts that 
do not exceed N80,000 and N20,000 respectively ($485 and $121) (Babalola 2012). Bayelsa 
State judicial structure is depicted in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Bayelsa State Judicial Structure 
 
  
 
Note that the traditional rulers of the state perform some limited judicial functions. They 
can settle property line conflicts, traditional marriage, and other conflicts arising from traditional 
practices. However, the performance of these limited judicial functions is based on the consent of 
the parties. Their decisions are not binding but may be admitted as evidence in formal courts 
especially in farmland conflicts. This practice may compare with non-court mandated mediation 
in the United States. Nigerian courts have prosecuted many corrupt officials brought before them 
by other anti-corruption agencies like the ICPC and the EFCC. In July 2007, Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha, for example, pleaded guilty before a federal high court in Lagos to six 
corruption charges (Nigeria Crime Database, 2014). Following that plea, the court sentenced him 
to a two-year jail term on each charge. The courts have equally dismissed corruption cases 
against individuals and organizations where prosecutors cannot prove cases against the accused 
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persons and individuals beyond a reasonable doubt. In the next sections, I discussed other anti-
corruption institutions (i.e. the ICPC and EFCC). 
7.3b The ICPC and EFCC 
Act #5 of 2000 established the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC). The mission of the ICPC is “to rid Nigeria of corruption through lawful 
enforcement and preventive measures” (ICPC, 2001). The establishing Act empowers the agency 
to investigate, arrest, and prosecute any individual(s) and organization(s) that violates any or all 
parts of the Nigerian Constitution relating to corrupt practices (Act 5 of 2000:1-63).  
The second agency established to fight corruption especially in the financial sector is the 
Economic and other related Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Established under the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act 2004, the mission of EFCC is to 
prevent, investigate, prosecute, and penalize economic and financial crimes as well as enforcing 
the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes, including: 
Economic and Financial Crimes commission Act (2004) 
The Money Laundering Act 1995 
The Money Laundering (Prohibition) act 2004 
The Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994 
The Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991; and  
Miscellaneous Offence Act (EFCC 2013). 
As at 2011, seven years after EFCC was established, the agency arraigned thirty 
prominent Nigerian politicians and other individuals on various corruption charges. Within the 
same period, only four out of the thirty politician arraigned have been convicted (HRW, 2013). 
The remaining twenty-six politicians’ cases are still in court as at 2013. However, EFCC 
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recorded a higher rate of convictions for economic and other crimes in 2013. According to the 
agency, it obtained 117 convictions in 2013 but did not give the figure of pending prosecutions 
or cases lost. Some selected cases handled by these anti-corruption agencies are summarized on 
Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Selected Nigerian Politicians Prosecuted for Corrupt Practices between 2005 and 
2011 
 
Defendant  Office Held Charges and 
Date 
Judicial 
Decision 
Remarks 
Tafa Balogun Police IG Money 
Laundering 
2005 
Convicted, 
Assets worth 
$150 million 
seized, and 
jailed 6 
months  
Ordinary 
Police 
Corporal may 
serve 10 years 
for collecting 
about $200 
bribe 
Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha 
Governor of 
Bayelsa State 
Money 
laundering, 
theft, bribery, 
and abuse of 
office 2005 
Bargain deal, 
Assets at home 
and abroad 
seized, 
refunded about 
N5 billion in 
foreign and 
local 
currencies, 2 
years jail term 
but released 
for time spent 
on detention  
A Local 
Government 
Chairman, 
Umar Shugaba 
Gan, in Bornu 
State was 
sentenced to 7 
years for 
stealing N1.05 
million (we 
can draw some 
ethical lessons 
from the two 
cases 
Timpreye Sylva Bayelsa State 
Governor 
Abuse of office, 
looting and 
mismanagement 
of public funds 
worth about 
N660 billion 
Pending, been 
in and out of 
EFCC 
detention 
Other 
prominent 
politicians like 
him use their 
loots to buy 
time by stalling 
prosecution 
Sources:  
1) HRW (2011). Corruption on trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission. 
2) Madu, H. (2009). Court Convicts Chairman of Monguno Local Government on corruption.  
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7.4 Anti-Corruption Measures in Bayelsa State  
In addition to these laws and institutions discussed in the preceding sections, Bayelsans 
have utilized other measures that help them to fight corruption. The measures as identified by 
participants are presented in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.3: Anti-Corruption Measures 
 
Measures  No of Respondents 
= 58  
Percentage of 
Responses 
Use of jungle justice 40 69 
Recovery of oil revenues and materials acquired 
illegally  
34 59 
Reporting corrupt individuals to ICPC and EFCC 19 33 
Maintaining transparency and accountability in oil 
revenue redistribution  
16 28 
Appointing credible officials to manage oil 
revenues 
10 17 
Dismissal of offenders 5 9 
 
From Table 7.3, 69% of the participants said that their communities used many forms of 
‘jungle justice’ especially public shaming of local corrupt officials like community leaders who 
embezzled community funds, chasing away contractors who were executing substandard jobs, 
publicly denouncing and forcing traditional rulers to abdicate for abusing traditional offices, and 
seizing properties of corrupt officials as measures against acts of corruption. In extreme cases 
accused persons were either beaten to death or burned alive. Akwagbe (pseudonym), a 
participant in this study, provided an evidence on two rapists who were burned alive for violently 
raping an 8-year old girl and her mother by positing that, 
It was around 12.00 pm on the em! em! em! I have forgotten the exact day but it was in 
the month of December, 2012. We heard several gunshot sounds in the neighborhood. 
Everyone in my household clutched together because we normally know what follows 
such gun shots. After about 30 minutes later, we heard sound of our community’s 
wooden gong (a wooden gong is musical instrument as well as a mass communication 
symbol widely used in rural communities). The sound of the wooden gong was an 
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invitation to assembly at the community center. It was accompanied by the voice of our 
town crier (a foot broadcaster or local press secretary) announcing the capture of rapists 
who raped a community member and her 8-year old daughter while they were in the 
forest fetching firewood. They rapists were caught by some members of our community 
vigilante unit. Some people assembled at the village square while some others stayed at 
home fearing that they may be attacked if everybody leaves home at the same time. I 
could not say whether the vigilante group that captured the suspected robbers or the first 
group of villagers who arrived at the square tied up the two young robbers and set them 
ablaze with used car tires and fuel. On arrival at the square, I witnessed for the first time a 
horrible scene of humans burned alive with used car tire and fuel. I threw up and was 
helped home by my neighbors (August 18, 2013).  
 
Those burned alive according to some other participants who claimed to have witnessed 
this form of jungle justice included people accused of armed robbery, kidnappers, and murder. 
Where people have confidence in their justice system, an accused person or persons do not 
necessarily receive mob justice. A common understanding in due process is that, “An accused 
person is deemed innocent until proved otherwise in the court of law.” There is no room for 
presumption of innocent in a mob or jungle justice. Indeed, a case of suspected robbers who 
received jungle justice in Bayelsa was reported by Wosu (2011). Reporting in the Daily 
Champion Newspaper under the title “Nigeria: Angry Mob Burn Two Robbers in Yenagoa,” 
Wosu reported that two armed robbers caught by youths in Yenagoa alleged to specialize in bank 
robbery were set ablaze by the youths. Actually some participants from among this 69% group 
cited two alleged corruption cases involving a traditional ruler and a local government area 
chairperson. According to the participants, those two public officials were chased out of their 
positions for allegedly stealing and embezzling public funds entrusted into their care. A 
participant in a frustrated tone and body language that suggested support for continued use of 
jungle justice stated:  
There is no reason to waste our time and risk our lives to arrest these criminals in our 
society and hand them over to law enforcement officials. In many instances, the law 
enforcement officials release the criminals we arrested after a short time. Some were even 
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given names of community members who reported the criminals or handed them over to 
those law enforcement officials. The criminals upon release targeted some of us in the 
community. But if we judge them (this participant was implying using jungle justice) by 
ourselves, they will not live to harass us or our communities again (August 16, 2013).  
 
Returning to the corruption case of a traditional ruler and chairperson of a local government, the 
participant said that the governor of Bayelsa State reinstated them and accused communities that 
chased them out of office of political vendettas.  
The repossession of oil revenues and materials acquired illegally helps to minimize 
corruption in the view of 59% of the participants. Participants said this measure reduced the 
amount of money and properties some of those criminals misappropriated at any time because 
they know that the community was watching and could take it back. Edoni (pseudonym) stated 
that, “an influential member of our RDC who served three terms in the committee convertedto 
his personal use an electric generator, a water pump, and motor cycle donated by the 
Government of Bayelsa State to our village to help in operating our borehole. We mobilized our 
youths, marched to his house, and repossessed our properties” (September 1, 2013).  
According to 33% of the participants, the state and communities reduce corruption by 
swiftly reporting officials involved in corrupt practices to the appropriate agencies like the ICPC 
and EFCC. According to the opinion of 28% of the participants, the state and communities 
maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in the redistribution of oil revenue as a 
means to check corruption. These participants who were bureaucrats pointed to the state’s annual 
budget that always shows income and expenditure reports to prove the existence of transparency 
and accountability in the process of redistributing oil revenues. Furthermore, 17% of the 
participants identified the appointment of credible officials to manage oil revenue redistribution 
as an anti-corruption measure. Finally, a small percentage (9%) of the participants stated that the 
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Bayelsa State reduced corruption by dismissing convicted corrupt officials. Dismissing officials 
convicted of corrupt practices was, according to these participants, in keeping with the state’s 
zero corruption tolerance policy. Indeed result has shown that the state and its communities have 
some measure in place to handle incidents of corruption. However, it is puzzling to note that 
corruption remains high in the state.  
One of the answers to this puzzle comes from the 2005 Budget Bill former Governor 
Alamieyeseigha presented to the BSHA before he was impeached the same year. In the budget 
bill, the former governor was reported in the Guardian Newspaper of December 2004 to have 
said that “Government is determined to restructure, re-professionalize and fortify 
public institutions, eliminate waste, inefficiency and ensure greater transparency, accountability 
and efficiency in the delivery of services” (pp. 1-2). The same governor was later convicted of 
corruption and removed from office, although later pardoned by President Jonathan. To find 
more answers to why the anti-corruption and by extension conflict prevention mechanisms are 
not controlling the social challenge in the state, I asked participants for their opinions.  
I posed a question on the effectiveness of various anti-corruption measures to the 
participants. Using a close-ended question that has three options – effective, ineffective, and 
difficult to say, I asked participants to provide their overall assessment of those anti-corruption 
measures. The assessment given by the participants are shown in Table 7.4. The analysis of 
participants’ assessment was used to confirm or reject hypothesis #2, “Nigeria’s anti-corruption 
laws and institutions do not prevent conflict in Bayelsa State.” 
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Table 7.4: Assessment of Effectiveness or Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Measures in 
Preventing Conflict 
 
Options Number of 
Participants 
Percentage of 
Responses 
Ineffective 41 71 
Effective 12 21 
Difficult to Say 5 8 
Total 58 100 
  
In Table 7.4 above, 71% of the participants said that the anti-corruption measures are 
ineffective while 21% of the participants said that the measures are effective. I asked questions to 
find out why the anti-corruption were ineffective in curbing corruption. Some explanations were 
given to me. An explanation I considered appropriate here related to the use of jungle justice 
(Table 7.3) as provided by the participant who threw up at the sight of accused rapists being 
burned alive with used car tires and fuel. Responding to my question on why the accused rapists 
were not handed over to law enforcement agencies in the state, that participated answered “The 
community does not believe that the police and the law courts can punish the accused to the 
fullest of the law. The police and the court collected money from the criminals and set them free. 
Some of the freed criminals even returned to attack the victims again (August 18, 2013). 
However, 8% of the participants said that it was difficult to say whether the measures were 
effective or ineffective. By this result in Table 7.4, hypothesis #2 is supported. Since corruption 
is the major creator and perpetuator of conflicts in Bayelsa (Chapter 6) and the laws and 
institutions put in place to control it are ineffective, it makes sense then to understand why they 
could not prevent conflicts. Based on the support for hypothesis #2, I asked participants further 
questions to know why the anti-corruption laws and institutions were ineffective. From the 
participants’ opinions, the following points which are supported by some ideas in literature 
review chapter on the Nigerian anti-corruption laws and agencies emerged: 
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Table 7.5: Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Laws and Institutions 
 
Factors  No of Respondents = 58 Percentage 
Corruption and lack of job 
security 
37 64 
Lack of resources 10 17 
Restrictions imposed by the 
establishment Acts 
8 14 
Out dated laws 3 5 
Total  58 100 
 
From Table 7.5, anti-corruption laws and institutions are ineffective. According to 64% 
of the participants, it is because, like many other things in Nigeria, corrupt officials in the justice 
agencies, for fear of losing their jobs, play along. According to some of these participants, 
agencies like the ICPC and EFCC only go after political opponents of the ruling class or 
members who have fallen out of favor with the kingmakers within the political elites. The 
unwritten rule is that any member of the ruling elite that has not lost favor of the kingmakers 
could get away with any corrupt act. For example, in one case, a complaint was made against 
two PDP chieftains, Deputy Senate leader, Ibrahim Mantu and Deputy Majority leader, 
Zwingina, who demanded N54 million bribe from the Minister of FCT nominee, Mallam El-
Rufai, in order not to block his nomination (Ologbenla, 2007). The social status of the two 
senators and the PDP, according to TI, ensured that the ICPC did not investigate them.  
A celebrated case was an investigative panel the FGN set up in 2001 to examine the 
decay in the now defunct Nigerian Airways Limited (NAL). Four people that had interests in the 
investigation sent the sum of N3.5 million to the panel through Mika Anache, a member of the 
ruling PDP and the Presidential Committee that reviewed Nigeria’s 1999 Constitutions (Tokpo 
2012). When the ICPC stepped in to investigate this corrupt act, the case remained stalled in the 
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court and one of the principal actors, Adeyemi Omowunmi, who gave the money to the PDP 
chieftain, Alhaji Mika Anache, mysteriously escaped from police custody. The government 
subsidized the defunct NAL money derived from petroleum products which accounts for more 
than half of the government’s annual revenues (Chapter 5). 
Another example of the politicization of the agencies and laws is case with former 
governor of Bayelsa State, Depreye Alamieyeseigha, who was impeached in 2005. 
Alamieyeseigha stole the state’s money and was also involved in money laundering not only in 
Nigeria but also in London and the United States (Daniel, Bacarese, and Hatchard, 2011; United 
Nations Organization 2013). Until his impeachment by the BSHA in 2005, indictment by the 
EFCC, and conviction by the courts in Nigeria and London, he was a member of the PDP 
(Daniel et al, 2011; Global Witness Organization, 2010; StAR-World Bank, 2013). The governor 
brought international disgrace to Nigeria especially by jumping bail in London where he was 
charged for money laundering and returning to Nigeria dressed as a woman with forged 
documents (Carroll, 2005). Many local and international media showed pictures of him wearing 
women’s dresses. For example, Offiong (2013) in his article titled “Nigeria: the Hall of Shame” 
published a picture of Alamieyeseigha in a woman’s dress which he used to escape London and 
returned to Nigeria as shown in Figure 7.3.  
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Figure 7.3: Governor Alamieyeseigha Escapes London Dressed as a Woman 
 
 
Source: Offiong, J. (2013). Nigeria: the hall of shame.  
 
He later spent only two years in jail after being convicted in Nigeria where he may have 
received preferential treatment by prison officials. The incumbent Nigerian president, Goodluck 
Jonathan, granted him a state pardon and he has been reinstated as a chieftain of the PDP. 
Alamieyeseigha’s successor, Tamipreye Sylva, followed the footstep of his predecessor and 
misappropriated N450 million ($2.8 million) between 2005 and 2012 (EFCC 2013). He is in jail 
while awaiting prosecution by the EFCC. An unemployed youth who stole a Sony Ericsson 
phone worth $250 belonging to a state governor was prosecuted by the EFCC and sentenced to 
45years in prison. One can wonder if such youth were a ruling party faithful whether his offence 
would have been headline news on the EFCC website. 
Concerning job security, the establishment acts of both the EFCC and the ICPC 
empowered an incumbent president to remove the chair of any of these agencies should he/she 
be considered incompetent to perform the duties of the office. Since a chair knows that he/she 
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could be removed at any time, such individual may use extreme measures, such as selective 
prosecution of political opponents, pressuring subordinates to muddle up investigation of cases 
involving close associates of an incumbent, and keeping blind eyes at wrong doings by the 
president, in order to keep his/her job. The measure of selecting and prosecuting political 
opponents of a sitting president by the chair of any of the anti-corruption agencies could achieve 
a win-win situation for the chair and the incumbent president. For the chair, he/she is assured of 
job security since the incumbent president has the power to appoint and/or dismiss the agency’s 
chair.  
For the incumbent president, an opponent being investigated for corruption could have 
political and economic damages inflicted on him/her. The society could spend more time 
scrutinizing the candidacy of such person thereby diverting attention from the incumbent’s own 
wrong doings. The opponent could divert money he/she would have spent on campaign tours 
educating the electorates on why he/she is better candidate than the incumbent to hiring top 
lawyers to defend and clear him/her of any wrong doing. For instance, Frida Wada, former chair 
of the EFCC wrote to former President Olusegun Obasanjo to prevail on the current President to 
re-appoint her as the chairperson of the EFCC. A copy of this letter is attached here as Figure 7.4 
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Figure 7.4: An Exhibit of Frida Wada’s Letter to former President Olusegun Obasanjo 
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The fourth and fifth paragraphs of Figure 7.4 revealed two important things that I must point out. 
The first thing is cronyism. In Chapter 3, Joseph (2014) perceived cronyism as “a strategy of 
both survival and upward mobility in Nigeria. It is not dismissed by the persistence of affluence 
for a relative few and penury for the many” (p. 59). Putting a public official in a position or 
retaining such official in a position based on familial or other links to powerful oligarchs 
undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of such individual and the organization he/she leads 
(Osoba, 1996; World Bank, 2013).  
The second thing in Figure 7.4 derives partly from first item above. That is, misuse of 
public resources in pursuit of personal goals. Paragraph five made no pretense on such diversion 
in order to achieve two goals. The first goal was going after perceived enemies of former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo whose crime in the eyes of the former EFCC boss was denying 
Obasanjo’s daughter political victory. But the agency was established and funded with tax 
payers’ money to fight corruption and not to secure political victory for daughters of former 
presidents of Nigeria. The second goal was to secure her position in the agency and possibly use 
it to deal with those she described in paragraph two of her letter. Each of these goals were never 
the purpose for which EFCC was established. The content of this letter supported conclusion of 
participants that anti-corruption agencies were ineffective in tackling corruption.  
Another factor that has hindered anti-corruption efforts by the high courts, ICPC, and 
EFFC and other institutions is the lack of personnel, equipment, and office spaces for these 
agencies. This is the view of 59% of the participants. The ICPC, for example is empowered 
under Section 3(12) of the Act to appoint, place, and perform other management functions of its 
personnel. Yet, the agency depends on personnel from other government agencies including the 
law courts and police departments. In some state offices, the agency shares offices with courts 
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and other state agencies. These problems compromised the work of the agency especially the 
security of cases under investigation and the ability of the agency to work independently. The 
problems added to the delays in prosecuting suspects. An example is the case of former governor 
Sylva who has remained in EFCC’s custody since 2012. He was yet to be tried as at September 
2013. The constitutive Acts pegged the period the agency can investigate and prosecute suspects 
at 90 days. However, the agency may apply for extension of the period on reasonable ground. 
In the opinion of 50% of the participants, the restrictions imposed by the establishment 
Acts make the agencies handicapped. Section 6A-F of the ICPC establishment Act provides 
narrow definition of corruption and requires the agency to act only on complaints from the public 
and organizations. The message here is that the agency cannot initiate any corruption 
investigation if it did not receive any complaints. Also, it has to seek advice from the Attorney 
General’s office before starting investigation as well as prosecuting a suspect. One can imagine 
how serious an agency and law that are so restrictive can function in a country with large 
uninformed population and divisive political practices.  
According to 45% of the participants, anti-corruption laws are not keeping pace with the 
modern sophistication of corruption: the advance fee fraud aka 419 Act became a bad brand, 
giving Nigeria a bad image, especially under the military administration of retired General 
Ibrahim Babangida. The 1963 Republican Constitution of Nigeria that first criminalized 
corruption was not explicit enough. Recent updates in the Nigeria’s Criminal Code, Acts and 
agencies created such as the Miscellaneous Offence Act (EFCC 2013), The Economic and 
Financial Crimes commission Act (2004), the Money laundering (Prohibition) act 2004, the 
Money Laundering Act 1995, the Failed banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial malpractices 
in Banks Act 1994, the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991; and have done very 
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little to plug the loopholes in the law that can stop fraudsters from undermining the economic 
growth of the country. 
The amount of money involved in corrupt deals is another major factor affecting the 
effectiveness of laws and institutions according to 36% of the participants. Ministers, 
parliamentarians, governors, top military officials, and other well connected Nigerians in the 
corrupt enterprises are always hitting it big. ThisDay Newspaper (2003) reported the case of a 
Permanent Secretary in the Defense Ministry who embezzled N420 million ($2.8 million). The 
Newspaper reported that on the intervention of the then Minister of Justice, the Secretary and his 
accomplices were set free by the court. In 2010, the ICPC took the former Chairman of the PDP, 
Chief Vincent Ogbulafor and two other accomplices to court for fraud that amounted to N2.3 
billion (Ige and Nnochiri, 2010). The case registered as ICPC/2010 is still in court as at July, 
2013 and the accused persons were granted bail in the sum of N5 million ($31,056). Had each of 
the amount involved in the few examples here been given to these agencies, they could have 
used them to improve on their effectiveness. Another issue with the amount of money involved 
in the fraud is that the suspects use part of their loots to stall the case in the court as they hire 
prominent lawyers that specialize in obtaining court injunctions and indefinite adjournments. The 
Chairman of the EFCC admitted in 2013 that the agency he leads is hampered by the large 
amount of money corrupt individuals steal. He further stated that such amount is used in 
undermining the investigation of suspects and prosecutions.  
From the discussions above, it is clear that Nigeria’s anti-corruption laws and institutions 
have failed to curb corruption thereby deepening conflicts in the country and Bayelsa State in 
particular. The result in Table 7.6 supported hypothesis #2. The conclusion in Chapter 6 was that 
corruption was the major creator and perpetuator of conflicts in Bayelsa. Now Table 7.2 is 
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showing that the laws and institutions put in place to control those acts of corruption that created 
and/or sustained conflicts are ineffective. It makes sense then to understand why they cannot 
prevent conflicts.  
I now move to Chapter 8 to summarize the major findings in this study. Based on these 
findings, I will recommend policy measures that if properly implemented will curb corruption 
and make the management of conflicts in the state much easier.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
The theme of this dissertation is motivated by my concern for corruption and violent 
conflicts in Bayelsa State which, is one of the major oil producing states in Nigeria. Bribery, 
stealing of public funds, cronyism, and political patronage have created and/or perpetuated 
violent conflicts in the state. The perceptions of Bayelsans is that corrupt behaviors by those who 
redistribute oil revenue have concentrated oil revenue benefits in the hands of a few elites at 
expense of the majority of Bayelsans. Oil revenue benefits include but not limited to 
employment opportunities, scholarships, access to political offices, and other related benefits. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2006); Joseph (2014); and Pandit (2012), among other writers pointed out 
that such concentration of benefits in the hands of few in the society is a recipe for the 
emergence of aggrieved masses in a society. At the intersection of grievances and greed, is 
conflict between groups of gainers and losers in the society. I conclude this study by 
summarizing major findings, providing policy recommendations based on the findings, and 
stating the study’s limitations. I equally stated in this chapter ethical issues and direction of 
future studies which I would use to improve on some of the limitations contained in this first 
study. 
As evidenced from the preceding chapters of this dissertation, corruption in oil revenue 
redistribution has had significant effects on conflicts in the Bayelsa State of Nigeria. The effects 
of corruption have sustained existing conflicts such as intra- and inter-community conflicts 
(Table 6.2). Other effects of corruption in oil revenue redistribution created new conflicts such as 
the rise of militia groups and militancy as well as the use of jungle justice and commercialization 
of justice (Chapter 5), and weakening of conflict management laws and institutions in the state 
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(Chapter 7). In this chapter, I summarize the findings in the study and provide policy 
recommendations on how to manage various acts of corruption in Bayelsa State. These 
recommendations should strengthen anti-corruption laws and institutions with the potential to 
ultimately reduce conflicts in Bayelsa State. I also examine the limitations to this study and 
suggested future research on corruption and conflicts in the remaining eight oil producing states 
in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region and other natural resource-rich countries that are plagued by 
corruption and conflicts. 
Evidences from Chapters 5, 6, and 7 have shown that Bayelsa State is a divided society 
especially between the vast majority of the state’s population and a very few privileged group 
who redistribute the state’s oil revenues. The literature review chapter earlier revealed that 
corruption brings division in a society (Johnston, 1986). Each group in a divided has goals that 
are different from its competitor. Recognizing the differences in goals and the fierce competition 
that follows opposing goals, Coser (1967) succinctly stated that “The aims of the opponents are 
to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the rivals” (p. 67). Since the goal of the few elites who 
redistribute oil revenues was to loot, based on the evidence in Table 5.7, and the goal of the vast 
majority of Bayelsans, fair share of the state’s resources, who depended on the oil resources of 
the state are incompatible, conflict between the two groups is inevitable. As shown in Chapters 3, 
5, 6, and 7, the same factors that created and/or sustained violent conflicts (illegal behaviors or 
corruption) in the state have weakened the institutions and laws that would have helped to 
manage them. I strongly believe that any approach needed to manage violent conflicts plaguing 
Bayelsa State requires reviewing the conditions that promote corruption in the state and 
strengthening the mechanisms that can help in the management of all forms of conflicts in the 
state.  
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The main objective of this dissertation is summed up in the main research question, 
which is: “How does perception of corruption in oil revenue redistribution create and/or 
perpetuate conflicts in Bayelsa State?” To answer the main research question, the greed and 
grievance theory was used to provide a framework for explaining how corruption in oil revenue 
redistribution creates and/or sustains conflicts in Bayelsa State. From the theoretical framework, 
two hypotheses were formulated. These were, #1: Perceptions of corruption in oil revenues 
redistribution creates and/or perpetuates conflicts in Bayelsa State and #2: Nigeria’s anti-
corruption laws and institutions cannot prevent conflicts in Bayelsa State. The summary below 
shows the results of the hypotheses and in turn, answered the main research question. 
8.1 Summary of Major Findings 
In Table 6.1, I presented evidence indicating that there had been conflicts in Bayelsa 
State before oil revenue redistribution. In that table, 88% of the participants admitted that 
conflicts among Bayelsa State’s ethno-linguistic groups are common. It is further supported in 
the literature review with the Anikpo’s (1998) work. According to Anikpo, communal conflicts 
in the Niger Delta region is historical, predating the discovering of oil but perpetuated by clashes 
between MNOC and host communities’ cultures.  
 
8.1a How Corruption Creates and/or Perpetuates Conflicts in Bayelsa State 
I adopted Morgan (1988) classification of corruption into bribery, cronyism, distortion, 
political patronage, and theft. These acts of corruption in oil revenue redistribution create and/or 
sustain Bayelsa’s conflicts by creating divisions and conflicts among stakeholders in the state. 
This is further confirmed by my fieldwork and theoretical framework. One of the products of 
corruption Johnston (1986) asserted is that it “produces divisions and conflicts, both among those 
226 
involved in corrupt enterprises… and those left out” (p. 464). Analysis of qualitative data in this 
dissertation especially in Chapter 6, Tables 6.1 and 6.2, demonstrated through participants’ 
perceptions of the existence of different forms of corruption that the various type of conflicts in 
Bayelsa State were created and/or perpetuated by bribery, cronyism, political patronage, and 
other forms of corruption.  
The results from Chapter 6 supported hypothesis #1. Though it was asserted in the 
literature that corruption can help reduce cumbersome bureaucracy and serve as alternative 
sources of income for lowly paid civil servants (Leff, 1964; Montinola and Jackman, 2002). My 
data analysis did not find much support for such assertion except an inference that may be drawn 
from a contract’s attempt to distinguish between tips and bribes.  
For instance, bribery reduced waiting time in some government offices in Bayelsa State 
and facilitated the discovery of missing files as evidence in Table 5.5. The explanation of ‘tips’ 
given by a successful contractor in one of Bayelsa State Government’s agencies which I 
reproduced below, further points to the ability of corruption to serve as supplementary income 
to poorly paid civil servants and a means of overcoming wait times.  
Those clerks greet you every time you step into the office. They help you file your 
documents correctly. They even provide you a seat if you have to wait long before you 
see the senior officials. How much do they receive at the end of the month as salary given 
the work they perform every day? Showing appreciation has nothing to do with contract 
costs. 
 
Helping to file documents correctly, offering seats to visitors, and the question of how much 
bureaucrats receive at the end of the month support claims that corruption, at least in the 
context of Bayelsa State, is not entirely a source of violent conflicts. But when tips are bribes 
such facilitation or appreciation would change. World Bank in the literature review chapter not 
only defined bribe but also emphasized its effect by positing that bribery is “an offering of 
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something of value in return for some action. It impacts the poor in the society and creates 
violence” (p. 6). The impact World Bank is alluding to here related to grievances which 
majority of the populace in a society bear against the greed few who monopolized natural 
resources rents in a society (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Pandit, 2012). Thus, two broad groups 
(greedy elites and aggrieved masses) emerge in Bayelsa State that is almost only dependent on 
petroleum resources (Table 5.2) for its survival. 
My analysis of data in Table 6.2 confirmed the World Bank’s conclusion that bribery and 
other forms of corruption as perceived by participants in this study created and/or perpetuated 
violent conflicts in Bayelsa State. Also, Watts, Okonta, and Kemedi (2004) concluded that 
bribery, as one of the challenges to customary forms of governance, contributed to conflicts in 
the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. Similarly, misappropriation of natural resources rents (oil 
revenues in this case) by a few greedy elites exacerbated grievances in the state. The above 
conclusion drawn from participants’ perceptions of corruption as creator and perpetuator of 
conflicts was vigorously supported by Collier and Hoeffler (2006) greed and grievance theory. 
Bayelsa State, like any other society in developing countries suffers what Collier and 
Hoeffler described as ‘natural resource dependence.’ Greed, defined by Collier and Hoeffler 
(2006) as “elites competition for control of natural resources rents, thrives in any natural 
resource dependent society.” Aggrieved citizens who Pandits (2012) in the literature review 
chapter described as ‘justice seekers,’ resorted to violence as their grievances increased (Obi, 
2005; Ojakorotu, 2005; Ross, 2012). This was the case in the Ogoni Bill of Rights and the 
Kaiama Declaration. I consider the Ogoni Bill of rights to be a non-violent communication of 
grievances because the MOSOP as at 1990 used mostly non-violent approach in protesting its 
perceived corruption of the elites. I cannot make the same claim for the Kaiama Declaration of 
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1998 because it contained threats of violence that was actually used extensively by various 
militia groups in the area from 1998 through 2009.  
The Kaiama Declaration #4 states “Ijaw youths in all communities in all Ijaw clans in 
the Niger Delta will take steps to implement these resolutions beginning from 30th of 
December, 1998, as a step towards reclaiming the control of our lives” (Ijaw Youth Council, 
1998). Following this declaration, MEND, NDV, Bush Boys, NDVF, and many other militia 
groups took up arms against perceived enemies of Ijaw people such as government of Nigeria 
and various MNOCs. The Human Rights Watch (1999), for example, reported the death of 
3000 people in the 1999 clash between Nigerian security personnel and militia groups in Odi, 
Bayelsa State. What changed since 2009 was a reduction in the intensity of conflicts in Bayelsa 
State.  
In line with hypothesis #1, corruption behaviors such as bribery, cronyism, political 
patronage, and theft of public funds are prevalent in Bayelsa State; and they collectively create 
and/or sustain intra- and inter-community conflicts in the state. It is troubling to observe that 
public officials in Bayelsa State devised means of demanding bribes like deliberately declaring 
contractors’ files as missing, making visitors to their offices to wait longer than necessary to 
transact whatever business that brought them there, and awarding government contracts to 
contractors who gave bigger brown envelopes. These civil servants’ tactics support Amuwo 
(2012) assertion that “public servants and elected officials can cause delays so they could get 
opportunities to extract bribes, individual bribers can improve their personal situations at the 
expense of the polity, the net loser” (p. 173). Bayelsans, who are the net losers in this case, 
become more aggrieved by the actions of public servants who they perceived as obstructing their 
enjoyment of the benefits of being members of Bayelsa society.  
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There are two main impacts bribery has on the execution of official duties by public 
officials according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (2012). The first impact is on 
the poor, the net losers, who have no resources to compete with those able and willing to pay 
bribes. The second impact is on the society where it unleashes violence as a means of choice to 
settle disparities between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have-nots’ (p. 6). Indeed, Table 3.3 and the result 
of data analysis provided in Table 6.2 in Chapter 6 associated bribery with violent conflicts. 
According to Table 6.2, bribery was among one of the major factors that created and/or 
perpetuated violent conflicts such as those between host communities and MNOCs, conflicts in 
the communities, and clashes between militants and the JTF, just to mention three examples in 
Bayelsa.  
On the problem of theft or looting of public funds, Nigeria’s Criminal Code Chapters 12, 
34, 35, 38, and 43 among other related chapters classified stealing, obtaining by tricks, 
conversion of public property like cash, cars, and other properties as criminal. They have, 
however, not deterred past public officials of Bayelsa State from stealing public funds generated 
through various official sources. Nossiter (2011) aptly summed up this looting culture by 
positing that “Riches flow into Nigeria, but are lost after arrival” (p. 2). Nossiter’s work is one of 
the many indicating how Bayelsa State’s official revenue sources such as statutory allocations, 
13% derivation, and excess crude account that yield billions of naira to the state have been looted 
by a few privileged people in the state, in violation of relevant chapters of the Nigerian Criminal 
Code. As detailed in Case Control Number 42 of the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative and 
World Bank (2013) document, former Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was prosecuted and 
convicted of embezzlement of state funds, fraud, and abuse of power.  
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All these charges and convictions stemmed from 1999-2005 when he was serving as 
governor of Bayelsa State. By virtue of his position, he was in charge of Bayelsa State’s oil 
revenues accruing from the three major sources as discussed at length in Chapter 5. His actions 
created conflict between Nigeria’s anti-corruption agency, EFCC, and the Bayelsa State 
Government over the return of recovered stolen funds to the state government. According to 
Oyesina (2014), Bayelsa State filed a suit in a federal high court in Abuja against the EFCC, 
seeking to recover N1.4 billion and $1.3 million in local and foreign currencies recovered from 
Alamieyeseigha.  
Analysis of data in Table 6.2 also showed that stealing and looting of public funds in 
Bayelsa State created and/or perpetuated conflicts in the community, clashes between officials of 
the JTF and militants, conflicts among ethno-linguistic groups, and conflicts among criminal 
gangs operating in the state as perceived by more than half of the participants. The emergence of 
criminal gangs such as illegal oil cartels, drug traffickers, the MEND, NDVF, and Bush Boys 
further showed how acts of corruption created conflicts. Their activities include kidnapping for 
ransom, killing of government officials, MNOCs’ officials, and ordinary citizens, oil bunkering, 
and eliminating opponents of their political godfathers in Bayelsa State. In addition, many 
violent organizations that emerged after the creation of Bayelsa State were formed and funded 
with oil revenue by politicians in the region (Servant, 2006).Though some of these violent 
criminal gangs spread their operations throughout all of the Niger Delta States and once in 
Abuja, but most of their deadliest operations have been in the creeks of Bayelsa State (Asuni, 
2009; Igwe, 2010). 
The Odi massacre of 1999 stands out. Odi is one of the oil cities in Bayelsa State. It 
started with criminal gangs kidnapping and murdering twelve officers of the Nigerian Police 
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Force (HRW, 2000; Ibekwe and Ewoh, 2012; Servant, 2006). The civilian government of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo sent in troops that scorched Odi, killing more than 3,000 people, 
raping women and children, and looting livestock (HRW, 2000). Bayelsa remains a volatile area 
even after the 2009 amnesty program initiated by late President Musa Yar’Adua and continued 
by President Goodluck Jonathan. Even during my 2013 fieldwork in the state, I witnessed an 
incident of militants collecting illegal fees, and there were reports of militant attacks and 
kidnappings.  
Furthermore, cronyism, a widely practiced act of corruption, favors friends and relatives 
of those in power (USIP, 2010). It has been praised for providing room for supervisors to bring 
in people they know and trust to do a piece of work well. However, it has failed equal 
opportunity tests in pluralistic societies like Bayelsa State as Bayelsans who are not relatives and 
friends of those in power are denied opportunities in government jobs, contracts, and even 
scholarship for students. In Bayelsa State as revealed by the work of Ebipade, Bekewei, and 
Inanife (2012), former Governor Timipre Sylva used his position to bring in his cronies. The 
former governor and his cronies then combined to loot the resources of the state. Parts of these 
funds stolen by the former governor and his cronies were among those properties and money 
ThisDay Newspaper reported in 2012 that the EFCC confiscated from the governor.  
Majority of the participants (88%) in Table 6.2 of this study stated that cronyism as 
practiced in Bayelsa combined with other acts of corruption to create and/or sustain various 
violent conflicts in Bayelsa State. The conflicts participants associated with cronyism included 
ones between host communities and MNOCs, conflicts within communities, and between 
government and Bayelsa youths, to mention but three such conflicts Cronyism is what Joseph 
(2014) referred to as ‘prebendal politics.’  
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As Joseph (2014) observed, “prebendalism is based on the treatment of state power as a 
congeries of offices which can be competed for, appropriated, and then administered for the 
benefit of individual occupants and their support groups” (p. 63). How the appropriation and 
administration of state power occur is summed up in Jensen and Wantchekon (2012) work 
entitled “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa.” According to Jensen and 
Wantchekon, “The key mechanism linking authoritarian rule and resource dependence, both in 
democratic transition and in democratic consolidation, is an incumbent’s discretion over the 
distribution of natural resource rents” (p. 3). Bayelsa State as revealed in Chapter 5 depends 
almost entirely on a single resource (crude oil) for its revenue. Politicians in the state and their 
political godfathers are the receivers and redistributors of Bayelsa State revenues and other 
benefits derived thereof. The monopoly of a state’s resources and their redistributions by 
whoever holds the state power has made competition for state power so attractive and violent. 
Those who hold it want to maintain it at all costs using many tactics such as political patronage, 
recruitment and funding of thugs, and buying favors from voter groups like women groups (e.g., 
women’s wing of political parties, religious organizations, and professional groups). The 
motivations of political office contenders in Bayelsa State, given the perception of a majority of 
its citizens and their experiences with past and present politicians, are to loot, steal, and divert 
projects that would have benefitted the majority of Bayelsans rather than to serve private 
interests (Table 5.5). 
The looting of Bayelsa State’s funds by former governors of the state first polarized the 
state between the beneficiaries of the corrupt behaviors of the former governors and those left 
out in the sharing of the loots. The impeachment of Alamieyeseigha, former governor and one 
of the most corrupt officials of the state, aptly showed division and conflicts in the State 
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Assembly where 17 members of Assembly supported his impeachment while 7 members 
opposed it (Nwajah, 2005). The former governor was impeached in 2005 for looting the states 
funds. In the streets of the state, mainly Ijaw population and a few other people that benefitted 
from his corrupt regime supported their kinsman. Some even took up arms to guard his home 
and delayed his arrest by law enforcement agents (Amaize and Oyadongha, 2005). Other ethnic 
groups and a small number of his political opponents within the Ijaw ethnic group engaged in 
confrontation with the ex-governor’s supporters.  
As Chapter 2 revealed, Bayelsa is blessed with more than fourteen other natural resources 
including lumber, clay, and fish. But since its creation in 1996, the state has relied heavily on oil 
for its subsistence. Based on the 13% derivation formula, the state is the third highest earner 
behind Akwa-Ibom and Rivers States of the derivation fund. In Table 5.4, this study showed that 
oil revenue accounted for more than 80% of the state’s annual revenue. This is consistent with 
existing literature such as Adebayo (1993), Ekpo (2004), and Obi (2005) who each stated that 
over 80% of Nigeria and its federating units’ annual income is derived from crude oil. Though 
the topography of the state is such that most of its communities are found in the swamp, its 
population size of 1.7 million people (NPC, 2006) and the little areas not in swamp should have 
developed more than other oil producing areas of Niger Delta region that have larger populations 
and less incoming funds. 
However, as a special case of the ‘paradox of plenty,’ majority of its citizens live in 
poverty while a few elites in the state strategize to corruptly enrich themselves by looting public 
funds as exemplified by former Governors Alamieyeseigha and Sylva who ruled Bayelsa from 
1999 to 2012. The high level of conflicts in the state are largely a result of acts of corruption. 
The state’s oil revenue benefits are so tempting that they provide escape routes for anyone who 
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can gets in a position to make decisions about who gets what, where, and when (Obi, 2012; StAR 
and World Bank, 2013). The past and present governors, chiefs, and other ruling elites of the 
state hold the state’s cake and knife. They dish out a greater part of Bayelsa’s treasury to 
themselves, families, friends, and cronies who are proxies for their corrupt enterprises.  
Corruption in the state’s oil revenue redistribution has engendered violent conflicts 
between host communities and MNOCs; government and militia groups; ethnic versus ethnic; 
and intra- and inter-communities in the state. Records from the EFCC, ICPC, local courts, and 
the court in London as well as the United Nations Stolen Assets Recovery Initiatives and the 
World Bank (2013) revealed that more than 85% of the state’s oil revenue has been embezzled 
by few individuals. The UN’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative file (2013) revealed that Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha’s loots of Bayelsa funds recovered from Cyprus, Demark, South Africa, United 
Kingdom, and United States as at 2013 was $10 million. The EFCC’s records showed choice 
properties in Abuja seized from former Governor Sylva which he bought with money stolen from 
the state’s oil revenues. 
Following the polarization of the state between the few managers of the state’s wealth 
and the masses on whose properties and sweat the state’s wealth were produced are violent intra- 
and inter-community; ethnic versus ethnic; multinational corporation/community, and other 
related conflicts plaguing the state. Findings from the field work showed how these conflicts 
have devastated the state. Table 6.3 for example, showed that 97% of participants said that these 
conflicts emerged in the state because of looting of public funds, taking bribes, and diversion of 
oil revenue to finance political activities.  
Divisions among the Bayelsans created by bribery, cronyism, political patronage, and 
other related acts of corruption resulted in groups fighting one another. Expanding on the 
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incitement of a Bayelsan groups against one another, HRW (2003) reported on how the extensive 
use of political thugs in PDP’s primary elections in the state resulted in the death of dozens of 
people in Nembe L.G.A. Political thugs and jobless youths recruited by those who looted oil 
revenue are assigned to do the dirty jobs of their recruiters such as destroying through arson and 
falsification of records of any evidence that could implicate their paymasters; intimidating and 
killing political opponents of their bosses and any other persons or groups that stood between 
them and their corrupt enterprises. A participant during the fieldwork aptly summarized how oil 
revenue redistribution influences conflicts by postulating that “during elections, incumbent 
political office holders used public funds they stole to recruit jobless youths, arm, and set them 
loose on political opponents. These thugs will intimidate, maim, and sometimes assassinate their 
patrons’ opponents and voters” (Nossiter, 2012).  
The goal of intimidating and eliminating political opponents is to capture the state’s oil 
revenue by winning elections which in turn confers the power of incumbency on the winner. This 
study has earlier found that Bayelsa like other states in Nigeria depends on oil resources for 
sustenance. The incumbent governor has discretion over the redistribution of the benefits derived 
from oil resources which Bayelsa State almost exclusively depends on for survival. Indeed 
Jensen and Wantchekon (2012) view such discretion as a key that links authoritarian rule and 
resource dependence in a democratic transition. Recall that Nigeria in general and Bayelsa in 
particular, started democratic transitions from over a decade of military rule in 1999. The past 
and present governors of Bayelsa State enjoy this power of incumbency in the redistribution of 
oil revenues and corrupt attitudes associated with it (StAR and World Bank, 2012). The 
theoretical framework explained that the greediness of these corrupt entrepreneurs denies other 
members of the state their share of the oil revenue generated benefits thus increasing the 
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oppressed group’s list of grievances such as inequality, lack of jobs, and ethnic and religious 
divisions against the oppressive group (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Obi, 2010; Omotola, 2006).  
Further findings from the fieldwork indicate that the state’s oil revenue redistribution 
benefits very few corrupt entrepreneurs such as chiefs, militia leaders, government officials, and 
other people who selfishly desire to control job opportunities, money, and other oil revenue 
generated benefits of Bayelsa at the expense of other members of the state. Former governors, 
traditional chiefs, and other extortionists in the state who formed the greedy class have goals that 
are incompatible with the goals of the legitimate owners (the 1.7 million people) of the state’s oil 
revenue benefits. The differences in the goal (control of oil revenue for their group’s interests) of 
the corrupt entrepreneurs and the goal (fair share of the oil revenue) of the larger aggrieved 
Bayelsa population resulted in the intra- and inter-community conflicts plaguing the state.  
 
8.1b Anti-Corruption Laws and Institutions cannot Prevent Bayelsa State Conflicts 
Another major finding is that Nigeria’s anti-corruption laws and institutions are not 
effective in preventing conflicts in Bayelsa State (Table 7.6). I have described in Chapter 7 of 
this dissertation some of the anti-corruption laws, decrees, criminal codes, and institutions put 
in place by Nigeria and its federating units (i.e., States) to fight corruption. Through those laws, 
some high ranking public officials in Bayelsa State like former Governors Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha and Sylva Timpreye have been convicted of violating anti-corruption laws of 
the state and Nigeria by engaging in such acts as bribery, fraud, looting, and money laundering 
(EFCC, 2012; StAR and World Bank, 2012). Their convictions, seizure of properties, and 
prison terms ought to have deterred current and future leaders in the state from engaging in any 
act of corruption. However, there seems to be little change in attitude towards corruption as 
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shown in the 2012 report by the FFP. In the report, FFP stated that violent conflicts erupted in 
the state following the dismissal of most of the eight elected Local Government Council (LGC) 
Chairmen in the state by current Governor Dickson Sariake. According to Folaranmi (2012), 
Governor Dickson appointed his former aides to replace those elected council chairmen he 
sacked. This governor’s action as reported by Folaranmi (2012) is akin to cronyism and 
violates Section 16(A-D) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. 
Relevant sections of the Nigerian Criminal Code stipulated penalties upon conviction of 
any person involved in corrupt acts. They include Chapter 38, Section 419 A-B, Chapters 41, and 
43. Other relevant anti-corruption mechanisms included the laws courts and two new agencies, 
ICPC and EFCC. These two agencies were established by the 2000 Act known as the ICPC 
Establishment Act and the 2003 Act establishing EFCC. These agencies have power to 
investigate, arrest, and prosecute those involved in corrupt behaviors. This dissertation found that 
some greedy elements in the society took advantage of the opportunity of their positions as 
governors, militia leaders, and local chiefs to loot the resources of the state. The looters used 
their ill-gotten wealth to buy justice, hinder the investigative institutions, and buy ethnic and 
militia support bases that sometimes committed arson in order to destroy evidence of their 
corrupt acts. 
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, participants in this study held as ‘unsatisfactory’ the performance 
of anti-corruption laws and institutions such as “Section 419” of the Criminal Code, the EFCC, 
ICPC, and law courts. Specifically, they commented that the court system put justice on sale. 
Moreover, the EFCC is unable to prosecute people because of the large amount of money stolen 
by suspects and how they use those stolen monies to stifle EFCC’s work (EFCC, 2013).  
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The weaknesses of the law and these institutions are exploited by corrupt officials to 
perpetuate corruption. Also, the theoretical framework showed that corruption and greed have 
both direct and indirect relationships. As Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have demonstrated in the 
greed and grievance theory, the opportunity (control of strategic territory or natural resource) to 
do well in war motivates a rebel leader to continue the struggle. Corrupt officials and those who 
can afford justice capitalize on the opportunities provided by corruption to weaken institutions 
like the law courts and the EFCC to steal larger amount of public funds. The EFCC (2013) 
observed that, “The amount of money stolen hinders the agency from effectively prosecuting 
corrupt officials. These persons who stole public funds use it to hire the best lawyers. The lawyer 
use various tactics including ‘asking courts to adjourn cases for a long period, not requesting for 
and ensuring that defense witnesses appear in court during trials.’ Similarly, money realized 
from illegal petroleum sales help the local and international oil cartels to consolidate their 
operations and eliminate any threat to their illegal business. The views expressed in the literature, 
reinforced by the theory, and supported by my fieldwork, confirmed that the anti-corruption laws 
and institutions in Nigeria cannot prevent conflicts in Bayelsa State. The effects of this scenario 
on the Bayelsa society include polarization of citizens, increasing use of jungle justice, and 
increased conflicts.  
On the inability of anti-corruption laws and institutions to prevent conflicts in Bayelsa 
State, I found that Nigeria has Criminal Codes, Decrees, Acts of National Assembly, and 
institutions that can reduce incidents of corruption, the main cause of conflicts in places like 
Bayelsa State. In the case of laws, decrees, and acts, the intended purposes include ensuring that 
the state economy is prosperous and efficient, dynamic and self-reliant for the benefit of every 
citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity (see Section 16, 
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Subsection 1-4) of the Nigeria Constitution (1999). When taking oath of office, public officials 
vow to defend the laws of the land. What is obtainable after the ritual of taking oath of office is a 
flagrant abuse of those laws they vowed to protect. Former Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha 
took the oath of office and then proceeded to steal N50 billion (about $800 million) of the state’s 
revenues. His successor, Timipre Sylva, also looted N660.45 billion (about $4.403 billion) of 
public funds (Chapter 1). Violation of oath of office is not limited to the governors who stole 
public funds. Some leaders of anti-corruption agencies who perverted the course of justice or 
used their offices for personal vendetta directly or indirectly contributed to conflict emergence 
and/or continuation. For instance, Figure 7.4 provides a clear evidence of a head of an anti-
corruption agency (EFCC) abandoning the agency’s mission (fighting corruption) and taking on 
what I would describe as political protection. Imagine a chairperson of EFCC spending tax 
payers’ money pursuing political opponents of former President Obasanjo and his family instead 
of going after those few greedy Nigerian elites who stole the country’s wealth and put tax payers 
and the country into perpetual pains.  
Given the manner of abuse of these laws and institutions by public officials, the general 
perception of most of the participants (71%) in this study was that the various anti-corruption 
measures have been ineffective in controlling corruption in Bayelsa State (Table 7.6). The 
ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies like the Court system, EFCC, and ICPC in preventing 
conflicts means that corruption, the main cause and/or sustenance of conflicts, is stronger than 
the measures put in place to curb it (Table 7.5). In the case of the court system, the 
commoditization of justice created and/or sustained existing conflicts like the use of jungle 
justice (Table 7.1). It also increased the level of grievances in the state (Table 7.5).  
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8.1c How did corruption undermine the effectiveness of laws and institutions? 
Corruption undermines the effectiveness of anti-corruption laws and institutions in three 
major ways. First, the establishment acts and/or decrees of those laws and institutions provided 
political interpretation and control of anti-corruption laws and institutions. For instance, the 
EFCC Act 2000, Section 3(2) says that “A member of the Commission may at any time be 
removed by the President for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising 
from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct or if the President is 
satisfied that it is not in the interest of the Commission or the interest of the public that the 
member should continue in office.” The political implication of this subsection of the act 
cannot be overemphasized. Ribadu Nuhu, the first chairman of EFCC from 2003-2004, was 
removed from his post by the former President Olusegun Obasanjo who appointed him to that 
position as provided by the establishment act. According to HRW (2011), Ribadu’s removal 
was not based on incompetence but for daring to arrest and prosecute former President 
Obasanjo’s loyalists like Peter Odili, Bode George, and James Ibori for violating Nigeria’s 
Criminal Codes Chapters 12, 17, 37, and 48. It may also be that his removal was justified by 
the clause that, “it is not in the interest of the public that member [Ribadu] should continue in 
office.” Can one conclude that the interests of those few suspects the EFCC was going after 
constitute the interests of all Nigerians?  
Also, the EFCC establishment act requires the agency to get the approval of the 
Ministry of Justice headed by the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) before anyone can 
be prosecuted. The AGF is a political appointee who, in the Nigerian context, is not apolitical. 
The required clearances from the AGF may have been a reason the EFCC did not investigate 
and prosecute Mrs. Patience Goodluck Jonathan, wife of President Jonathan over $13 million 
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she was accused of laundering (Sahara Report, 2011). A Nigerian civil society organization, 
Coalition against Impunity and Illegality (CAGIL), sued the EFCC for failure to prosecute Mrs. 
Jonathan over the $13 million money laundering allegation. To date, CAGIL and other 
interested Nigerians have not received any explanation as to why Mrs. Jonathan was not 
investigated. 
 Secondly, the agencies, either because of structural control by the Presidency and 
Ministry of Justice or a combination of other acts of corruption such as cronyism, political 
patronage, and bribery, have engaged in selective prosecution, which has further weakened 
their ability to perform well. Lessig (2013) agrees to a link between corruption and 
ineffectiveness of institutions when he concluded that “corruption weakens the effectiveness of 
public institutions.” In a 2011 HRW report titled “Corruption on Trial? The Records of 
Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission,” the agency noted how interferences 
from Nigeria’s political establishments like the Presidency and the AGF’s office are affecting 
the EFCC’s effectiveness.  
Thirdly, though the court system, as part of the anti-corruption institutions, tried in 
prosecuting and convicting or agreeing to bargain deals with such ex-convicts like 
Alamieyeseigha, Tafa Balogun (former Inspector General of Police), and Joshua Dariye, its 
judicial decisions have encouraged corruption to flourish.  
The conclusion of this dissertation therefore is that bribery, looting, cronyism, and other 
perceptions of corruption created and/or perpetuated conflicts in Bayelsa State. Those corrupt 
behaviors weakened Nigerian anti-laws and institutions established to fight them. Thus, their 
inability to reduce corruption further compromised their ability to prevent conflicts in Bayelsa 
State.  
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8.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, I make the following policy 
recommendations for implementation in managing corruption and conflicts in Bayelsa State:  
 Bayelsa State economy should be diversified 
 BSHA should enact new laws to an incumbent’s discretion over the 
redistribution of oil revenues 
 Bayelsa State should establish effective means to recover and re-invest in the 
state all misappropriated resources 
 A sincere re-orientation of all stakeholders in the state in order to restore public 
confidence in the society 
 Anti-corruption laws and institutions need to be constantly updated to keep up 
with modern sophistications of corruption.  
First, Bayelsa State should diversify the state’s economy to reduce its almost near 
dependence on petroleum products. Chapter 2, Table 2.2 of this study reveals fifteen other 
natural resources of the state excluding oil. It is confirmed in Chapter 5, Table 5.4 that Bayelsa 
depends almost entirely on crude oil revenue for its survival thereby neglecting the other fifteen 
natural resources found in the state. The NNPC’s annual report and reports from other energy 
sources consistently show that price of oil fluctuates. The state should invest some of the 
revenues from oil toward the development of these alternative resources. I believe it will help 
reduce over reliance on oil for the state’s revenue. 
Second, the BSHA should consider enacting new laws that will reduce the incumbent’s 
discretion over the redistribution of oil revenues. As presently practiced in the state, the state 
governor receives the state’s share of oil revenues consisting of statutory allocations, 13% 
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derivation, and excess crude oil (Chapter 5, Table 5.4), and determines what, how, and when 
other stakeholders in the state get their shares through the annual budget. Though the governor 
submits the budget proposal to the BSHA for approval, there is no proper monitoring or 
reporting system to ensure that what the Assembly approved was actually implemented. An 
annual report of a Nigerian Niger Delta region based non-governmental organization that 
reports on government accountability in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, the NDCB Report 
(2009), revealed this lack of monitoring of BSHA approved budget when it posited that: 
At the state level, a Motherless Babies’ Home was budgeted at N200 million. However, 
by the end of 2008, NDCBP discovered that there was nothing to show an attempt or 
intention to build a motherless babies home at the proposed area. Investigation carried 
out showed that officials of relevant government ministries claimed lack of knowledge 
of the project even where it was clearly spelt out in the budget for 2008 (p. 25).  
 
This NGO further claimed that the same BSHA approved another N100 million for the 
same project in the 2009 Bayelsa State budget even when it was clear that the amount approved 
in 2008 was never spent on the project. Fast forward to 2013, The incumbent Governor 
Dickson Sariake Henry, was accused of deceiving Bayelsans by claiming that his 
administration has more than N28 billion in savings out of over N400 billion allocations that 
accrued to the state between 2012 and 2013 (Kpodo, 2013). Kpodo’s deception accusation 
against Governor Dickson surfaced when the governor and BSHA took a 60 million euro 
(about N353 million) from the Polish Government. His argument is that if the governor’s N28 
billion savings claim is true, why then borrow with interest N353 million when you can use the 
state’s savings of N28 billion without interests. A rational question BSHA could have asked the 
governor before approving this 2013 loan would have been when and what did we spent the 
N28 billion savings on.  
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Any proposed new law should do among other measures ensure that an independent 
non-partisan committee is established to receive all allocations, a similar committee should 
select line items where all the accruals will be spent, and a professional audit agency that will 
audit all receipts and expenditures and report on the performances of all the two committees. 
The audit report once adopted by the Assembly should be put in the public domain.  
Third, since bribery, lootings, cronyism, political patronage, and other forms of 
corruption have been prevalent in the redistribution of the Bayelsa State’s crude oil revenues 
thereby denying majority of Bayelsans their entitlements and in the process created and/or 
sustained conflicts among different stakeholders in the state, there should be effective means to 
recover and reinvest in the state all misappropriated resources. This step can restore public 
confidence in institutions and also reduce the list of grievances perceived by the aggrieved 
groups. 
Fourth, a sincere re-orientation of all persons and groups in the Bayelsa society is 
greatly needed at this time in the life of the state. The content of such re-orientation should 
include the art of governance at all levels and followership. Many government policies and 
programs in the state tend to have favored political godfathers of the state and their cronies as 
shown in Chapters 6 and 7 of this study. For that reason, most Bayelsan like the SSABS have 
lost hope in the ability of the state to, among other things, guarantee their civil rights and civil 
liberties as provided in the constitution. With such hopelessness comes a decline in the level of 
patriotism required of a citizen. Ethnic or narrow interests supersede statewide and national 
interests. I strongly believe that the re-orientation of every stakeholder in Bayelsa State is 
necessary for the survival of the state, improved governance, and better followership.  
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Fifth, on the inability of anti-corruption laws and institutions to prevent conflicts in the 
state, this study believes that the age of the laws; restrictions imposed by the establishment Acts 
of the institutions; and the same corrupt behaviors of the managers (i.e., government officials, 
political party godfathers, and other related managers) of the institutions such as the EFCC, 
ICPC, and Law Courts are the reasons these laws and institutions cannot prevent conflicts. I 
recognize that some of the Nigerian criminal codes are about fifty decades old but they are not 
older than the codes of less corrupt countries like the United States. Title 18 of the US Code, 
Mail and Wire Fraud Status of 1872, Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organizations Act 
of 1972, and the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, among other related codes 
(Cornell Law, undated), are not younger than the Nigerian Criminal Code and the 2003 EFCC 
and the 2000 ICPC establishment acts. However, criminals are always find loopholes in 
existing codes to perpetrate their criminal acts. For example, oil revenue redistributors use non-
governmental organizations they founded (Table 5.5 of Chapter 5), to steal public funds. I 
believe that updating the codes can help to keep up with the complexities of modern corrupt 
practices.  
Additionally, the Nigerian Presidency needs to be divested with the power to appoint 
and remove chairmen of these institutions especially the EFCC and ICPC. Doing so will 
prevent the politicization of these agencies and reduce incidents of selective prosecution of 
political opponents of whoever is the incumbent president, governor, and such other top 
officials. Officials of the agencies need to be professionals as is the case in the United States, 
Sweden, and other less corrupt societies. Professionalization of the agencies can ensure 
efficiency and improve their effectiveness in curbing corruption and conflicts in Bayelsa State. 
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Also, the agencies should be independent of the AGF. I said this because the AGF is a 
political appointee. Chapter 7 of this study contains some insights into what the AGF’s office 
can do when some influential members of a political party that appoints the office holder are 
involved in corrupt behaviors. 
The discretion of the governor to redistribute oil rents and other benefits encourages 
bribery, lootings, cronyism, political patronage, and other forms of corruption in the state. The 
effects of these illegal behaviors of state officials and their cronies have resulted in violent 
conflicts, driven away potential investors in the state, debased the state’s culture, and weakened 
the ability of its laws and institutions to prevent conflicts among individuals and institutions in 
the state. I recommend in this regard that the State Assembly work with other State Assemblies 
to modify the current South-South anti-corruption laws as well as making the modifications 
available to the current National Constitution Review Committee sitting in Abuja for possible 
incorporation into the new national constitution that will emerge in 2015. Such modification 
should include among others the removal of immunity for public officials involved in corrupt 
practices; on conviction, all stolen assets must be recovered and the convicts must be banned 
from holding public office for life. Also, the new laws should guarantee protection for 
whistleblowers. It is because there is no constitutional protection of this important group in the 
society that corrupt individuals are encouraged to act with impunity since nobody can expose 
them without consequences.  
8.3 Limitations of the Study and Ethical Issues 
8.3a Limitations of the study 
There some limitations in this dissertation. The first limitation pertains to the 
sensitiveness of the problem (corruption and conflicts) and data collected. The practice of 
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corruption is culturally sensitive and involves entering the personal space of participants in order 
to understand how they perceive it. I interviewed 58 participants across various sections of the 
Bayelsa society (Table 4.1). During my interaction with those participants, I come to understand 
how sensitive the subject matter is to them. Due to this sensitiveness, some of the participants 
expressed fears and were selective in expressing their perceptions.  
The second limitation is the sample size of 58 participants made up of youths and adults 
drawn from oil bearing and oil impacted communities, politicians, bureaucrats, and officials of 
MNOC in Bayelsa State. This number is not large enough for the whole Bayelsa State with a 
population of 1.7 million people (NPC 2006). Other communities and companies not directly 
involved in oil resource related activities were dropped. In some communities, because of real 
threats to my life and the life of potential participants in such areas, interviews, discussions, and 
observations were abandoned. Information that would have been collected from such became 
unavailable. The perceptions of a small sample population who participated in this study may not 
reflect a fair state of corruption in the entire Bayelsa State, but they are the reality especially in 
OBCs and OICs from where participants were drawn from. It was the reality in those areas that 
this study focused on.  
I took steps to minimize the effect this small sample size may have on my study. First 
was to make the six local government areas covered in this study as homogeneous as possible by 
stratifying them into two communities of OBCs and OICs. I then used simple random sampling 
to select two OBCs and two OICs (see Chapter 4). Another step I took was to ensure that only 
people who have experience of the issues being studied such as youths, women, men, 
bureaucrats, oil company officials, and politicians in Bayelsa State were interviewed. Therefore, 
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I am highly confident that the findings from this dissertation is generalizable in groups and states 
that share the same conditions as those communities in Bayelsa State. 
The third and final limitation, although less significant but critical to this study, was 
language issue. I am fluent in Izon, Atissa, and Epketiama languages that made it easier for me to 
collect information using semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and participant 
observation from these ethno-linguistic groups. However, gathering information from other 
ethno-linguistic groups like Biseni, and Ogbein remained critical. 
8.3b Ethical Issues 
 For ethical reasons, I ensured that all participants in this study were not be below 18 
years at the time. Participants’ consents either in writing or oral were obtained before involving 
them in this study. Any identifying information of participants I collected were coded and stored 
in my field journal and tape recorder. I used pseudonyms instead of real participants’ names in 
my reports. I never granted anyone access to my field journal or tape recorder at any time during 
this research. All data collected through the semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, 
and participant observations were confidentially handled. Before I returned a tape recorder I 
borrowed from the International Conflict Management (INCM) program, I deleted every data I 
stored in it. At the end of writing my report, I destroyed every data that may connect my 
participants and/or their communities. I observed all other IRB’s protocols on the conduct of 
research. I took all these measures in order to ensure my participants’ confidentiality.  
8.4 Future Research Efforts 
Based on these limitations, further researches are needed on corruption in oil revenue 
redistribution in Bayelsa State and other states in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. My future 
research interests are on economic diversification, national and regional security, minority rights, 
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and conflicts in multi-ethnic societies in Africa, Latin America, and Middle East. A society that 
is dependent on a single resource face serious challenges. Do states have untapped resources? 
How are they utilizing their current resources? How can the untapped resources be tapped? What 
are the citizens’ inputs and benefits in the exploration, production, and use of these resources? 
What are the impact of a mono-cultural economy on a state and regional security? How citizens 
of a state participate in the exploration, production, and management as well as how much 
benefits they derive from these activities can control corruption and reduce conflicts in that 
society.  
Another vital area requiring some research efforts is the looting of public funds in 
Bayelsa State by its governors. How do we handle the conditions that enable the state governors 
to steal or loot public funds? Can Bayelsa and other states where public officials openly steal 
public funds enact new laws and establish new institutions that can deter whoever that may be 
elected as governor from engaging in corrupt behaviors? Some researchers like Adebayo (2012), 
HRW (2013), and Osoba (1996) have raised question on the ability of public officials to live 
above corruption. Questions posed in my dissertation for future research have not been 
answered. I will research on these questions in future and hope to find answers that can help 
states diversify their economies, reduce corruption in public service, and manage conflicts in 
their states and across nations for the benefit of everybody. 
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